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1.1 General Motivation  
While practitioners and researchers have for decades been carefully considering how 
quantitative data affects financial markets, we are just now beginning to explore the 
narratives that contextualize quantitative data in corporate disclosures. This is surprising, 
given that efficient market theorists like Fama (1970) assume that prices always "fully 
reflect" available information – whether quantified or described qualitatively. Considering 
the benefits derived from the analysis of quantitative data, it would be negligent to ignore 
the ever-increasing amount of qualitative information. This is especially so, since the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is pursuing its mission of ensuring efficient 
markets by mandating publicly traded firms to disclose significant information in numeric 
and textual form.1 The latter is hereby intended to explain and complement quantitative 
figures. It provides insights that extend beyond financial projections and measures, and 
reveals, for example, manager expectations or important qualifiers and caveats that are 
not evident from numerical data (Ferris et al., 2013). Thereby, the qualitative, textual form 
is superior to numeric data in that it gives managers more flexibility to express information. 
They decide how precisely and with which words a certain aspect shall be described. By 
contrast, the presentation and calculation of numeric data are often determined by 
accounting standards like GAAP (Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012).  
Yet, discovering and quantifying information from unstructured text is a nontrivial task. 
For a long time, the only way to process such data was to simply read the flood of 
disclosures provided by companies. Manual handling of the large number of textual 
documents available is, however, extremely time-consuming. In fact, stakeholders have 
been criticizing qualitative disclosures for being too long and difficult to understand. Even 
a distinguished expert like Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett once lamented: "Too 
often, I've been unable to decipher just what is being said or, worse yet, had to conclude 
that nothing was being said” (SEC, 1998). Thereby, not only pointing out difficulties in 
processing qualitative data, but also challenging the SECs mission by raising the question 
of whether qualitative information in corporate disclosures is truly informative. This is a 
challenging issue to solve, given the temporal and cognitive limitations of human beings 
that preclude large-scale analysis.  
                                                 
1 For more information on the SEC’s mission, visit: https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. 
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Only with the rise of computational power and the tremendously increasing online-
availability of text over the last few decades, computer-based techniques have emerged as 
a new way to analyze the vast amount of qualitative information provided by a plethora 
of firms. Easy access to data and analytical tools2 has enabled practitioners and researchers 
alike to process a variety of texts from different disclosure media (e.g., voluntary and 
mandatory corporate disclosures, news articles, and internet postings). In order to collect 
and quantify information from the narratives, they increasingly rely on machine-assisted 
methods, and analyze, for example, readability, sentiment, targeted phrases, or measures 
of document similarity. As a consequence, researchers have presented promising results in 
predicting the reactions of financial markets, underlining the tremendous importance of 
new ways of processing qualitative data. Textual sentiment has been linked, for instance, 
to abnormal stock returns (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; Jegadeesh and 
Wu, 2013), subsequent stock return volatility (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011 & 
2015), and future earnings and liquidity (e.g., Li, 2010). Readability on the other hand, is 
associated with stock return volatility (Loughran and McDonald, 2014), earnings 
persistence and earnings surprise (Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2014), analyst 
dispersion (Lehavy et al., 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2014), as well as investors’ 
trading behavior (Miller, 2010). Thus, these studies provide evidence that market 
participants incorporate more than just quantitative data in their decision making and 
would benefit from quick and efficient processing of disclosures. 
Although textual analysis has received considerable attention in the accounting and 
finance literature, the new research opportunities provided by computerization and 
digitization have not been used with the same intensity in the real estate industry. In fact, 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were explicitly excluded from the analysis, because of 
their different nature and regulatory requirements (e.g., underlying asset, distribution 
requirement). However, it is precisely these specific regulatory requirements of US REITs 
that make them an interesting starting point for an in-depth analysis. For example, the 
high dividend payout requirement of at least 90% of their taxable earnings allows only a 
limited cash reserve. Thus, REITs are highly dependent on external equity capital and must 
turn to the capital markets repeatedly, in order to take advantage of growth opportunities. 
As a result, US REIT managers have an unusually strong incentive to be transparent and 
maintain investor trust (e.g., Price et al., 2017), which ensures relatively high disclosure 
                                                 
2 A large number of corporate disclosures are publicly available on the SEC's EDGAR database, and open-source software 
such as Python and R make the analysis of qualitative data accessible to everyone. In addition, market participants can buy 





quality. In addition, the significance of the US REIT market, as evidenced by its recent 
market capitalization of $1,249,186.3 million as of December 31, 2020 for 223 listed 
REITs, suggests that the sector is worth investigating while providing an ideal laboratory 
to close this gap in the literature.  
This dissertation aims to provide first important insights in this regard by exploring whether 
qualitative data revealed in corporate disclosures of US REITs conveys valuable information 
to market participants, helping them to make well-informed investment decisions. In 
particular, the first paper comprising this thesis examines the informativeness of the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of US REITs. It investigates whether 
sentiment conveyed through the narrative is associated with future firm performance and 
whether it generates a market response. The second study exploits an unsupervised 
machine learning algorithm to identify the risk factors discussed in 10-Ks and evaluates 
the validity of this approach by analyzing the relation between the extracted risk-factor 
topics and stock return volatility after the filing date. The third article assesses whether 
linguistic issues are associated with underpricing, the phenomenon that an Initial Public 
Offerings’ (IPOs’) closing price at the end of the first trading-day is higher than its offer 
price.  To do so, it determines the level of uncertain language in IPO prospectuses, as well 
as their similarity to prospectuses filed up to six months prior to the document in question.  
Overall, this thesis is the first to conduct a comprehensive analysis on the informativeness 
of qualitative information provided in US REIT corporate disclosures. In particular, it 
investigates multiple disclosure media, uses different tools to process textual data, and 
analyzes various qualitative dimensions of text to assess whether and how the market 
reacts to qualitative information revealed by US REITs.   
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1.2 Research Questions 
While all three research articles focus on the informativeness of qualitative data revealed 
in corporate disclosures of US REITs, they differ in terms of disclosure media, 
methodologies, textual features, and outcomes investigated. This section provides an 
overview of the subject matter and the superordinate research questions addressed in the 
respective papers of this dissertation. 
 
Paper 1 | Is the MD&A of US REITs informative? A Textual Sentiment Study 
Paper 1 examines whether language disclosed in the MD&A of US REITs provides signals 
regarding future firm performance and thus generates a market response. Specifically, the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary, and a custom dictionary for the real 
estate industry created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018), are employed to determine the 
inherent sentiment, that is, the level of pessimistic or optimistic language for each filing. 
The central considerations can be stated as such: 
 Does textual sentiment in the MD&A of US REITs reveal managers’ expectations 
regarding future firm performance?  
 Does the market efficiently process the information conveyed through textual 
sentiment in the MD&A of US REITs? 
 Are the domain-specific wordlists by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) more appropriate to 
capture sentiment in the MD&A of US REITs? 
 Does the market react more strongly to negative information in line with the 
negativity bias shown in large body of psychology literature? 
 Do US REITs behave similarly to their industrial firm counterparts? 
 
Paper 2 | Can Risks be Good News? Revealing Risk Perception of Real Estate 
Investors using Machine Learning 
Paper 2 expands the analysis on annual reports and investigates the risk section. This 
section requires US REITs to specify risk factors that could adversely affect the company’s 
business and operations. To identify the individual risk topics disclosed in 10-Ks, this study 
uses a machine-assisted topic detecting modeling, specifically the Structural Topic Model 
(STM), and investigates the validity of this approach to quantifying risk in narrative form. 
The research questions are as follows:  
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 Do the STM extracted risk factors help to explain the perceived risk in the stock 
market? 
 How do the identified risk topics impact on investor risk perceptions? Are they risk-
reducing, risk-increasing, or boilerplate? 
 Is the risk-factor influence consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, mostly 
in the short-run, whereas fundamentals dominate the risk perception of investors 
in the long run? 
 Can a hybrid model, combining machine-assisted topic modelling and a classic 
factor, namely the number of words a firm allocates towards a specific risk, more 
efficiently explain investor risk perceptions? 
 Is the STM superior to more common approaches like Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA) and Correlated Topic Model (CTM) in identifying risk factors revealed in risk 
disclosures of US REITs?  
 Are the STM-identified risk factors capable of capturing changes in firms’ reporting 
behavior during or after extreme events such as the global financial crisis (2007-
2009)? 
 
Paper 3 | Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
Paper 3 concentrates on Form S-11, the initial document for registering US REIT IPOs with 
the SEC. Form S-11 constitutes one of the most important documents during the IPO 
process which informs investors about the firms’ business model, financial situation, 
potential problems or risks, and other important information. Recognizing that the vast 
majority of theories attribute underpricing to asymmetric information between the parties 
involved in the IPO, which can be reduced by both quantitative and qualitative information, 
this study investigates whether and how qualitative data in Form S-11 helps to explain 
initial-day returns of US REITs. The central research questions can be summarized as 
follows: 
 Does the qualitative information revealed in Form S-11 help to explain the 
underpricing of US REIT IPOs?  
 Does the language used in Form S-11 impact investor capability to price the issue? 
 Do higher levels of uncertain language in Form S-11 make it more difficult for 
investors to price the issue and thus increase initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs? 




 Does higher similarity to prior filings indicate that the filing contains a relatively 
high proportion of standardized content, but little useful information?  
 Does higher similarity to prior filings suggest that information asymmetries persist, 
leading to increased underpricing? 
 
1.3 Submissions and Conference Presentations 
This section summarizes the authorship, submission process, and conference participation 
for each of the three papers comprising this dissertation. 
 
Paper 1 | Is the MD&A of US REITs informative? A Textual Sentiment Study 
Authors:  
Marina Koelbl  
Submission:  
Journal:   Journal of Property Investment and Finance   
Submission Date:  12/08/2019 
Current Status:  published in Volume 38 Number 3 
Conference participation:  
The paper was presented at the Center of Finance Workshop “Artificial Intelligence and 
Finance” at the University of Regensburg in July 2019, at the 35th Annual Conference of 
the American Real Estate Society (ARES) in Paradise Valley, US, as well as at the 26th 
Annual Conference of the European Real Estate Society (ERES) in Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, 
France. 
 
Paper 2 | Can Risks be Good News? Revealing Risk Perception of Real Estate 
Investors using Machine Learning 
Authors:  
Marina Koelbl, Ralf Laschinger, Bertram I. Steininger, and Wolfgang Schaefers  
Submission:  
Journal:   European Accounting Review 
Submission Date:  03/01/2021 
Status:    Under Review until 05/18/2021 
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Journal:   Contemporary Accounting Review 
Submission Date:  11/12/2020 
Status:    Under Review until 01/30/2021 
Conference participation:  
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ARES Virtual Session 2020 and the 
IRES Symposium for Doctoral Students 2020, where the contribution earned the best 
presentation award. In 2021, the paper was presented at the AREUEA-ASSA Conference, 
the Cambridge Real Estate Seminar, the ERES Conference, and will be presented at the 
AREUEA-SINGAPORE Conference, and the annual conference of the “Verein für 
Socialpolitik” later this fall. 
 
Paper 3 | Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
Authors:  
Nino Paulus, Marina Koelbl, and Wolfgang Schaefers  
Submission:  
Journal:   Journal of Property Investment and Finance 
Submission Date: 06/04/2021 
Current Status:  Under Review 
Conference participation:  
The paper will be presented at the Center of Finance Workshop “Artificial Intelligence and 
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2 Is the MD&A of US REITs informative? A 
Textual Sentiment Study 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Purpose: This study examines whether language disclosed in the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) of US REITs provides signals regarding future firm performance and, 
thus generates a market response. 
Design/methodology/approach: This research conducts textual analysis on a sample of 
approximately 6,500 MD&As of US REITs filed by the SEC between 2003 and 2018. 
Specifically, the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary, and a custom 
dictionary for the real estate industry created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018), are employed 
to determine the inherent sentiment i.e., the level of pessimistic or optimistic language for 
each filing. Thereafter, a panel fixed effects regression enables investigating the 
relationship between sentiment and future firm performance, as well as the markets’ 
reaction. 
Findings: The empirical results suggest that higher levels of pessimistic (optimistic) 
language in the MD&A predict lower (higher) future firm performance. Hereby, the use of 
a domain-specific real estate dictionary, namely that developed by Ruscheinsky et al. 
(2018) leads to superior results. Corresponding to the notion that the human psyche is 
affected more strongly by negative than positive news (Rozin and Royzman, 2001), the 
market responds solely to pessimistic language in the MD&A.  
Practical implications: The results suggest that the market can benefit from textual 
analysis, as investigating the language in the MD&A reduces information asymmetries 
between US REIT managers and investors. 
Originality/value: This is the first study to analyze exclusively for US REITs, whether 
language in the MD&A is predictive of future firm performance and whether the market 
responds to textual sentiment.  
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2.2 Introduction 
In 1968 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced reporting 
requirements that mandate publicly traded firms to include a narrative disclosure, called 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), in their annual and quarterly reports. The 
justification for this requirement is as follows: “The Commission has long recognized the 
need for a narrative explanation of the financial statements, because a numerical 
presentation and brief accompanying footnotes alone may be insufficient for an investor 
to judge the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative of 
future performance. MD&A is intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the 
company through the eyes of management by providing both a short and long-term 
analysis of the business of the company.” (SEC, 1987).   
Although the MD&A is clearly meant to inform investors, and specific SEC rules for the 
MD&A as well as subsequent SEC releases give detailed instructions and interpretive 
guidance to assist companies in preparing their MD&A disclosures (Huefner, 2007), the 
informativeness of the MD&A has frequently been criticized. For example, Pava and Epstein 
(1993) show that although most of the companies they study accurately describe historical 
events, very few provide useful and accurate forecasts in their MD&As. However, early 
research examining the market implications of qualitative disclosure relied on human 
coders making item-by-item subjective assessments of tone (e.g., Bryan, 1997; Barron et 
al., 1999; and Callahan and Smith, 2004). Recognizing the limitations of manual coding 
(e.g., small sample sizes, subjectivity), whether the MD&A is truly informative remains an 
open empirical question. 
With the rise of behavioral finance in the last decade, this discussion was resumed and 
textual analysis has garnered increased attention, with the aim of assessing the 
informativeness of corporate disclosures. Thereby, researchers most frequently relied on 
textual tone analysis to examine firms’ prospectuses (Feldman et al., 2010; Jegadeesh and 
Wu, 2013; Li, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 & 2015). Furthermore, most studies 
reviewed a random sample of firms, restricted only by the availability of necessary data. 
However, Callahan and Smith (2004) find evidence that the impact of language varies 
across industries. 
This paper adds a new dimension to the discussion by analyzing MD&As for a sample of 
US REITs. In contrast to a sample randomly drawn from the capital market, the US REIT 
market provides a number of beneficial characteristics. First, equity REITs are fairly 
homogeneous regarding characteristics that usually vary widely across different industries 
(Hartzell et al., 2008). Second, US REITs are required to pay out a minimum of 90% of 
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taxable earnings to shareholders as dividends. Consequently, in order to take advantage 
of growth opportunities, US REITs must turn to the capital markets. As such, US REIT 
managers have an unusually strong incentive to be transparent and maintain investor trust 
(Danielsen et al., 2009; Doran et al., 2012; Price et al., 2017). Third, the underlying assets 
of US REITs are real estate, which is an illiquid, slow-moving asset and thus more 
compatible to analysis over a relatively large time-span (e.g., from one quarter to the 
subsequent quarter).  
These unique characteristics suggest that the MD&As of US REITs are particularly 
informative. However, the asset class’s peculiarities also indicate that results from previous 
studies cannot automatically be extended to US REITs. Thus, we investigate the 
information content of the MD&A for a US REIT sample by answering the following 
questions: Does textual sentiment in the MD&A reveal managers’ expectations regarding 
future firm performance? If so, does the market process the information efficiently?  
To extract sentiment from the MD&A, we rely on a dictionary-based approach. Specifically, 
we employ the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary and a custom wordlist 
for the real estate industry created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) to determine the overall 
sentiment inherent in each filing. Our findings suggest that higher levels of pessimistic 
(optimistic) language in the MD&A are associated with lower (higher) future firm 
performance. This holds even after controlling for the information released in other 
concurrent disclosures that may be predictive of future performance. Hereby, the use of a 
domain-specific real estate dictionary, namely the dictionary developed by Ruscheinsky et 
al. (2018) leads to superior results. Moreover, we find a significant market response to 
pessimistic language in the MD&A at the time of the SEC filing. However, corresponding 
to the notion that individuals are affected more strongly by negative than positive news, 
we cannot find a significant impact of optimistic language. Overall, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study providing evidence that the use of language in the MD&A 
reveals US REIT managers’ expectations regarding future firm performance and that the 
market responds to this information. We demonstrate that the market can benefit from 
textual analysis, as investigating the language in the MD&A should decrease information 
asymmetries between US REIT managers and investors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 discusses related literature. 
Section 2.4 introduces the data, that is, sample and variables. Section 2.5 defines the 
specific sentiment measures and presents empirical methods for the analysis. Finally, 
Section 2.6 reports the empirical results and Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.3 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development  
Textual analysis has recently attracted increased attention to address many pivotal 
questions in behavioral finance. Not least because in today’s world a huge amount of 
information is stored as text instead of numeric data (Nasukawa and Nagano, 2001). Apart 
from annual and quarterly reports or merely the MD&A, researchers have focused on 
multiple disclosure outlets such as earnings press releases and earnings conference calls 
(Henry, 2008; Davis et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2014; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012), news 
articles (Tetlock, 2007, 2008; Engelberg et al., 2012; Ferguson et al., 2015; Garcia, 2013; 
Heston and Sinha, 2017), and internet postings (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das and Chen, 
2007; Chen et al., 2014). Thereby, researchers have presented promising results in 
predicting the reactions of financial markets. Textual sentiment has been linked, for 
example, to abnormal stock returns (Feldman et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; Jegadeesh 
and Wu, 2013, Heston and Sinha, 2017), trading volume (Tetlock, 2007; Garcia, 2013), 
subsequent stock return volatility (Loughran and McDonald, 2011 & 2015), and future 
earnings and liquidity (Li, 2010).  
Although textual analysis has received considerable attention in the accounting and 
finance literature, real estate still lags behind. Only recently, have researchers focused on 
textual sentiment in the context of the real estate market. For example, Doran et al. (2012) 
and Price et al. (2017) analyze transcripts and audio files of earnings conference calls for a 
REIT sample, to show that sentiment impacts initial reaction-window abnormal returns. In 
creating a custom dictionary for the real estate domain, Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) find 
media sentiment to lead future REIT market movements. Beracha et al. (2019) apply the 
newly developed wordlists to news abstracts of the Wall Street Journal and provide 
evidence that news-based sentiment has predictive power for the direct commercial real 
estate market in the US. In related literature, Hausler et al. (2018) link news-based 
sentiment to total returns of the US securitized and direct commercial real estate market. 
Most recently, Carstens and Freybote (2019) investigate how institutional REIT investors 
react to an ‘abnormally’ positive tone disclosed in annual and quarterly reports of US REITs. 
They find institutional REIT investors to respond positively (negatively) to an abnormally 
positive tone and behave as net buyers (net sellers) in periods of institutional REIT investor 
optimism (pessimism). 
Interestingly, a substantial body of literature focuses on how investor sentiment affects the 
real estate market. Thereby, researchers usually rely on surveys (Das et al., 2015; Marcato 
and Nanda, 2016; Freybote, 2016) or market-based indicators, such as the closed-end fund 
discount (Lin et al., 2009), buy-sell imbalances (Freybote and Seagraves, 2017) or mortgage 
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fund flows (Clayton et al., 2009; Ling et al., 2014) to measure investor sentiment. The 
major difference between investor sentiment and textual sentiment is that the former 
presents the subjective judgments and behavioral characteristics of investors, while the 
latter could include the former, but also contains the more objective reflection of 
conditions within firms, institutions and markets (Kearney and Liu, 2014). The connection 
between textual sentiment and investor sentiment is complex and the extent to which they 
are casually related has not yet been thoroughly examined or understood (Kearney and 
Liu, 2014). Nonetheless, prior research has linked investor sentiment, among others, to 
pricing and market returns in the commercial real estate market (Clayton et al., 2009; Ling 
et al., 2014), REIT returns (Lin et al., 2009; Das et al., 2015), REIT bond pricing (Freybote, 
2016), as well as institutional investor trading behavior (Das et al., 2015). In sum, prior 
findings on investor sentiment indicate that real estate is sensitive to sentiment.  
This paper conducts textual analysis on the MD&A section of annual and quarterly reports 
- a section that mandates managers to provide information on past performance, current 
financial positions, and future prospects. Since the structure and content of the MD&A are 
fixed, managers are “legally obligated to touch upon” subjects they would probably avoid 
in voluntary disclosure outlets like earnings press releases or conference calls (Buffett, 
1998). In other words: analyzing a mandatory disclosure medium, namely the MD&A, 
guarantees a relatively high level of preparation, while still allowing managers considerable 
leeway on how to present the company's business, financial conditions, and results of 
operation. Assuming that executives report their views truthfully (under SEC scrutiny and 
penalty of litigation), it can be argued that statements released by management have high 
predictive ability.  
Given the abovementioned features of the MD&A, and results of prior (investor sentiment) 
studies indicating that real estate is prone to sentiment, we expect the narrative to provide 
information regarding future US REIT performance. Against this background we test the 
the following hypothesis to assess the informativeness of the MD&A for a US REIT sample:  
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of total pessimistic (optimistic) language disclosed in the 
MD&A of US REITs is negatively (positively) associated with future firm performance.  
If management shares information about the firm’s prospects with investors through 
disclosures in SEC filings, then market reaction should be associated with the nonfinancial 
information disclosed by management in the MD&A section. To assess whether the market 
accurately processes information delivered in the MD&A of US REITs, we test the following 
hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 2: Pessimistic (optimistic) language disclosed in the MD&A is negatively 
(positively) associated with market returns around the SEC filing date. 
 
2.4 Data 
To answer our research questions, we use two types of dataset: (1) the text corpus given 
by corporate annual and quarterly reports, as well as (2) real estate return data, and firm 
fundamentals. 
2.4.1 Management Discussion and Analysis  
While management can use a variety of formal and informal methods to communicate 
with investors, we focus on annual and quarterly reports, more precisely on the MD&A. 
This section is particularly suitable for the analysis, because the SEC mandates publicly 
traded firms to express expectations regarding future firm performance in this section. Our 
initial sample contains all Equity REITs present in the FTSE NAREIT All REITs Index at any 
point of time between January 2003 and December 2018.3,4 We start the analysis in 2003, 
because the SEC issued new guidelines for preparing MD&As, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
increased disclosure requirements in this year. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
some firms remain in the index all through the sample period, whereas other enter, exit or 
both enter and exit. Based on NAREIT information, the number of index constituents 
increased from 144 in 2013 to 186 in 2018 (see Figure 2.1 in the Appendix). At present, 
leading players in terms of market capitalization are American Tower Corporation, Simon 
Property Group, Inc., Crown Castle International Corp., Prologis, Inc., and Public Storage 
(see Figure 2.2 in the Appendix). To access the corresponding filings electronically, we 
employ the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. 
Thereafter, the MD&A is extracted from the entire SEC filing by filtering for the item 
number. For annual reports, we capture the portion of the filing that is assigned to “Item 
7.”, whereas for quarterly reports one has to seek “Item 2.”. This procedure yields a sample 
of almost 10,000 observations consisting of 268 unique firms. 
                                                 
3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a United States federal law that set new or expanded requirements for 
all US public company boards, management and public accounting firms. 
4 Mortgage REITs are excluded from the analysis because of their different characteristics. 
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2.4.2 REIT Return Data and Firm Fundamentals  
For each filing in the sample, we further collect a number of accounting and financial 
market variables. All accounting and financial market data is derived from Compustat, 
CRSP, or I/B/E/S.56  
Regarding the dependent variables for our tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we 
require measures of future firm performance and market returns centered on the SEC filing 
date. To measure future firm performance, we use the real-estate-specific measure funds 
from operations per share (FFO/Share) for the quarter after the company filing date. In 
contrast to common performance variables like ROA or Tobin’s Q, which carry investment 
properties at historical cost, this metric takes into account the market value of assets. In 
accordance with NAREIT guidelines, the FFO is calculated as net income excluding gains 
or losses from sales of properties and adding back real estate depreciation.7  To measure 
market response to language disclosed in the MD&A, we calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) relative to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over the three-day 
window centered on the filing submission date (-1 day to +1 day).8  We additionally 
investigate alternative time periods using CAR(-1,5), and CAR(-1,10), where the distinct 
reaction-windows are specified within parentheses. 
To account for additional quantifiable information in SEC filings besides language, control 
variables like Firmsize, REV, Leverage, SUE, MB, ROE, Liquidity, Volatility are included in 
each regression. Those variables are likely to be associated with future firm performance 
and the market response around the filing submission date. We describe all control 
variables below, and provide specific definitions, including Compustat data items in Table 
2.10 in the Appendix.    
First, we measure the current quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) as the 
difference in I⁄B⁄E⁄S actual earnings per share and the most recent mean analyst forecast 
estimates, scaled by the stock price. However, when there are no analyst forecasts for the 
particular quarter, we follow Feldman et al. (2010) and calculate SUE as Compustat income 
before extraordinary items for the current quarter, minus income for the previous quarter, 
scaled by the market value of equity. We also measure the market-to-book value (MB) as 
the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity. SUE and MB serve as control 
                                                 
5 Center for Research on Securities Prices 
6 Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
7 As a non US GAAP measure the FFO is rarely reported and definitions differ. Thus, no FFO data is 
available on Compustat before 2007 and later, many data points are missing. 
8 We also separately run our analysis using the CRSP equal-weighted index for computing abnormal 
returns. The untabulated results are robust to the variation. 
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variables for the information in other concurrent disclosures that may predict future 
performance. Additionally, we collect the current quarter’s return on equity (ROE) that is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by the common equity. ROE is 
included to capture persistence in performance metrics. Finally, we include various firm-
structure variables. The variables Firmsize and REV control for firm size. The variable 
Firmsize is defined as the logarithm of the firm’s total assets, whereas REV represents the 
difference between current quarter sales and sales in the previous quarter. Leverage and 
Volatility are proxies for firm risk. Leverage is defined as total liabilities scaled by total 
assets, and Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the most 
recent quarter. We also control for Liquidity using the ratio of traded shares to shares 
outstanding. 
Unfortunately, not all accounting and financial market data is available for each 
observation in the sample. We eliminate any SEC filing for which we do not have the 
necessary data, which results in a final sample of roughly 6,500 observations.  
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
FFO/Share [$] 0.544 0.432 5.451 - 3.449 0.968 
CAR(-1,1) [$] - 0.001 0.000 0.106 - 0.117 0.033 
CAR(-1,5) [$] - 0.003 - 0.003 0.166 - 0.200 0.055 
CAR(-1,10) [$] - 0.003 - 0.002 0.139 - 0.163 0.045 
Firmsize [mm $] 3.360 3.423 4.442 1.332 0.579 
REV [mm $] 3.180 1.084 121.768 - 112.235 27.219 
Leverage 0.575 0.574 1.111 0.044 0.168 
SUE 0.000 0.000 0.220 - 0.266 0.036 
MB 2.544 1.968 17.579 - 6.859 2.832 
ROE 0.014 0.014 0.285 - 0.263 0.054 
Liquidity 0.459 0.388 1.829 0.000 0.325 
Volatility [$] 6.132 2.447 50.692 0.071 9.310 
 
2.5 Methodology 
2.5.1 Dictionary-based Approach 
The pioneering work of Tetlock (2007) is arguably among the first applications of the 
dictionary-based approach in the financial domain. Examining news articles from The Wall 
Street Journal, Tetlock emphasizes that high values of media pessimism induce downward 
pressure on market prices, and that unusually high or low pessimism predicts temporarily 
high market trading volumes. Subsequently, several papers followed his example and relied 
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on dictionary-based approaches to extract qualitative information from text. Thereby, 
researchers frequently employed general English language dictionaries such as the Diction 
or the Harvard GI wordlists (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2012; Davis 
and Tama-Sweet, 2012). However, Loughran and McDonald (2016) argue that most 
researchers used only the GI and Diction wordlists, because these lists were the first ones 
readily available. Henry and Leone (2016) claim that general dictionaries tend to lack 
predictive power in a financial context, since the language used in the accounting and 
finance domain tends to be very specific. To overcome this issue and to enable the 
generation of accurate and efficient sentiment scores, researchers developed dictionaries 
specific to the finance domain. The first of these is the Henry wordlist (Henry, 2008). 
However, the 85 negative words included in Henry’s dictionary are sparse to gauge 
sentiment efficiently (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). Subsequently, Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) created a dictionary specifically for financial text by examining word 
usage in 10-Ks (thereafter referred to as LM dictionary). In contrast to the Henry list, this 
dictionary is quite extensive and contains 354 positive and 2,355 negative words.9 Only 
recently, Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) adjusted the LM dictionary for their investigation on the 
impact of media-sentiment in real estate markets. Comparing headlines from Bloomberg, 
The Financial Times, Forbes and The Wall Street Journal to the wordlists of the LM 
dictionary, the researchers added words that are considered positive or negative in the 
context of real estate, and removed other words that have a rather different or unclear 
classification. In total, 197 words were added to the wordlists, whereas 43 words were 
deleted. Overall, the real estate dictionary contains 408 positive and 2,455 negative words. 
Indeed, recent studies recognize the researchers’ efforts and confirm the superiority of 
domain-specific wordlists (Rogers et al., 2011; Doran et al., 2012; Henry and Leone, 2016).  
In sum, both, the LM dictionary as well as the custom wordlists of Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
are derived from the word use in corporate filings, and thus match the subject of our 
textual corpus very well. While the first dictionary focusses solely on the language generally 
used in financial texts, the latter takes into account terminology specific to the real estate 
industry. For example, words like ‘bubble’, ‘crash’, or ‘depression’ that clearly convey 
sentiment in the context of real estate are included in the adjusted wordlists of Ruscheinsky 
et al. (2018), although missing from the original LM wordlists. Therefore, this paper 
employs both dictionaries: (1) the financial dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
and (2) the real estate-specific dictionary of Ruscheinsky et al. (2018). 
                                                 
9 Revised version currently available at: https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/ 
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2.5.2 Sentiment Measures 
To extract sentiment from the textual corpus, i.e., the MD&A, we employ the 
abovementioned dictionaries, to categorize all words in the narrative into either positive 
or negative. However, in order to facilitate the procedure and to reduce linguistic 
complexity, firm disclosures are pre-processed. In this respect, punctuation, numbers, 
symbols, and stopwords are removed. The remaining text is organized in a document-term 
matrix (DTM) in order to visualize the occurrence of each word in the textual corpus. The 
rows represent the documents or filings, columns are the words appearing in the 
document and cells are designed to capture how often each term was used in the 
document. Finally, applying either dictionary to the matrix allows easy computation of the 
number of positive and negative words in each filing. This raw count of words is 
inappropriate as a measure of tone however, because simple frequencies obviously depend 
on document length. To solve this problem, we use the ratio of negative (positive) words 
to the total number of words in the MD&A to assess the disclosure tone:  
 = 	
  (2.1) 
 = 		
  (2.2) 
Both NEG and POS range from 0 to 1, whereby a higher value indicates a greater level of 
pessimism or optimism, respectively.   
Additionally, we follow Henry and Leone (2016) and employ a relative measure, which 






By construction, Tone is bound between −1 and 1. Hence, the variable allows deciding 
rapidly, whether a text is relatively positive (if greater than 0) or relatively negative (if less 
than 0).   
All measures of language are calculated from the LM dictionary (NEGLM, POSLM, ToneLM) 
and the dictionary created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) (NEGRE, POSRE, ToneRE). Table 2.2 
displays the descriptive statistics of all six sentiment measures.  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Sentiment Measures  
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
NEGLM 0.017 0.016 0.038 0.006 0.006 
POSLM 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.004 0.003 
ToneLM - 0.224 - 0.237 0.344 - 0.674 0.208 
NEGRE 0.018 0.017 0.040 0.006 0.006 
POSRE 0.013 0.013 0.025 0.005 0.004 
ToneRE - 0.131 - 0.138 0.472 - 0.660 0.233 
 
2.5.3 Model Specification  
To test the ability of our measures of language to predict future firm performance, defined 
as the FFO/Share in the quarter subsequent to the current quarter (Hypothesis 1), we 
estimate the following fixed-effects regression model for all six measures of tone: 
 ℎ⁄  =  + !	" "#$ +  %&$ + $ + ' + #$ (2.4) 
In this model, 	 denotes the firm, and  the period. In addition to the measure of language, 
the regression equation includes a vector of control variables consisting of firm 
characteristics and previous market variables such as Firmsize, REV, Leverage, SUE, MB, 
ROE, Liquidity, and Volatility. All control variables are defined in Table 2.10 in the 
Appendix. The regression variables $ and ' indicate that we account for unobserved firm 
and time effects. #$ represents the error term. To account for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation, the models are estimated using white robust standard errors.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that language in the MD&A is associated with market returns around 
the filing submission date. We regress CAR (i.e., the cumulative abnormal return relative 
to the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio) over the distinct reaction-windows 
(CAR(-1,1), CAR(-1,5), CAR(-1,10)) on our measures of sentiment, so as to gauge the 
incremental market response to language. Again, the model is estimated employing a 
fixed-effects regression with robust standard errors: 
()* =   + !	" "#$ + %&$ + $ + ' + #$ (2.5) 
Apart from a vector of control variables that includes firm characteristics as well as 
variables that might have information content for predicting future market returns, we 
include unobservable firm and time effects.  
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2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Main Regression Results 
Future Firm Performance  
The results of the panel fixed-effects regression regarding the association of language in 
the MD&A and future firm performance (Hypothesis 1) are displayed in Table 2.3. 
Regressions are run for all six measures of language (NEGLM, POSLM, ToneLM, NEGRE, POSRE, 
ToneRE).  
Table 2.3: Future Firm Performance - FFO/Share 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept - 0.708* - 0.960** - 0.972** - 0.691* - 1.089** - 0.788**  
 (0.079) (0.027) (0.017) (0.079) (0.010) (0.044)  
Firmsize 0.375*** 0.422*** 0.407*** 0.372*** 0.397*** 0.359***  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  
REV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (0.513) (0.486) (0.484) (0.510) (0.498) (0.525)  
Leverage 0.279* 0.284* -0.306* 0.280* 0.305* 0.299*  
 (0.098) (0.092) (0.079) (0.097) (0.079) (0.082)  
SUE - 0.020 0.053 0.042 0.020 0.045 0.038  
 (0.953) (0.879) (0.905) (0.954) (0.897) (0.913)  
MB - 0.001 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.000  
 (0.928) (0.998) (1.000) (0.917) (0.967) (0.951)  
ROE 0.172 0.236 0.214 0.175 0.222 0.179  
 (0.445) (0.310) (0.352) (0.439) (0.344) (0.431)  
Liquidity - 0.113 - 0.129* - 0.125* - 0.114 - 0.124* - 0.109  
 (0.128) (0.089) (0.099) (0.124) (0.098) (0.137)  
Volatility 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**  
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.021) (0.030)  
NEGLM - 9.530***       
 (0.004)       
POSLM  - 6.360      
  (0.315)      
ToneLM   0.096     
   (0.403)     
NEGRE    - 9.432***    
    (0.002)    
POSRE     9.698**   
     (0.025)   
ToneRE      0.297***  
      (0.001)  
N 6,648 6,648 6,648 6,648 6,648 6,648  
R2 0.321 0.319 0.319 0.321 0.320 0.321  
Adj. R2 0.292 0.291 0.291 0.292 0.291 0.293  
see next page  
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Table 2.3: continued  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 
see Table 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Concerning the sentiment measures derived from the LM dictionary, we find a negative 
and significant coefficient on the measure of negative language (NEGLM), suggesting that 
pessimistic language disclosed in the MD&A provides information about future 
performance. However, we cannot find a significant impact of the remaining two 
sentiment measures. The coefficients on both the measure of optimistic language (POSLM) 
as well as on the tone measure (ToneLM), are statistically insignificant at common levels.
  
In contrast, we find statistically significant coefficients on all three measures of language 
derived from the real-estate-specific dictionary of Ruscheinsky et al. (2018). Thus, the 
measure of negative language (NEGRE), the measure of positive language (POSRE) as well as 
the tone measure (ToneRE) significantly predict future firm performance, and all coefficients 
have the expected sign. While pessimistic language in the MD&A negatively affects future 
firm performance, the opposite is true for optimistic language.10  
Since the measure of positive language, and the tone measure derived from the LM 
dictionary, both lack statistical significance, we find the dictionary of Ruscheinsky et al. 
(2018) to be more appropriate for capturing sentiment in the MD&A of US REITs. This is 
consistent with recent studies by Rogers et al. (2011), Doran et al. (2012), and Henry and 
Leone (2016) who provide evidence of the superiority of domain-specific wordlists. 
Although both the LM wordlists as well as the dictionary developed by Ruscheinsky et al. 
(2018) are suitable for a financial context, the latter benefits from the researchers’ efforts 
to capture terminology specific to the real estate industry. 
Market Response  
Next, we examine whether language in the MD&A is related to market returns around the 
filing submission date (Hypothesis 2). Tables 2.4 to 2.6 present the regression results for 
the alternative reaction-windows (i.e., CAR(-1,1), CAR(-1,5), CAR(-1,10)). 
  
                                                 
10 In unreported results, we find that sentiment affects future firm performance up to one year. This 
corresponds to a sluggish real estate market with inherently illiquid assets and long transaction 
periods. 
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Table 2.4: Market Response CAR(-1,1) 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept 0.007 - 0.001 0.000 0.007 - 0.002 0.000  
 (0.394) (0.858) (0.973) (0.348) (0.835) (0.988)  
Firmsize - 0.001 0.000 0.000 - 0.001 0.000 0.000  
 (0.682) (0.898) (0.943) (0.661) (0.849) (0.904)  
REV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.253) (0.221) (0.224) (0.251) (0.211) (0.231)  
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (0.626) (0.657) (0.584) (0.635) (0.652) (0.615)  
SUE - 0.015 - 0.014 - 0.014 - 0.015 - 0.014 - 0.014  
 (0.357) (0.388) (0.373) (0.361) (0.387) (0.378)  
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.250) (0.304) (0.301) (0.244) (0.309) (0.297)  
ROE - 0.005 - 0.003 - 0.004 - 0.005 - 0.003 - 0.003  
 (0.472) (0.700) (0.600) (0.469) (0.702) (0.613)  
Liquidity - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001  
 (0.811) (0.683) (0.723) (0.803) (0.670) (0.731)  
Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.759) (0.659) (0.699) (0.770) (0.658) (0.696)  
NEGLM - 0.284***       
 (0.004)       
POSLM  - 0.082      
  (0.715)      
ToneLM   0.003     
   (0.333)     
NEGRE    - 0.288***    
    (0.002)    
POSRE     - 0.086   
     (0.637)   
ToneRE      0.003  
      (0.347)  
N 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586  
R2 0.104 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.103  
Adj. R2 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 
see Table 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Table 2.5: Market Response CAR(-1,5) 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.008  
 (0.215) (0.720) (0.531) (0.208) (0.659) (0.523)  
Firmsize - 0.004 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.004 - 0.003 - 0.003  
 (0.246) (0.458) (0.368) (0.244) (0.483) (0.347)  
REV 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*  
 (0.094) (0.080) (0.084) (0.093) (0.080) (0.088)  
see next page  
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Table 2.5: continued  
Leverage 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004  
 (0.626) (0.624) (0.595) (0.631) (0.640) (0.618)  
SUE 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020  
 (0.425) (0.411) (0.414) (0.421) (0.407) (0.410)  
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.586) (0.674) (0.657) (0.581) (0.664) (0.651)  
ROE - 0.011 - 0.008 - 0.009 - 0.011 - 0.008 - 0.009  
 (0.282) (0.408) (0.361) (0.283) (0.417) (0.370)  
Liquidity - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002  
 (0.707) (0.612) (0.640) (0.698) (0.605) (0.642)  
Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.865) (0.969) (0.924) (0.856) (0.964) (0.927)  
NEGLM - 0.333**       
 (0.026)       
POSLM  0.063      
  (0.835)      
ToneLM   0.004     
   (0.393)     
NEGRE    - 0.326**    
    (0.022)    
POSRE     - 0.059   
     (0.810)   
ToneRE      0.003  
      (0.430)  
N 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586  
R2 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128  
Adj. R2 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.091 0.090 0.090  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 
see Table 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Market Response CAR(-1,10) 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.005  
 (0.484) (0.656) (0.546) (0.515) (0.506) (0.741)  
Firmsize - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.003 - 0.003  
 (0.254) (0.314) (0.278) (0.269) (0.466) (0.409)  
REV 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.044)  
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (0.813) (0.803) (0.797) (0.814) (0.855) (0.826)  
SUE - 0.018 - 0.018 - 0.018 - 0.018 - 0.017 - 0.018  
 (0.670) (0.673) (0.672) (0.672) (0.684) (0.677)  
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.543) (0.563) (0.555) (0.547) (0.545) (0.569)  
ROE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001  
 (0.992) (0.974) (0.992) (0.997) (0.944) (0.929)  
see next page  
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Table 2.6: continued  
Liquidity 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002  
 (0.633) (0.656) (0.643) (0.641) (0.682) (0.681)  
Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.829) (0.861) (0.835) (0.836) (0.843) (0.895)  
NEGLM - 0.094       
 (0.601)       
POSLM  0.085      
  (0.804)      
ToneLM   0.002     
   (0.649)     
NEGRE    - 0.067    
    (0.686)    
POSRE     - 0.374   
     (0.182)   
ToneRE      - 0.003  
      (0.441)  
N 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586 6,586  
R2 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.135  
Adj. R2 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.099 0.099  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 
see Table 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 
 
We find a negative and significant coefficient on NEGLM and NEGRE for the three-day and 
the six-day windows, respectively. This suggests that pessimistic language in the MD&A is 
associated with lower abnormal returns at the time a firm files its 10-K or 10-Q with the 
SEC. However, the coefficient becomes insignificant during the CAR(-1,10) window, 
indicating that the impact of language is fully incorporated into the stock price by that 
time. In contrast to the measures of pessimistic language (NEGLM, NEGRE), we cannot find a 
significant impact of either optimistic language (POSLM, POSRE) or the tone scores (ToneLM, 
ToneRE) on market returns. 
Given that results on the FFO/Share reveal that managers disclose positive as well as 
negative expectations regarding future firm performance, the asymmetrical relation 
confirms the notion of an existing negativity bias. A large body of psychology literature 
shows that negative information has more impact and is more thoroughly processed in a 
number of contexts (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001).  
Overall, our findings indicate that US REITs behave similarly to their industrial firm 
counterparts in some cases and differently in others. On the one hand, prior research in 
accounting and finance links language disclosed in the MD&A to future performance (Li, 
2010; Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012). On the other hand, analyzing a random sample of 
firms, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) state that tone in corporate disclosures has no impact 
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on abnormal returns. This suggests that REIT investors more efficiently process information 
disclosed by firm executives. Accordingly, Hausler et al. (2018) argue that real estate 
markets are especially prone to sentiment because of their characteristics such as low 
transparency, information asymmetry, illiquidity, and long transaction periods. 
2.6.2 Robustness 
Performance Measures 
In addition to the real-estate-specific performance measure FFO/Share, we test our 
hypothesis employing the return on assets (ROA). This measure is used frequently as an 
independent performance variable, but seems to be less applicable to the REIT industry, as 
the variable does not reflect the market value of investment properties. Nonetheless, as 
shown in Table 2.7, the empirical results are consistent with our findings based on the 
FFO/Share. More precisely, our results confirm that higher levels of pessimistic (optimistic) 
language in the MD&A predict lower (higher) firm performance in the quarter after the 
filing submission date. Again, the use of the dictionary from Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
improves the predictive power of the sentiment measures. 
Table 2.7: Future Firm Performance - ROA 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept 0.016* 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.014  
 (0.095) (0.390) (0.232) (0.136) (0.421) (0.143)  
Firmsize - 0.002 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.002  
 (0.542) (0.813) (0.650) (0.595) (0.680) (0.472)  
REV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.644) (0.536) (0.573) (0.614) (0.602) (0.673)  
Leverage - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.002 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.003  
 (0.429) (0.504) (0.557) (0.447) (0.511) (0.492)  
SUE 0.007 0.007* 0.007 0.007 0.007* 0.007*  
 (0.108) (0.095) (0.102) (0.104) (0.095) (0.094)  
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000  
 (0.818) (0.973) (0.909) (0.840) (0.993) (0.865)  
ROE 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011***  
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Liquidity - 0.002** - 0.003** - 0.002** - 0.002** - 0.002** - 0.002**  
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.043)  
Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.633) (0.539) (0.628) (0.622) (0.516) (0.658)  
NEGLM - 0.199***       
 (0.000)       
POSLM  0.047      
  (0.619)      
see next page  
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Table 2.7: continued  
ToneLM   0.004***     
   (0.002)     
NEGRE    - 0.152***    
    (0.002)    
POSRE     0.191***   
     (0.002)   
ToneRE      0.006***  
      (0.000)  
N 6,649 6,649 6,649 6,649 6,649 6,649  
R2 0.447 0.442 0.445 0.445 0.444 0.448  
Adj. R2 0.424 0.419 0.422 0.422 0.421 0.424  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 




We further compare observations that occurred during the financial crisis of 2007/2008 to 
a sample excluding the crisis. For the subsample representing the financial crisis, neither 
of the sentiment measures is statistically significant at common levels (Table 2.8). This is 
not surprising, since all measures of language are derived from the MD&A. The narrative 
is authored by firm executives and as such depends substantially on their truthfulness and 
expectations regarding future performance. If executives are uncertain about future 
performance, measures of language suffer predictive power. Especially after the enormous 
decrease in values and firm results at the beginning of the financial crisis, executives were 
extremely insecure about future performance. In contrast, the subsample excluding the 
crisis supports the predictive power of textual sentiment (Table 2.9). On balance, regression 
coefficients can be interpreted reliably as the true casual effects of language on 
performance. However, language in the MD&A is less accurate as a predictor of future 
performance during recessions.  
Table 2.8: Future Firm Performance - Financial Crisis of 07/08 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept - 5.224* - 5.686* - 5.884* - 5.129* - 5.765* - 5.664*  
 (0.096) (0.072) (0.071) (0.098) (0.073) (0.083)  
Firmsize 1.093 1.324 1.264 1.073 1.260 1.200  
 (0.257) (0.185) (0.210) (0.262) (0.217) (0.231)  
REV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (0.375) (0.431) (0.383) (0.369) (0.387) (0.378)  
Leverage 3.191*** 3.128*** 3.113*** 3.205*** 3.178*** 3.158***  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  
SUE - 0.252 - 0.206 - 0.113 - 0.277 - 0.181 - 0.155  
 (0.774) (0.809) (0.894) (0.752) (0.836) (0.856)  
see next page  
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Table 2.8: continued  
MB 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008  
 (0.768) (0.758) (0.762) (0.770) (0.763) (0.766)  
ROE - 0.183 - 0.162 - 0.178 - 0.182 - 0.194 - 0.186  
 (0.696) (0.729) (0.701) (0.697) (0.683) (0.692)  
Liquidity 0.154 0.154 0.140 0.157 0.144 0.143  
 (0.453) (0.450) (0.494) (0.442) (0.478) (0.487)  
Volatility 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035**  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)  
NEGLM - 6.499       
 (0.699)       
POSLM  - 34.722      
  (0.143)      
ToneLM   - 0.220     
   (0.644)     
NEGRE    - 8.248    
    (0.592)    
POSRE     - 8.082   
     (0.571)   
ToneRE      - 0.063  
      (0.875)  
N 806 806 806 806 806 806  
R2 0.427 0.430 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.427  
Adj. R2 0.321 0.324 0.321 0.321 0.320 0.320  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 
see Table 2.10 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Table 2.9: Future Firm Performance - without Financial Crisis of 07/08 
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) 
 
  
Intercept - 0.570 - 0.813* - 0.808* - 0.557 - 0.927* - 0.623  
 (0.209) (0.093) (0.079) (0.209) (0.051) (0.161)  
Firmsize 0.358*** 0.399*** 0.385*** 0.356*** 0.373*** 0.337***  
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)  
REV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.665) (0.632) (0.634) (0.664) (0.659) (0.690)  
Leverage 0.181 0.183 0.202 0.181 0.198 0.198  
 (0.356) (0.350) (0.314) (0.358) (0.322) (0.321)  
SUE - 0.019 0.000 - 0.008 - 0.019 - 0.006 - 0.006  
 (0.960) (1.000) (0.984) (0.960) (0.988) (0.989)  
MB - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.003 - 0.002 - 0.003  
 (0.759) (0.809) (0.807) (0.752) (0.831) (0.770)  
ROE 0.190 0.256 0.234 0.194 0.241 0.190  
 (0.489) (0.366) (0.402) (0.483) (0.395) (0.491)  
Liquidity - 0.183** - 0.196** - 0.193** - 0.184** - 0.192** - 0.178**  
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021)  
Volatility 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005*  
 (0.090) (0.074) (0.083) (0.093) (0.065) (0.091)  
see next page  
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Table 2.9: continued  
NEGLM - 9.122***       
 (0.004)       
POSLM  - 4.688      
  (0.481)      
ToneLM   0.096     
   (0.418)     
NEGRE    -8.901***    
    (0.004)    
POSRE     10.406**   
     (0.035)   
ToneRE      0.312***  
      (0.001)  
N 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842 5,842  
R2 0.319 0.318 0.318 0.319 0.318 0.320  
Adj. R2 0.287 0.286 0.286 0.287 0.287 0.288  
White robust p-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test. For complete definitions, 




The SEC instructs firm executives to signal expectations regarding future firm performance 
in the MD&A. However, it is uncertain whether the narrative provides enough information 
to enable investors “to look at the company through the eyes of management” (SEC, 
1987). We follow a recent stream of literature in behavioral finance and address this issue 
by employing techniques from other research areas such as computer science and 
computational linguistics. Specifically, we extract textual sentiment from the narrative to 
investigate whether language disclosed in the MD&A predicts future firm performance and 
generates a market response. In so doing, we limit the analysis to a sample of US REITs, 
which provides a number of beneficial characteristics compared to a sample drawn 
randomly from the capital market (e.g., industry jargon, homogenous firm characteristics, 
truthful managers, and slow-moving assets). We use the LM financial dictionary and a 
custom dictionary for the real estate industry created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018), to 
determine the overall sentiment inherent in each filing. 
Confirming the informativeness of the MD&A, we find that higher levels of pessimistic 
(optimistic) language in the MD&A are indeed associated with lower (higher) future firm 
performance. This holds even after controlling for the information released in other 
concurrent disclosures that may predict future performance. In accordance with prior 
literature from Rogers et al. (2011), Doran et al. (2012), and Henry and Leone (2016), the 
use of a domain-specific real estate dictionary, namely that developed by Ruscheinsky et 
al. (2018), leads to superior results. Furthermore, we find a significant market response to 
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pessimistic language in the MD&A at the time of the SEC filing. However, we do not find 
a significant impact of optimistic language. Overall, the empirical results suggest that 
managers deliver expectations about future performance, although corresponding to the 
notion that individuals are affected more strongly by negative news, the market does not 
process optimistic information efficiently.  
Our results suggest that the market can benefit from textual analysis, as investigating the 
language in the MD&A reduces information asymmetries between US REIT managers and 
investors. Nevertheless, one needs to be cautious when applying sentiment analysis. 
Employing the dictionary-based approach, researchers typically collapse a document down 
to a document-term matrix to generate sentiment measures. As a result, the direct context 
of a word is ignored, which discards all information that can be gained from word 
sequences. Thus, combinations of words or phrases that might imply different meanings 
from the constituent words are disregarded. A more recent stream of literature overcomes 
this issue by utilizing machine-learning approaches such as N-grams, support vector 
machines or naïve Bayes to classify the content of documents based on statistical inference 
(Li, 2010; Hausler et al., 2018). Hence, using a machine-learning approach to conduct the 
analysis would be worthwhile. Moreover, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) provide evidence 
that firm executives use the various available disclosure media to report strategically, or 
even use language deliberately to mislead investors (Huang et al., 2014). Therefore, it is 
advisable for future research to investigate multiple disclosure media (i.e., corporate annual 
or quarterly reports and the corresponding earnings press releases and conference calls) 
or more spontaneous indicators like pictures, gestures, and facial expressions to outwit 
executives. 
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2.9 Appendix 
Figure 2.1: NAREIT All Equity Index Constituents and Market Capitalization 
 
This figure shows the number of Equity REITs present in the FTSE NAREIT All REITs Index at any point of time 
between January 2003 and December 2018 as well as the total market capitalization over years. 
 
Figure 2.2: NAREIT All Equity Index Leading Players 
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Table 2.10: Variable definitions using Compustat data items 
Dependent Variables 
FFO/Share FFO scaled by shares outstanding (NIQ+SPPEY+(DPACREQt- DPACREQt-90))/CSHOQ 
AR Actual return – return on CRSP value-weighted market portfolio 
CAR Sum of AR over the reaction-window 
Control Variables 
Firmsize Logarithm of total assets log(ATQ) 
REV Current quarter sales – sales in the previous quarter (SALEQt-SALEQt-90) 
Leverage Total liabilities/ total assets (LTQ/ATQ) 
SUE 
Actual earnings – most recent mean analyst forecast from I/B/E/S scaled by the stock price 
(PRCCQ) 
MB Market to book value of common stock ((PRCCQ*CSHOQ)/CEQQ) 
ROE Income before extraordinary items/common equity as reported (IBQ/CEQQ) 
Liquidity Traded shares/shares outstanding (CSHTRQ/CSHOQ) 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily returns over the most recent quarter (PRCCD) 
This table describes the variables used and the corresponding Compustat data items. 
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3 Can Risks be Good News? Revealing Risk 




The SEC mandates firms to inform investors about their assessment of future contingencies 
in their 10-Ks. However lengthy and complex disclosures – mostly for dozens of firms in 
an investor’s portfolio – can barely be processed by a human being. To cope with the flood 
of information, we exploit an unsupervised machine learning algorithm, the Structural 
Topic Model, to identify the risk factors discussed in 10-Ks. We apply this algorithm to a 
US REIT sample between 2005 and 2019 to assess whether the probability of appearance 
of the extracted risk factors helps to explain the perceived risk on the stock market. We 
find that the majority of risk factors is significantly associated with volatility indicating that 
our machine-assisted modeling presents a valid approach to quantify risk disclosures in 
textual form. Furthermore, we investigate in which direction individual topics affect 
investor risk perception. Even if all kinds of directions exist, uninformative topics with no 
impact, increasing risk-perception topics, and decreasing risk-perception topics, the latter 
is clearly predominant. The predominance of the risk-reducing effect indicates that risk 
disclosures can indeed be considered good news as long as they clarify the implications of 
already known risk. 
 
Keywords: Risk, Textual Analysis, Machine Learning, Structural Topic Model, 10-K
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3.2 Introduction 
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investors can find precise risk 
information for a company of interest in the standardized report form of 10-Ks. The 
complex (inter-)relationship of risk can hereby be condensed and described quantitatively 
(e.g., volatility) or qualitatively (e.g., “the corona virus could have a material adverse effect 
on our business”). However, the qualitative form is the regular form, since companies are 
required to discuss “the most significant factors that make the company speculative or 
risky” within “Item 1A - Risk Factors” (SEC, 2005). Although all types of risk – whether 
quantified or described qualitatively – influence the decisions of managers and investors 
alike, mandatory risk disclosures in qualitative form (e.g., Item 1A) are less explored than 
quantitative information. This is mainly driven by how we are trained to make investment 
decisions – as a quantified trade-off between expected return and risk. Ignoring the 
information that is stored in textual data instead of numeric data would be negligent since 
the textual form gives managers more flexibility than numeric data to express or hide 
information about risk. They decide how precisely, with which words, and to what extent 
risk factors are described. By contrast, the presentation and calculation of numeric data 
are often determined by accounting standards like GAAP (Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012).  
The length and complexity make it increasingly difficult and time-consuming for investors 
to read and interpret disclosures. Our data show that the average length of Item 1A had 
increased from roughly 41,000 to 93,000 words between 2006 and 2019. The complexity, 
measured in years of formal education a person needs to understand the text, remains at 
a constantly high level of more than 20 years on average. Certainly, human investors are 
not able to handle the large quantity of corporate disclosures provided by dozens or 
hundreds of firms. 
We suggest solving this challenge using an unsupervised machine learning technique, 
which automatically clusters words around topics found in a large set of documents – the 
topic model. It assumes that documents are characterized as a collection of topics, and 
topics as a collection of words. This machine-assisted reading of text corpora enables 
uncovering latent topics in a relatively short time period in comparison to a human being. 
The underlying procedure is conceptually similar to factor analysis, where a large and 
complex dimensionality of variables is reduced to fewer factors (Dyer et al., 2017). 
However, previous studies indicate that topic modeling has the tendency to find already 
known factors; for example, the extracted topics across different industries are more likely 
identifiers for the known industries than common factors across industries.  
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To overcome this issue, we use advanced topic modeling approaches which allow that the 
topics correlate within documents (Correlated Topic Model, CTM) and covariate words 
describing similar (sub-)sectors can be excluded in order to clearly extract the common risk 
factors across firms (Structural Topic Modeling, STM). The text corpora in Figure 3.1 
illustrate why covariate words are important to extract the common risk factors. The 
identified words defining the topics using the traditional Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
correspond to the already known sectors – corpus A is provided by a firm in the healthcare 
sector and corpus B by a firm in the residential sector. At the same time, both corpora 
address the topic “Legal & Litigation Risk” which is identified by STM as the common topic. 
Thus, STM allows extracting common factors across documents by excluding the already 
known factors (e.g., healthcare and residential) and their corresponding words. 
Figure 3.1: Stylized Illustration of LDA and STM 
 
 
This figure shows text corpora provided by a firm in the healthcare sector (Corpus A) and a firm in the residential 
sector (Corpus B). Both corpora address the topic “Legal & Litigation Risk” which is identified by STM as the 
common topic. Words associated with the topic “Legal & Litigation Risk” are highlighted in yellow. Words 
associated with the LDA topic “Health Care” are highlighted in blue. Words associated with the LDA topic 
“Residential” are highlighted in red. Words associated with either the metadata covariate “Health Care” or 
“Residential” are in bold. 
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An appealing testing ground for our textual analysis procedure is presented by the REIT 
industry for multiple reasons. First, while the sector is characterized by relatively 
homogenous business models and firm characteristics, different investment foci or 
property types (e.g., healthcare, residential) are salient and distract the LDA from extracting 
common risk factors (see Figure 3.1). Second, REITs’ 10-Ks guarantee a relatively high 
disclosure quality, given their high dividend payout requirement of at least 90% of their 
taxable earnings. Consequently, they have a very limited cash reserve and must turn to the 
capital markets repeatedly to raise funding for new projects. This regulation incentivizes 
that REITs are transparent, act for the long-term, and sustain investor trust (Danielsen et 
al., 2009; Doran et al., 2012; Price et al., 2017). Third, the real estate industry is 
characterized by a high number of institutional investors who are likely to process lengthy 
and complex disclosures in the form of 10-Ks. In addition, such investors are rarely driven 
by noise trading or herding behavior which irrationally influence the stock prices. In line 
with previous research, we expect investors to alter their perception of future firm 
performance and risk based on the firms’ disclosure (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Bao 
and Datta, 2014).  
To assess whether our machine-assisted topic detecting modeling presents a valid 
approach to quantify risk in narrative form, we analyze whether the STM extracted risk 
factors help to explain the perceived risk on the stock market. Indeed, we find that the 
majority of risk topics is significantly associated with volatility, confirming the effectiveness 
of our model. Furthermore, we disentangle how the identified risk topics explain investor 
risk perception, in addition to traditional firm characteristics. Although an initial intuition 
suggests that risks are per se negative, we primarily expect a risk-reducing effect of risk 
disclosures, since most risk factors are revealed in a timely manner through press releases 
or Form 8-K. Instead of disclosing new risk factors, Item 1A primarily provides essential 
information on risk factors that have already been communicated to investors using more 
frequent channels thereby reducing uncertainty and risk perception. In line with 
expectations, most of our identified factors follow the convergence argument indicating a 
risk-reducing effect. Consequently, it seems like executives’ concerns of adverse effects of 
disclosing “negative” information are baseless and risks described in 10 Ks can indeed be 
considered good news as long as executives clarify the implications of already known risk.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study applying advanced topic modeling 
(CTM and STM) to the accounting and finance domain. Both models yield superior results 
than previous textual analysis approaches like keyword counts or the LDA, whereas STM 
is even better than CTM. We thus add to the literature by proposing STM to quantify the 
risk described in disclosures at a higher level of granularity than previous methods. By 
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analyzing the topics’ generated vocabulary, the nature and scope of the disclosed risk 
factors can be identified. This allows assessing the stock market reaction to each risk factor. 
Finally, we close a research gap, since prior studies conducting textual analysis often 
exclude the banking, insurance, and REIT sectors due to their financial characteristics and 
legal requirements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 discusses related literature 
on mandatory risk disclosures and develops hypotheses. Section 3.4 explains the textual 
analysis procedures (i.e., LDA, CTM, and STM) and interprets the risk factors. The empirical 
methods for the analysis are presented in Section 3.5, while Section 3.6 introduces the 
data used and describes the variables. The empirical results are reported in Section 3.7, 
and Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.3 Previous Literature and Hypotheses Development  
3.3.1 Textual Analysis in Accounting and Finance 
Fueled by the rise of computational power and the tremendously increasing online-
availability of text, a growing body of literature in accounting and finance has focused on 
computer-based techniques to find and quantify information revealed in qualitative 
disclosures (e.g., media news, public corporate disclosures, analyst reports, and internet 
postings). Within the finance research, probably Tetlock (2007) provides the pioneering 
study by employing automated content analysis to extract sentiment from the Wall Street 
Journal’s column “Abreast of the Market”. He demonstrates, that media pessimism 
induces downward pressure on market prices and leads to temporarily high market trading 
volume. Thereafter, multiple studies analyze how sentiment predicts the reactions of 
financial markets. For example, Garcia (2013) processes finance news from The New York 
Times and provides evidence that positive words also help to predict stock returns. Tetlock 
et al. (2008) analyze firm-specific news from the Dow Jones News Service and The Wall 
Street Journal and prove that negative words convey negative information about firm 
earnings above and beyond stock analysts’ forecasts and historical accounting data. 
Antweiler and Frank (2004), Das and Chen (2007), and Chen et al. (2014) investigate the 
textual sentiment of internet messages. Hereby, Antweiler and Frank (2004) find evidence 
that the amount of message posting (activity) predicts market volatility and trading volume. 
Chen et al. (2014) figure out that the fraction of negative words contained in articles 
published on Seeking Alpha negatively correlates with contemporaneous and subsequent 
stock returns. Das and Chen (2007) make assumptions about the relationship between 
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textual sentiment and investor sentiment when interpreting textual sentiment or tone of 
internet messages as small investor sentiment. They link market activity to small investor 
sentiment and message board activity. Regarding the studies addressing corporate 
disclosures, textual sentiment has been found to be positively related to abnormal stock 
returns (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013), 
subsequent stock return volatility (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011, 2015), and future 
earnings and liquidity (e.g., Li, 2010).  
Further research investigates the readability of corporate disclosures and provides evidence 
that lower annual report readability is associated with increased stock return volatility 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2014), lower earnings persistence and higher earnings surprise 
(Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2014), larger analyst dispersion (Lehavy et al., 2011; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2014), as well as lower trading due to a reduction in small 
investor trading activity (Miller, 2010). Only recently, Cohen et al. (2020) use sentiment 
and multiple similarity measures to show that changes to the language and construction 
of corporate disclosures impact stock prices with a time lag. The authors conclude that 
investors need time to process complex and lengthy disclosures.  
This study contributes to the emerging literature on textual analysis by adopting a new 
perceptive. Instead of focusing on the tone conveyed through the narrative, the complexity 
of the language, or document similarity, we examine the individual risk factors disclosed 
in Item 1A of the annual reports. 
3.3.2 Textual Analysis of Risk Disclosures 
The literature in accounting and finance has applied various methods to assess a firms’ risk 
disclosure, which we classify in two categories. Within the first and more straightforward 
category, the entire risk disclosure is observed as a unit and its “size” is considered as a 
proxy for risk. Within the second and more sophisticated category, the individual risk itself 
comes to the forefront. The former category comprises studies that count risk keywords 
(e.g., Li, 2006; Kravet and Muslu, 2013) or rely on the total length of the risk section (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 2014; Nelson and Pritchard, 2016) to measure firms’ risk disclosures. 
Hereby, increased levels of risk disclosure are linked to higher stock return volatility (Kravet 
and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014), trading volume (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), and 
lower future earnings and stock returns (Li, 2006). Although these straightforward 
approaches allow the user to process a large number of textual documents which is 
beyond human capacity, they obviously lose a lot of information written in the text.  
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Only recently and within the latter category, researchers have started to focus more on the 
written content by making use of machine learning approaches to identify and quantify 
the individual risks. In this context, the unsupervised machine learning approach Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is most popular for finding the individual risks discussed in firms’ 
filings. The outcomes are manifold: Israelsen (2014), for example, examines the association 
between the risks disclosed in Item 1A and stock return volatility, as well as betas of the 
Fama-French Four-Factor model. Employing a variation of the LDA, Bao and Datta (2014) 
analyze whether and how risk disclosures affect investor risk perceptions. Their findings 
indicate that some risk factors increase or decrease investor risk perceptions, and thus lead 
to higher or lower post-filing return volatility, whereas others have no effect at all. Gaulin 
(2017) uses disclosed risk factors to analyze disclosure habits and suggests that managers 
time the identification of new risks, as well as the removal of previously identified ones, to 
match their expectations of adverse outcomes in the future. Recently, Lopez-Lira (2019) 
demonstrates the importance of risk disclosures by providing a factor model that uses only 
identified firm risk factors to explain stock returns and performs as least as well as 
traditional models, without including any information from past prices.  
The key benefit of machine learning approaches is that they do not require predefined 
rules (i.e., a priori determined keywords) to identify risk factors. Instead, risk factors or in 
general topics derive naturally from fitting the statistical model to the textual corpus, based 
on word co-occurrences in the documents. 
3.3.3 Hypothesis Development 
Common to all approaches, whether straightforward or sophisticated, is that they attempt 
to quantify qualitative information in risk disclosures without the need for a human being 
to read them. However, quantifying risk disclosures in the form of Item 1A is quite 
challenging given that firms neither reveal the likelihood that a disclosed risk will ultimately 
affect the company, nor the quantified impact a risk might have on the firm’s current and 
future financial statements. Thus, risk disclosures might inform the reader, for the most 
part about a vague range, but certainly not the level of future performance (Kravet and 
Muslu, 2013). Nevertheless, assuming that firm executives truthfully report their views 
(under SEC scrutiny and penalty of litigation), it can be argued that detailed firm-specific 
information is provided in Item 1A. In fact, previous research (e.g., Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
Bao and Datta, 2014) finds a stock market reaction to risk disclosures confirming its 
informativeness.  
Recognizing that management’s discretion entails considerable leeway in deciding which 
risks to disclose and how much of the filing is allocated to a particular risk-factor topic, we 
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assume that this proportion provides valuable information on how companies assess the 
probability of occurrence and the extent of the risks. Accordingly, the topic distribution in 
the filing could serve as a proxy for risk disclosures, allowing investors to quantify the 
information provided in narrative form.  
Hypothesis 1: The probabilities of the appearance of the extracted topics in textual risk 
reports present significant explaining factors in empirical models analyzing investor risk 
perception. 
In line with the intention of mandatory risk disclosures to warn of future adverse outcomes, 
sophisticated investors process disclosures and alter their expectations of future firm 
performance accordingly. While intuition might suggest that risks are per se negative, 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) define three opposing arguments regarding how risk disclosures 
affect the risk perception of investors. The first argument suggests that investor risk 
perceptions remain unaffected since risk disclosures are vague and boilerplate in nature 
because managers are likely to disclose all possible risks and uncertainties without 
considering their impact on businesses just to be on the safe side (null argument). The 
second argument states that risk disclosures reveal unknown risk factors or risk-increasing 
facts about known risk factors causing diverging investor opinions and increasing risk 
perceptions (divergence argument). The third argument assumes that executives use 
disclosures to resolve firms’ known risk factors or give more facts about known risk factors 
and thus, reduce risk perceptions (convergence argument). 
Contradicting the null argument, Loughran and McDonald (2020) find that less than 21% 
of 10-Ks filed in 2018 forewarn of the adverse effects of a pandemic in general. Given the 
lessons learned of other disease outbreaks (e.g., SARS or swine flu) over the last decade, 
it seems like pandemics should have long been identified as a potential global risk and 
more firms should have addressed them in their filings if they just want to be on the safe 
side. Furthermore, it seems quite unlikely that previously unknown risk factors and 
contingencies are revealed in Item 1A (divergence argument), which is published only once 
a year, given that firms are required to promptly file 8-Ks, whenever “material” events take 
place.11  Contingencies that do not require a Form 8-K might be discussed in press releases 
or even materialize before they are published in Item 1A. Therefore, it is likely that Item 
1A primarily provides essential information on risk factors that have already been 
communicated to investors through more frequent channels, instead of disclosing new risk 
factors. For example, the current pandemic, which has so far only been presented as a risk 
                                                 
11 According to the SEC (2012), “the types of information required to be disclosed on Form 8-K are 
generally considered to be ‘material,’ … [meaning] there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider the information important in making an investment decision.” 
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factor in very few reports, is now known to investors as a risk anyway. Investors’ 
expectations regarding the adverse effects of the pandemic have already been 
incorporated into prices when the company finally specifies them in its report. Thus, the 
detailed information regarding the pandemics’ influence on the firm in Item 1A may reduce 
risk perceptions and converge investors’ opinions. We thus formulate our second 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The majority of the risk factors present a risk-reducing effect, supporting 
the convergence argument. 
 
3.4 Textual Analysis with Machine Learning 
3.4.1 Topic Modeling 
The Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is the most frequently used topic modeling approach 
in the scientific literature; it is borrowed from genetic science (Pritchard et al., 2000) and 
transferred to machine learning by Blei et al. (2003), who named it after the Dirichlet 
distribution. It is a mixture model, thus generating the probabilities of co-occurring topics 
(subpopulation) within the distribution over all words (population).  Put simply, the mixture 
model aims to break documents down into topics, whereby the words within each topic 
co-occur most frequently. Thus, applying the LDA to a textual corpus results in two data 
structures in the output. The former presents the probability of appearance of each topic 
in each document ( +,), with documents being indexed by -. The latter lists a set of words 
and their probabilistic relation with each of the extracted topics (.), with topics being 
indexed by /.  
LDA comes with the limitation that the Dirichlet distribution assumes almost uncorrelated 
topics. However, they are likely correlated since particular topics are likely to occur at the 
same time. For example, a shopping mall firm pointing out that the loss of the anchor 
tenant is a potential risk, may also talk about related risks such as the impact of e-
commerce on the retail business. These covariances are addressed by Blei and Lafferty 
(2007) in their Correlated Topic Model (CTM) method. Also, the CTM is a mixture model 
but replaces the Dirichlet distribution with a logistic normal distribution in order to include 
the covariance structure among topics. Surprisingly, it is not very often applied even if Blei 
and Lafferty (2007) show the theoretical and practical importance of a covariance structure 
by using 16,351 Science articles. Employing a smaller collection of articles, they calculate 
the log likelihoods of the held-out data given a model estimated from the remaining data. 
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A higher likelihood of the held-out data indicates a better model. They find that CTM is 
always superior to LDA for altering the number of topics from 5 to 120.12   
The Structural Topic Modeling (STM) by Roberts et al. (2019) goes even one step further 
and incorporates metadata of pre-specified covariates, not only covariances, to 
disentangle the unique topics. Again, it remains a mixture model based on a logistic normal 
distribution, which is the same as CTM if it ignores the covariates. In order to allow the 
algorithm to find topics beyond the already known identifiers (see Figure 3.1 and 
discussion in the Introduction for healthcare vs. residential), we include property types as 
metadata covariates. More details on the STM algorithm are given in the next sections and 
Appendix A presents technical details of the STM. 
To compare CTM and STM, we conduct an analysis similar to that described above and 
performed by Blei and Lafferty (2007). We fit a smaller collection of documents to a varying 
number of topics (between 10 and 25) and calculate the residuals, lower bounds, and log 
likelihoods of the held-out data. For example, the better a model fits the higher is the 
probability of the held-out data. All three measures indicate a better fit for STM over CTM 
for the full range of topic numbers (see Figure 3.2, Panel A-C). Additionally, topic modeling 
requires an a priori determination of the number of topics to be generated. All comparison 
measures indicate directly or converge to a topic number of 20 as the best number. 
Consequently, we extract 20 individual risk factors from the risk reports. 
Figure 3.2: Comparison of CTM and STM 
Panel A: Residuals  
  







                                                 
12 This paper provides only an overview of LDA and CTM); for deeper insights, we refer to the 
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Figure 3.2: continued 
Panel B: Lower Bound (in millions)  
  
Panel C: Held-Out Likelihood  
  
This figure shows the standard criteria for comparing different topic models, namely residuals regarding the text 
corpora, lower bound and held-out likelihood with a standard of 20 percent. On the left hand side and identical 
scale, the STM outperforms the CTM on our data set. The right side shows two different scales for each model to 
clarify the turning points of optimization process for a different number of topics (K) within each model. 
 
Based on the superiority of CTM over LDA (see, Blei and Lafferty, 2005), and STM over 
CTM and LDA (see, Roberts et al. (2014), we focus on the use of STM in or later analysis 
so that we assume that covariates describe pre-specified subsectors. Nevertheless, we 
verify our decision by applying LDA and CTM (see Section 3.7.4). 
3.4.2 Topic Identifications 
To apply the STM to our textual corpus, we use the programming language R (version 
4.0.2) and the corresponding package STM, authored by Roberts et al. (2019). As often 
done in machine-learning-based text analysis methods, several preprocessing steps are 
necessary before running the topic model. First, we reduce documents to individual words 
or tokens and clean the data by removing white spaces, numbers, and punctuation. 
Second, relying on the “stop word” list provided by the STM package, words like ‘and’, 
‘or’, and ‘the’ are removed from the corpus, since they lack semantic information, and 
thus do not help to identify the topics. Third, we eliminate infrequent words (e.g., 
Argentina, banana, bio-fuel) to avoid their influence. More precisely, we remove words 
appearing in fewer than 20 disclosures. On the one hand, this threshold rules out words 
occurring solely in 10-Ks of one particular firm, since we have 14 years of observations 
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to an individual topic, and thus introduce noise into the process. Excluding them ensures 
the robustness of the algorithm, and in addition, increases computational speed (Papilloud 
and Hinneburg, 2018). Unlike Roberts et al. (2019), we do not stem the words and instead 
use explicit word inflections for reasons of interpretability. This abandonment is supported 
by Schofield and Mimno (2016), who find that stemming does not improve topic stability, 
and possibly even degrades it. 
3.4.3 Risk Factor Topics 
Although topic-modeling approaches allow classifying textual data without further 
instruction by the user, the topics created by the algorithm do require interpretation. More 
specifically, a human being has to assign labels with an assessment of the most plausible 
content to the algorithm-based topics, which are only equipped with a number and a set 
of words most frequently associated with each topic. In order to label the risk-factor topics 
appropriately, we read a random sample of disclosures comprising 2% of the overall 
sample. Two of us then independently reviewed the word lists comprising the 20 highest 
associated terms for each risk-factor topic. As recommended by Roberts et al. (2019), we 
also inspected documents that were considered to be highly associated with a specific 
topic, and thus, are expected to represent the topic most clearly. 
Following this procedure, we entitled, for example, topic #1 “Transaction” including words 
such as ‘unenforceable’, ‘origination’, ‘repurchases’, and ‘sale-leaseback’. Topic #8 labeled 
“Capital Products and Market” contains words such as ‘nyse’ (New York Stock Exchange), 
‘cdo’ (Collateralized Debt Obligation), ‘servicer’, and ‘electronically’. The frequent 
appearance of phrases such as ‘plaintiffs’, ‘defendant’, ‘supreme’, and ‘prejudice’ suggests 
that the corresponding topic #13 is related to “Legal & Litigation risk”. The STM also 
reveals topics related to the “REIT Status”, “Property Risk”, “IT”, “Tax”, and “Politics”. Table 
3.5 in Appendix B presents the 20 highest associated words for each risk factor topic and 
the corresponding name. 
For some topics, however, it is more difficult to find a one-title-fits-all label. For example, 
topic #10 of contains phrases such as ‘hackers’, ‘terrorists’, ‘libor’, and ‘tcja’ (Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act), and thus, the interpretation is somewhat blurry or mixed. In this case, examining 
disclosures including these keywords can be helpful in finding the missing link among the 
STM-identified words for a topic, being able to find a generic topic and interpret its 
meaning. The annual report of Boston Properties, Inc. in 2018 discusses certain ‘risks 
associated with security breaches through cyber attacks’, ‘terrorist attacks may adversely 
affect the ability to generate revenues’, and ‘tax changes that could negatively impact 
financials’ in close proximity to each other. A deeper look into the documents shows that 
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numerous disclosures raise these risks directly one after the other. Given that topic models 
rely on word co-occurrences and ignore visual clues (e.g., subsection titles, boldface fonts, 
extra spacing) or logical coherence, the resulting “mixture of topics” is the consequence. 
At a higher level, however, topic #10 can be subsumed as “Contingencies”.  
Similarly, polysemy – the capacity for a word to have multiple meanings – makes it harder 
to label topics, at least for non-professionals. At first glance, the words ‘migration’ and 
‘recycling’ do not fit with the other words in topic #5 of Item 1A (e.g., ‘moodys’, ‘poors’) 
which intuitively entails the label “Rating”. However, the word ‘migration’ may also be 
used in the context of ‘rating migration’ and ‘recycling’ might refer to ‘capital recycling’ 
which may be the reason for a rating upgrade or downgrade. 
 
3.5 Model Specification 
When applying the STM to our textual data, we pre-specify risk-factor topics along with 
their frequency of appearance in each individual 10-K. To assess whether the probability 
of appearance of the STM extracted risk factors helps to explain the perceived risk on the 
stock market and how risks affect investor risk perception, we regress these frequencies 
(Freq_Topics) on the firms’ stock return volatility (Vola) by using the following two-way 
fixed-effects regression model: 
0$ =  +  !1_3	&$ +  %($ + $ + ' + #$ , (3.1) 
where 	 denotes the firm, and  the year. In addition to the vector of frequencies of the 
individual risk topics (Freq_Topics), the regression equation includes a vector of control 
variables (Controls). The parameters $ and ' incorporate the unobserved firm and time 
effects and #$ is the error term. The two-way fixed effects model is most applicable for 
our analysis since we aim to investigate the specific differences between individuals in a 
micro panel dataset covering roughly 14 years (Wooldridge, 2010). To produce consistent, 
efficient, and unbiased estimates, we examine whether any of the models’ assumptions 
are violated. Employing Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to check for multicollinearity, we 
find values greater than 5 for Topic #7, Topic #11, Topic #14, and Topic #18. Thus, these 
topics are explained by all other topics by at least 80% each, so that we exclude these 
topics from our later analysis. In doing so, we apply a stricter threshold often applied 
(greater than 10 or 90% is explained by the other topics), since we prefer to have a 
parsimonious model with fewer variables, which make it less susceptible to spurious 
relationships and harder to verify that our topics are significant. The VIFs of the remaining 
variables are within the range of 1.1 and 4.4. 
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3.6 Data 
To test our hypotheses, we combine multiple datasets: (1) the text corpus given by Item 
1A of the annual 10-Ks obtained from EDGAR, (2) investors’ risk perception proxied by 
stock volatility from CRSP, as well as (3) firms’ financial fundamentals obtained from 
Compustat or Thomson Reuters, and information besides the pure risk description 
disclosed in their filings that could affect investor activity. 
3.6.1 Textual Corpus 
Since this study analyzes mandatory risk disclosures in 10-Ks of US REITs, our sample begins 
with the earliest date when Item 1A was available (December 1, 2005), and extends 
through the fiscal year-end 2019.13  In contrast to other studies focusing on the entire 
firm-year sample available from the Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
database, we limit our examination to a single industry, namely the REIT industry. Our 
sample consists of all Equity REITs present in the FTSE NAREIT All REITs Index at any point 
of time during the sample period. Mortgage REITs are excluded from the analysis because 
they differ in characteristics (e.g., underlying asset, risk structure), exposed risk factors, and 
are recognized as more difficult to value for external investors (Buttimer et al., 2005). 
Whereas 25 firms remain in the index throughout the sample period, 221 firms enter, exit, 
or both enter and exit. The corresponding filings are downloaded from the SEC’s EDGAR 
database. To extract Item 1A, we parse the 10-K forms, employing the edgarWebR 
package in R, which assigns each line of the report to a particular section of the annual 
10-K. Thereafter, the risk factor section can be extracted by searching for the item number 
(1A). Firm-year observations that lack necessary control variables or stock prices are 
excluded, resulting in an overall sample of roughly 1,230 observations consisting of 199 
unique firms. The limiting variables are the control variables and not the risk factors (see 
Table 3.1 for more details about N). 
Figure 3.3 displays the sample composition of the 10-Ks over years; it mostly follows the 
number of Equity REITs included in the FTSE NAREIT All REITs Index over the same time 
                                                 
13 Actually, there is a second risk section in the 10-K. Item 7A should list “quantitative and qualitative 
disclosures about market risk” which are relevant for a company (e.g., interest rate risk or foreign 
currency exchange risk). However, Item 7A differs from Item 1A in that this section not only names 
but additionally quantifies the impact of the individual risk factors on future firm performance. Thus, 
managers usually use numbers to describe how risk factors affect firms’ filings in this section. 
Additionally, with an average length of only 6,680 words, Item 7A is just a tenth of the average 
length of Item 1A. Given that our method focuses on textual data i.e., the words used to 
qualitatively describe relevant risks, we exclude Item 7A from the main analyses. This is essential 
because topic models cannot take numbers into account and shorter documents decrease the 
robustness of the topic model because it “learns” less from the data (Papilloud and Hinneburg, 
2018). However, for reasons of completeness, results for Item 7A are presented in Appendix D. 
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period. For some years, the observations exceed the number of index constituents, since 
we include a REIT in our sample if it was a constituent at some point during the period. 
We thus take into account survivorship bias and address index effects like greater investor 
and analyst attention to firms listed in an index. The number of observations is also driven 
by the data availability on CRSP and Compustat. 
Figure 3.3: Sample Distribution over Years 
 
This figure shows the number of observations included in the sample and the number of Equity REITs present in 
the FTSE NAREIT All REITs Index over years. 
 
3.6.2 Metadata Covariates  
To apply the STM to the textual corpus, we include the property type of the respective 
REIT as metadata covariate. We, therefore, assign the property type as classified by CRSP 
Ziman to each filing. The metadata covariate “Retail” is, for example, accompanied by the 
words ‘shopping’, ‘goods’, ‘e-commerce’, ‘consumer’, ‘malls’, and ‘anchor’. The words 
‘hotels’, ‘leisure’, ‘travelers’, ‘room’, and ‘franchise’ are instead typically associated with 
the lodging industry. Observations assigned to the category ‘Unknown’, meaning that the 
firm is not assigned to a type for this year in the Ziman dataset are excluded from the 
analysis. The group ‘Unclassified’ includes asset classes like Timber, Data Centers, 
Infrastructure, and Specialty. These STM-derived word sets for each metadata covariate, 
describe the specifics of each asset class impressively well. Table 3.6 in Appendix B shows 
the full list of metadata covariates, along with their covariate words. 
Contrary, topics identified by LDA highly correspond to the investment types (see Table 
3.13 in Appendix C). For example, LDA Topic #1 corresponds to “Health Care”, LDA Topic 
#4 to “Residential”, and LDA Topic #9 to “Retail” to name a few (see discussion in the 
Introduction for healthcare vs. residential and Table 3.13 in Appendix C). Moreover, the 
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to Ziman property types. Specifically, we find that disclosure frequencies are mostly driven 
by 1-3 property types (see Table 3.14 in Appendix C). 
3.6.3 Investors’ Risk Perception 
Our primary variable of interest is the perceived risk on the stock market. Since risk is 
typically measured by the stock return volatility, we use volatility after the filing submission 
date on the dependent side of our model. Volatility is thereby derived from the daily closing 
prices from CRSP. We assume that investors and analysts need time to process lengthy 
disclosures and do not immediately update their predictions. However, it is unclear how 
long it takes until investors read 10-Ks, and new information is incorporated into price 
changes. Thus, we apply multiple testing periods for firms’ stock return volatility after the 
10-K filing is published – a 5, 40, and 60 trading-day period. We thereby cover the entire 
period from the 10-K filing date to the next 10-Q that may report changes in risk factors. 
The 5 trading-day period gives investors and analysts enough time to read, interpret and 
react to disclosures while being short enough to minimize the influence of other disruptive 
events that may also affect volatility. The 60 trading-day period accounts for investors 
comparing risk factors disclosed in 10-Ks to changes disclosed in 10-Qs.14  
We define volatility as the standard deviation of daily log returns (over the corresponding 
testing period) extrapolated to the 5, 40, and 60 trading-day periods after the 10-K filing 
day. 
04 = √ ∗ 7∑ (9:(!;<)=>?)?<@A
B
4=!  , 
(3.2) 
where  C {5, 40, 60}. 
This procedure enables capturing volatility induced by the information released in the 10-
K, but does not, in contrast to the common approach, use the 252 trading-day volatility 
to calculate current volatility. We see a 252 trading-day window as too diluted since it 
includes price-sensitive information over the entire prior trading year. Thus, past 
information that is already known and has been incorporated into prices, would be 
extrapolated to the testing period. Additionally, the standard deviation over a 252 trading-
day window would cause autocorrelation problems after adding lag volatility for the 252 
days before the 10-K filing date, since the majority of the time window overlaps, see Figure 
3.4, Panel A.  
 
                                                 
14 We additionally analyze the 10 and 20 trading-day periods. As expected, the results are in the 
intermediate ranges. 
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Figure 3.4: Volatility around Publication Date 
Panel A: T-day Method 
 
Panel B: Lagged Volatility 
This figure contrasts the common approach using the 252 trading-day volatility to calculate current volatility to 
our T-day method (Panel A). Panel B shows the lagged volatility measure. 
 
By contrast, our T-day method of volatility testing surveys volatility, starting from the filing 
publication date until the end of the processing period. To account for the problem of 
autocorrelation due to volatility clustering around specific dates and other influencing filing 
events, we include a lagged volatility measure in the model as a control variable. This 
variable gauges the standard deviation T days before the publication date, see Figure 3.4, 
Panel B. 
3.6.4 Control Variables  
To control for information beyond the risks revealed in Item 1A that might affect investor 
activity, a set of control variables is included. Besides firm characteristics, performance, 
and risk measures, we additionally consider textual 10-K characteristics that previous 
research has revealed as determinants of return volatility. We describe all control variables 
below, and provide more specific definitions, including Compustat data items, in Table 3.7 
in Appendix B. We cluster the controls into two subsets: accounting-based/market-based 
and textual.  
For the first of the two, we include the REIT-specific performance measure Funds From 
Operations per share (FFO/Share), to incorporate the real-estate-specific income 
characteristics. Thus, we follow NAREIT’s guidelines by adding amortization and 
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depreciation to the net income and subtracting the net of gains and losses originated by 
the sale of assets from the net income. Since FFO/Share is a performance measure, we 
expect a negative coefficient sign. The variable Size, measured as the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s total assets, is included in each regression. In line with Fama and French (1993), 
we expect its coefficient to be negative, as small firms are more volatile than large firms. 
Leverage is a common proxy for firm risk, so that we expect the variable to be positively 
related to volatility. The motivation for the next two factors is purely at the operating 
level – the annual change in revenue (ΔREV) as well as sales growth (Sales_Growth). ΔREV 
is defined as current sales or rental income less prior year sales. Sales_Growth is calculated 
as REV scaled by total assets in the previous year. We expect a positive influence from both 
variables. 
In the subset of market-based controls, Beta proxies the firm risk similar to Leverage, so 
that we expect a positive nexus to volatility. BTM is calculated as the book value of equity, 
scaled by the market capitalization of equity. Our expectations of the coefficient on Book-
to-Market (BTM) are ambiguous. On the one hand, the coefficient could be positive if 
market participants have little confidence in the future prospects of a firm. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on BTM will be negative if growth opportunities are positively related 
to firm risk (Fama and French, 1993; Campbell et al., 2014).  
Additionally, we include the stock return volatility (Lag_Vola) for T trading-days before the 
10-K filing date, to control for positive correlation in the short-run, and information 
released in other outlets as the 10-K. We expect a positive relationship between the pre- 
and post-filing-date volatility. We also include the stock return volatility of the S&P 500 
(VolaS&P) for T trading-days before the 10-K filing date, as a benchmark for changes in 
market-level return volatility and expect a positive coefficient. The change of a firms’ 
average daily trading volume from the symmetric period of T trading-days before to after 
the 10-K is filed (ΔVolume), serves as a factor of the economic interactions in the financial 
market. In addition to stock price changes, trading volume conveys important information 
about the underlying economic forces. We expect that higher changes in the trading 
volume go in line with higher volatilities. Furthermore, the percentage of institutional 
ownership (IO), defined as the sum of shares held by institutional investors, divided by the 
shares outstanding, is incorporated as obtained from Thompson Reuters. Institutional 
investors have higher capacities to process 10-Ks, and thus could react in a timely manner 
to the disclosed information, causing a positive coefficient on IO. Conversely, the 
coefficient could be negative if the long-term orientation of sophisticated investors is 
predominant and they behave inertially. 
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Finally, we include additional controls related to the textual content. Since other research 
shows that the number of words (in Item 1A) is positively related to stock return volatility 
after the disclosure date (Campbell et al., 2014), we incorporate the natural logarithm of 
the total text length of the risk sections (Text_Length). To account for higher information-
processing costs due to complex language, we additionally incorporate the readability of 
the risk sections, measured by the Gunning fog index (FOG). 
3.6.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables – STM’s frequencies for the risk 
factor topics (Freq_Topic) of Item 1A and the control variables. STM reveals additionally to 
the risk-factor topics (.), the frequencies for these topics (+,), see Section 3.4. These 
frequencies sum to 1 within each document but not over all documents. We observe rather 
small topic frequencies for Item 1A by looking at the means; the highest is around 7.6% 
for Topic #16, the lowest for Topic #14 at 2.2%. An equal distribution over all topics would 
result in 5% (1/20) for each topic. Focusing on the extreme values (Min and Max), we see 
that all topics constitute the core of any 10-K filing (lowest Max is 99.8%) or are practically 
not discussed (highest Min is 0.0004%). The probabilities of all topics are extremely 
skewed in distribution so that we use a log transformation of these factors in our later 
regressions, but present here, the percentage figures for easy comprehension. By using 
the Shapiro and Wilk’s test, we can conclude that the logs of the risk factors are normally 
distributed (Royston, 1982). The correlation coefficients among the logged risk factors are 
not higher/lower than 0.47/-0.63 (Table 3.8 in Appendix B). Thus, the topics have no direct 
linear relationship, but as shown in Section 3.5, the VIF for 4 topics (#7, #11, #14, and 
#18) is high. Thus, these topics are explained substantially by a linear combination of the 
other topics, so that we exclude them from our later analysis and restrict our model to 
topics that mostly convey new information. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Item 1A 
Freq_Topic 1 2,207 5.121 20.447 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.017 99.940 
Freq_Topic 2 2,207 5.043 20.626 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.020 99.934 
Freq_Topic 3 2,207 2.441 13.409 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.055 99.773 
Freq_Topic 4 2,207 3.968 17.793 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.036 99.901 
Freq_Topic 5 2,207 3.475 16.227 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.044 99.835 
Freq_Topic 6 2,207 4.828 19.686 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.020 99.934 
Freq_Topic 7 2,207 3.715 17.584 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.025 99.894 
Freq_Topic 8 2,207 4.317 18.118 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.043 99.877 
Freq_Topic 9 2,207 4.883 20.521 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.020 99.978 
Freq_Topic 10 2,207 4.813 16.571 0.000 0.011 0.024 0.116 99.870 
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Table.3.1: continued 
Freq_Topic 11 2,207 3.330 15.479 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.025 99.959 
Freq_Topic 12 2,207 6.648 23.855 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.024 99.939 
Freq_Topic 13 2,207 6.406 22.932 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.028 99.932 
Freq_Topic 14 2,207 2.221 13.626 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012 99.973 
Freq_Topic 15 2,207 5.477 21.310 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.022 99.952 
Freq_Topic 16 2,207 7.566 25.358 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.019 99.939 
Freq_Topic 17 2,207 6.527 23.341 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.023 99.939 
Freq_Topic 18 2,207 7.043 23.956 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.036 99.983 
Freq_Topic 19 2,207 6.913 23.799 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.025 99.975 
Freq_Topic 20 2,207 5.265 21.145 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.020 99.931 
Control Variables 
FFO/Share 1,862 170.343 7,264.763 -18.258 0.594 1.386 2.593 313,483.000 
Size 2,020 7.759 1.314 -1.931 7.106 7.907 8.558 10.556 
Leverage 2,020 0.566 0.181 0.000 0.473 0.560 0.660 1.638 
ΔREV 1,876 47.207 204.435 -4,403.782 1.039 21.619 68.020 3,701.640 
Sales_Growth 1,862 0.034 0.436 -0.800 0.001 0.011 0.027 16.478 
Beta 1,892 0.974 0.495 -0.692 0.622 0.927 1.259 4.661 
BTM 1,956 -0.116 3.018 -64.892 -0.049 0.0002 0.001 75.038 
IO 1,749 0.760 0.283 0.000 0.637 0.838 0.954 2.383 
VolaS&P (-5, 0 days) 1,543 0.019 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.017 0.025 0.082 
VolaS&P (-40, 0 days) 1,537 0.056 0.030 0.025 0.038 0.047 0.056 0.175 
VolaS&P (-60, 0 days) 1,535 0.068 0.031 0.030 0.052 0.056 0.078 0.193 
ΔVolume (0, 5 days) 1,543 0.119 0.893 -4.306 -0.049 0.025 0.183 20.333 
ΔVolume (0, 40 days) 1,529 0.052 0.545 -2.601 -0.085 0.001 0.095 7.790 
ΔVolume (0, 60 days) 1,519 0.050 0.520 -2.860 -0.082 0.003 0.100 7.646 
Text_Length 2,207 68,231 50,034 36 38,302 57,270 87,198 516,463 
FOG 2,207 22.460 1.707 5.000 21.665 22.496 23.307 29.698 
Dependent Variables 
Vola (0, 5 days) 1,543 0.041 0.047 0.001 0.020 0.032 0.047 1.125 
Vola (0, 40 days) 1,537 0.116 0.123 0.030 0.071 0.085 0.110 2.119 
Vola (0, 60 days) 1,535 0.142 0.132 0.033 0.088 0.107 0.141 2.130 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the frequencies (in %) for the risk factor topics (Freq_Topic) of Item 1A, further 
control variables, and dependent variables (Vola). The definition of all variables is presented in Table 3.7 in Appendix B. N is the 
number of observations, StdDev stands for standard deviation, Q1 is the first and Q3 the third quartile of the distribution, and 
Min is the minimum and Max the maximum of each variable. N is set to the maximal available number of observations for each 
variable. 
 
The classical fundamentals in the control set show the normal values and are comparable 
with other REIT studies (e.g., Doran et al., 2012; Price et al., 2017; Koelbl, 2020). The 
percentage of institutional ownership (IO) is on average 76%, with an interquartile range 
from 64% to 95%. The restriction to shares outstanding in the denominator results in 
extreme ratios of greater than 1 for a few observations where the institutional investors 
own more than the outstanding shares. The Text_Length counted by words included in 
Item 1A varies in the interquartile range from 38,302 to 87,198. The extreme values are 
surprising; the shortest Item 1A has only 36 words, whereas the longest has 516,463 
words. The low number of words is driven by small REITs which do not have to publish risk 
reports according to the SEC requirements; see Example 1-2 in Table 3.9 in Appendix B. In 
total, we have only 8 reports with fewer than 1600 characters (including stop words) for 
their reports; see Example 3 in Table 3.9 for a short Item 1A with 374 words. The 
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readability of the text, as measured by the Gunning fog index, is complex. The interquartile 
range is close with 21.7 to 23.3 and higher than the reading level of a colleague graduate 
given by 17. What is surprising is the low minimum with 5.0, probably induced by the 
short reports mentioned above, since the value 10 is only at the level of a high school 
sophomore (usually aged 15-16). 
 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Validity of STM to explain Investor Risk Perception 
Recognizing that firm executives are free to decide which risks to disclose and how much 
to discuss a specific risk factor, we hypothesize that the probability of appearance of the 
STM extracted risk factors helps to explain the perceived risk on the stock market. To test 
our Hypothesis 1, we regress disclosure frequencies for each risk factor topic on the stock 
return volatility. We run three model specifications, for which we alternate the dependent 
variable (Vola) according to the time horizon of investor risk perception – 5 trading days 
(Model 1), 40 trading days (Model 2), and 60 trading days (Model 3) after the respective 
10-K filing was published.  
After controlling for firm-level characteristics and other textual measures from 10-Ks that 
have been shown to be associated with volatility in previous studies, we find that the STM 
extracted risk factors help to explain investor risk perceptions. In line with the efficient 
market hypothesis, risk factors should mostly be relevant in the short-run, whereas 
fundamentals dominate the risk perception of investors (after the information of 10-Ks has 
been incorporated into prices) in the long run. Indeed, 12 of 16 risk topics are significantly 
associated with volatility in the short-run (5-day window).  
If we move to 40 trading days, we observe lower coefficients for the risk factors with the 
exemption of Topic #1 and #15 which increase. Furthermore, we observe fewer significant 
coefficients in the long run – 6 factors for 40 days. Regarding the fundamentals, some are 
never relevant (FFO/Share, ΔREV, and Sales_Growth), others increase their impact over 
time and mitigate the impact of risk factors. Leverage is the only fundamental variable that 
is significant in the short-run, but insignificant in the long run. This is not surprising since 
Beta already incorporates a large part of the risk. The ratio of institutional owners (IO), 
volatility of the last trading days (Lag_Vola), and trading volume (ΔVolume) also increase 
their impact over time. Textual variables (Text_Length and FOG) are never relevant so that 
the risk factors convey the information of Item 1A. In the 60-day-window model, 7 risk 
factors are significant and the coefficients have a comparable magnitude compared to the 
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40 trading-day period. However, the goodness of fit improves with R2 increasing to 27% 
from 18%. This effect is mostly driven by controls (IO, Beta, and Lag_Vola).  
Table 3.2: Probability of Appearance – Risk Perception 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (0, 5 days) (0, 40 days) (0, 60 days) 
Freq_Topic 1 -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
Transaction (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 2 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
Regulation (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Freq_Topic 3 -0.011*** -0.004 -0.006 
Business Process (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 4 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 
Unsecured Claims and Debts (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Freq_Topic 5 0.009*** 0.008* 0.008 
Rating (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 6 -0.0003 -0.008* -0.009** 
Tax and Capital Contribution (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 8 -0.010*** -0.005 -0.008** 
Capital Products and Market (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Freq_Topic 9 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
Acquisition (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 10 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
Contingencies (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Freq_Topic 12 0.0001 -0.005 -0.004 
IT (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Freq_Topic 13 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.010** 
Legal & Litigation Risk (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 15 -0.013*** 0.009** 0.010** 
Single Tenant Risk (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 16 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.005 
Property (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 17 -0.004** -0.004 -0.004 
Politics (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 19 -0.013*** -0.005 -0.006 
Cash-flow (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 20 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Property (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
FFO/Share 0.0005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.002 0.013* 0.014* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.025** 0.016 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.027) 
ΔREV 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00002 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Sales_Growth 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
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Table 3.2: continued 
Beta 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.013* 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
BTM -0.020*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
IO -0.018*** -0.043*** -0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) 
Lag_Vola 0.350*** 0.352*** 0.542*** 
 (0.038) (0.062) (0.045) 
VolaS&P  0.168 0.079 0.316 
 (0.123) (0.231) (0.212) 
ΔVolume 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Text_Length -0.005 0.014 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) 
FOG -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 1,228 1,224 1,223 
R2 0.318 0.182 0.272 
This table presents the results of fixed-effect models controlling for unobserved firm and time effects for Item 1A. 
The table reports panel regression results of fixed effects models, which include coefficients and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of determinants affecting investor’s risk perception. The dependent variable (Vola) takes a 
different number of trading days after the 10-K filing date into account – 5 trading days (Model 1), 40 trading 
days (Model 2), and 60 trading days (Model 3). The definition of all variables is presented in Table 3.7 in Appendix 
B.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
This result is contrary to Cohen et al. (2020) who find that corporate reports of non-REITs 
impact stock prices with a lag. One possible explanation for the diverging results might be 
that REITs generally attract more institutional investors, who are able to process official 
firm filings faster, and thus react more quickly to the disclosed information. By using our 
findings, we conclude that the topic distribution presents a valid approach to quantify risk 
disclosures and explain investor risk perception, however, the risk factors’ influence is 
mostly in the short-run. 
3.7.2 Risk Disclosures can be Good News 
To analyze Hypothesis 2, which predicts a risk-reducing effect for the majority of risk 
factors, we assign the STM-extracted risk factors to the competing arguments of Kravet 
and Muslu (2013). Consistent with Bao and Datta (2014), our results provide support for 
all three arguments, depending on the specific risk types disclosed but primarily reduce the 
volatility (convergence argument).  
In the shortest 5-trading-day model, four risk-factor topics #6, #9, #12, and #20, have an 
insignificant coefficient, thus supporting the null argument of an uninformative risk factor. 
Three risk factors, including topics #2, #4, and #5 are positively associated with stock 
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return volatility (divergence argument). Specifically, after controlling for other factors 
causing stock price movements, a 1% increase in the probability of appearance for topics 
#2, #4, and #5 will lead to a 3.1, 3.9, and 0.9 basis point increase of the stock return 
volatility after filing the 10-K, at the 1% significance level.15 In line with the assumption 
that executives use 10-Ks to resolve firms’ known risk factors or give more facts about 
known risk factors and thus, reduce risk perceptions, the convergence factors are in the 
majority (topics #1, #3, #8, #10, #13, #15, #16, #17 and #19). For example, after 
controlling for the effect of other variables, a 1% increase in disclosure about topics #1, 
#3, and #8, will lead to a 0.6, 1.1, and 1.0 basis point decrease in volatility after the 
disclosure date, respectively. Thus, instead of presenting new risk factors, executives use 
Item 1A extensively to resolve the REITs’ known contingencies, thereby reducing investor 
risk perceptions. The predominance of the convergence arguments suggests that 
executives’ concerns of adverse effects of disclosures are baseless – risk disclosures may 
even be good news as long as they clarify the implications of already known risk. 
In contrast to prior efforts quantifying the information revealed in risk disclosures (i.e., 
length of Item 1A or the number of risk keywords), an additional advantage of our 
approach is that it can be interpreted economically, as the STM not only provides 
frequencies of appearance, but also the corresponding set of words representing the topic. 
Our results indicate, that risk factors talking about Tax and Capital Contribution, 
Acquisition, IT, and Property (#6, #9, #12, and #20) have no effect on stock return volatility 
after the filing submission date. The risk factor topics supporting the divergence argument 
comprise Regulation, Unsecured Claims and Debts, and Rating (#2, #4, and #5). The 
convergence factors cover the topics Transaction, Business Process, Capital Products and 
Market, Contingencies, Legal & Litigation Risk, Single Tenant Risk, Property, Politics, and 
Cash-flow (#1, #3, #8, #10, #13, #15, #16, #17, and #19). However, STM only provides 
the set of words representing the risk factor while researchers choose the label. Therefore, 
labels may not represent topics appropriately. Israelsen (2014) gets to the heart of this 
dilemma by stating that “it is the words that define the topics, not the title”. 
3.7.3 Probability of Appearance vs. Absolute Allocation of Words 
So far, our analyses focus on the probability of appearance of risk factor topics and ignores 
the number of words a firm allocates towards a specific risk. For example, even in the 
extreme case that a firm describes litigation risk with 100% within its 10-word long risk 
                                                 
15 Given that the STM mostly identifies few topics that represent the majority of the filing, the actual 
impact of a specific topic on the firms’ volatility is higher because the typical increase of the 
probability of occurrence for a risk factor is higher than our used example of 1%. 
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disclosure, it seems that this risk is for this firm much less material than for another firm 
that allocates 20% of its 1000-word long disclosure towards litigation risk. We adapt our 
target variables by multiplying the probability of appearance for each risk factor 
(Freq_Topics) with the total length of the corresponding disclosure (Text_Length). This 
approach presents a hybrid model using machine learning and widely used wordcount 
methods. We regress the log transformation of the new target variable (Abs_Allocation) 
on the stock return volatility following the 5, 40, and 60 trading-day windows. The 
descriptive statistics of Abs_Allocation are given in Table 3.3 and the results of the 
regression model which follows Equation (3.1) are in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics – Absolute Allocation of Words 
 N Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Item 1A 
Abs_Allocation 1 2,157 4,784.894 20,770.350 0.025 1.368 3.466 9.380 211,302.900 
Abs_Allocation 2 2,157 3,180.996 14,577.500 0.001 1.536 3.854 11.476 138,226.600 
Abs_Allocation 3 2,157 899.028 6,324.319 0.106 4.675 10.062 28.268 133,751.700 
Abs_Allocation 4 2,157 2,200.952 11,153.190 0.003 2.174 6.535 21.225 108,071.900 
Abs_Allocation 5 2,157 1,680.289 8,918.072 0.104 3.044 7.509 21.734 142,100.100 
Abs_Allocation 6 2,157 4,300.814 20,565.220 0.053 1.514 4.321 11.861 175,507.700 
Abs_Allocation 7 2,157 2,074.562 10,261.370 0.001 2.203 5.334 14.812 97,628.020 
Abs_Allocation 8 2,157 2,005.718 8,796.460 0.207 4.073 8.368 21.142 87,897.500 
Abs_Allocation 9 2,157 4,258.056 23,163.760 0.057 1.985 4.361 9.766 358,091.100 
Abs_Allocation 10 2,157 2,517.047 8,149.857 0.156 6.277 12.305 48.238 72,535.240 
Abs_Allocation 11 2,157 2,618.542 13,752.160 0.001 1.997 5.100 15.108 186,137.400 
Abs_Allocation 12 2,157 3,524.577 14,625.800 0.0001 1.418 4.120 12.151 132,529.400 
Abs_Allocation 13 2,157 4,080.354 16,148.920 0.001 1.704 4.595 14.166 173,824.100 
Abs_Allocation 14 2,157 2,124.229 14,972.500 0.001 0.593 2.183 6.113 180,428.300 
Abs_Allocation 15 2,157 4,613.534 20,843.580 0.023 2.390 5.010 12.168 241,480.400 
Abs_Allocation 16 2,157 4,252.121 16,687.200 0.071 1.798 4.441 11.206 159,719.300 
Abs_Allocation 17 2,157 4,191.365 16,482.040 0.161 2.496 4.602 12.725 126,125.000 
Abs_Allocation 18 2,157 4,892.229 26,515.550 0.001 2.442 7.021 20.794 516,358.900 
Abs_Allocation 19 2,157 6,162.992 31,754.840 0.041 1.925 4.782 12.686 410,365.500 
Abs_Allocation 20 2,157 3,981.453 17,581.560 0.138 2.208 4.583 10.895 137,661.800 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the frequencies (in %) for the risk factor topics multiplied by the total length of the 
corresponding disclosure (Abs_Allocation). N is the number of observations, StdDev stands for standard deviation, Q1 is the first 
and Q3 the third quartile of the distribution, and Min is the minimum and Max the maximum of each variable. N is set to the 
maximal available number of observations for each variable. 
 
Table 3.4: Absolute Allocation of Words – Risk Perception 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (0, 5 days) (0, 40 days) (0, 60 days) 
Abs_Allocation 1 -0.007*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
Transaction (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Abs_Allocation 2 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 
Regulation (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Abs_Allocation 3 -0.011*** -0.005 -0.006 
Business Process (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
see next page 
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Table 3.4: continued 
Abs_Allocation 4 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
Unsecured Claims and Debts (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Abs_Allocation 5 0.009*** 0.010** 0.008* 
Rating (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Abs_Allocation 6 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** 
Tax and Capital Contribution (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 8 -0.010*** -0.006 -0.008** 
Capital Products and Market (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abs_Allocation 9 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
Acquisition (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 10 -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
Contingencies (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Abs_Allocation 12 0.00001 -0.005* -0.004 
IT (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abs_Allocation 13 -0.017*** -0.008* -0.010** 
Legal & Litigation Risk (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Abs_Allocation 15 -0.012*** 0.009* 0.010** 
Single Tenant Risk (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 16 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.005 
Property (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 17 -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004 
Politics (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 19 -0.012*** -0.005 -0.006 
Cash-flow (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Abs_Allocation 20 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Property (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
FFO/Share 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.001 0.012* 0.013* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.029** 0.018 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.027) 
ΔREV 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00002 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Sales_Growth 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Beta 0.009*** 0.024*** 0.015** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
BTM -0.020*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
IO -0.018*** -0.044*** -0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) 
Lag_Vola 0.354*** 0.328*** 0.521*** 
 (0.037) (0.058) (0.043) 
VolaS&P  0.866*** 1.610*** 1.290*** 
 (0.133) (0.291) (0.305) 
ΔVolume 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
see next page 
Can Risks be Good News? Revealing Risk Perception of Real Estate Investors using Machine Learning 
61 
Table 3.4: continued 
Text_Length -0.005 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
FOG -0.0003 -0.00005 0.00004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 1,228 1,224 1,223 
R2 0.345 0.207 0.283 
This table presents the results of fixed-effect models controlling for unobserved firm and time effects for Item 1A. 
The table reports panel regression results of fixed effects models, which include coefficients and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of determinants affecting investor’s risk perception. The dependent variable (Vola) takes a 
different number of trading days after the 10-K filing date into account – 5 trading days (Model 1), 40 trading 
days (Model 2), and 60 trading days (Model 3). The definition of all variables is presented in Table 3.7 in Appendix 
B.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Consistent with previous findings 12 of 16 risk topics are significantly associated with 
volatility in the short-run (5-day window). Again, the risk factor influence varies over the 
windows. Comparable to the probability model (Section 3.7.1), we observe lower 
significant coefficients for the risk factors if we move to 40 trading days (8 risk factors 
instead of 6) or to 60 trading days (8 risk factors instead of 7). In comparison to the 
probability model (Freq_Topics), the absolute allocation of words model explains the 
variations better; the R2 is higher for all windows. For example, the model with 
Abs_Allocation explains around 35% of the variation for the 5-day window, whereas 
Freq_Topics explains 32%. The goodness of fit decreases for longer windows – 21% for 
40 days and 28% for 60 days – but remains higher than all models using Freq_Topics. The 
classification of risk factors to the competing arguments of Kravet and Muslu (2013) 
remains unchanged. 
Based on the comparable coefficients and the higher explanatory power for the 
Abs_Allocation model, we evaluate this hybrid model as a good alternative to combine 
machine learning with a classical factor. Thereby, a combination of the number of words 
and machine-assisted topic modeling helps to explain investor risk perceptions most 
efficiently. The topics are most important for a short window even after controlling for 
traditional firms-specific accounting and market control variables. 
3.7.4 Alternative of Risk Perception and Alternative Topic Modeling 
To examine the robustness of our finding that the majority of the risk factors follow the 
convergence argument, we alter the measure of risk perception and topic modeling 
approach. For the alternative measure of risk, we follow Kravet and Muslu (2013) and re-
run our analysis using the change in the standard deviation of a firms’ daily stock returns 
from the symmetric period of T trading-days before to after the 10-K is filed. For example, 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) calculate the difference between the volatility during the first 60 
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trading days after the filings and the last 60 trading days before the filings. Higher volatility 
after the filing goes in line with the divergence argument whereas lower volatility is 
supported by the convergence argument. Our results are robust to this alternated 
dependent variable since all coefficients’ signs are the same and their magnitudes have a 
comparable size (see Table 3.10 in Appendix B). Thus, our conclusion that most risk factors 
follow the convergence argument applies even after using a different measure of risk 
perception, too. 
After presenting an alternative for the dependent side, we change the topic extracting 
process on the independent side, too. Even if Blei and Lafferty (2007) and Roberts et al. 
(2014) show that STM and CTM are superior to LDA, we want to stress our results and use 
all three topic model approaches for our best model (Abs_Allocation). Within this 
robustness check, we additionally run regressions for STM, CTM, and LDA extracted risk 
factor topics over the 5 trading-day and 60 trading-day periods. Note that the model-
specific topics are not directly comparable since their words are different. In the short-run, 
LDA identifies three risk factors and CTM four risk factors that are significantly associated 
with investor risk perception; these numbers are lower than the twelve factors for STM. 
STM also leads in the long run with eight significant risk factors, CTM has no significant 
factor, and LDA two factors. This relatively low number could also be induced by 
randomness around the t-value and not from the economic significance of the factors. 
Additionally, the goodness of fit is highest for STM for both time windows. Thus, we 
conclude that our empirical findings confirm the theoretical and empirical derived 
superiority of STM (see Section 3.4) as a topic model approach. The results are presented 
in Table 3.12 in Appendix B. 
3.7.5 Validity of the STM to capture Changes in Reporting Behavior 
The lessons of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) and the strengthened disclosure 
requirements of the SEC, changed the reporting behavior of companies. To further assess 
the validity of our method, we analyze whether the STM identified probabilities of 
appearance are capable of capturing these changes in 10-Ks. To conduct the analysis, we 
calculate the yearly growth rate of the probability of appearance for each of the risk factors 
over all firms. Figure 3.5 illustrates these growth rates for selected topics whose reporting 
certainly changed during or after the crisis: Regulation (#2), Single Tenant Risk (#15), and 
Rating (#4). 
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Figure 3.5: Yearly Growth Rate of the Probability of Appearance 
 
This figure shows yearly growth rates of the probability of appearance for the topics Regulation (#2), Single Tenant 
Risk (#15), and Rating (#4). 
 
We observe that topic #2 Regulation had decreased before/during the crisis and increased 
in the aftermath, representing strengthened regulatory requirements after the crisis. 
Contrary, Single Tenant Risk (#15) peaked in 2009 and 2011 and has increased on average 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This might be due to strengthened disclosure 
requirements, or it showcases that risk factors become immanent or even real threats for 
the company during an economic crisis. Rating (#4) dropped in the year 2010 and has 
oscillated since then around zero. This trend may reflect the loss of confidence in rating 
agencies following the events of 2007 and 2008. In summary, probabilities of appearance 
are time-varying and deviate from their previous level when specific events (e.g., global 
financial crisis) occur. Thus, disclosure frequencies reflect changes in firms’ reporting 
behavior caused by specific events, confirming the validity of the STM. 
 
3.8 Conclusion  
Firms have to inform their shareholders about the expected implications and consequences 
of adverse events so that the investors are able to monitor the current and future risk 
factors a firm is facing and integrate them into their decision-making analysis. Specifically, 
the SEC mandates firms to discuss the most relevant factors that may entail speculative or 
risky aspects for the firm in their 10-Ks.  
Recognizing the temporal and cognitive limitation of human investors to read and react to 
the massive amount of text, we exploit unsupervised machine-learning approaches (STM, 
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REITs’ 10-Ks. However, since LDA is limited when identifying common risk factors across 
industries, we focus on the advanced topic modeling approaches (STM and CTM). Hereby, 
STM has demonstrated superiority over CTM. 
To assess whether our machine-assisted topic detecting modeling presents a valid 
approach to quantify risk in narrative form, we analyze whether the STM extracted risk 
factors help to explain the perceived risk on the stock market. Indeed, we find that the 
majority of risk topics is significantly associated with volatility, confirming the effectiveness 
of our model. Furthermore, we disentangle how the identified risk topics explain investor 
risk perception, in addition to traditional firm characteristics. Consistent with Bao and 
Datta (2014), we find evidence supporting all three competing arguments provided by 
Kravet and Muslu (2013). Specifically, whereas four risk factors support the null argument 
of uninformative disclosures, three risk factors reveal previously unknown contingencies 
to investors, thus increasing their risk perceptions (divergence argument), and the majority 
(9 risk factors) decreases risk perceptions (convergence argument). The predominance of 
risk-reducing risk factors is in line with expectations since most risk factors are revealed in 
a timely manner through press releases or Form 8-K. Thus, instead of disclosing new risk 
factors, Item 1A primarily provides essential information on risk factors that have already 
been communicated to investors using more frequent channels. Consequently, it seems 
like executives’ concerns of adverse effects of disclosing “negative” information are 
baseless and risks described in 10 Ks can indeed be considered good news as long as 
executives clarify the implications of already known risk. Assuming that the number of 
words a firm allocates towards a specific topic is also important, we test our hypotheses 
using the absolute allocation of words rather than pure disclosure frequencies. The results 
are in line with previous analyses. Given that this model explains investor risk perceptions 
most efficiently, we evaluate the combination of machine learning and a classical factor as 
beneficial. We further analyze whether the STM identified probabilities of appearance are 
capable of capturing changes in firms’ reporting behavior during or after extreme events 
such as the global financial crisis (2007-2009). Indeed, the disclosure frequencies change 
for the topics Regulation (#2), Single Tenant Risk (#15), and Rating (#4). The response of 
disclosure frequencies to specific events confirms the validity of the STM. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ STM in the accounting and 
finance domain. Clearly, investors would benefit from using machine-learning techniques 
allowing them to process a huge amount of company information simultaneously, just as 
the risk items in the 10-Ks. However, STM is not suitable for the entire business sector 
universe in one model since it is limited in the application of covariates. It is thereby 
applicable to a variety of industries whose companies operate in the same business and 
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are exposed to various risk factors. The banking sector comprises, for example, commercial 
banks and investment banks but are exposed to country-specific regulations and 
accounting standards. Similar to property types in the REIT sector, the sector-specific 
vocabulary distracts common approaches (LDA and CTM) from discovering underlying 
topics, whereas the STM accomplishes that.  
Further research might focus on other industries (e.g., the banking sector) or investigate 
other variables that could be affected by risk disclosures, such as bid-ask spread or trading 
volume. Additionally, it is worth examining whether risk disclosures provide (negative) 
signals regarding future performance or liquidity. 
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3.10 Appendix A 
Technical Details on the STM 
The Structural Topic Modeling (STM) by Roberts et al. (2019) incorporates metadata of 
pre-specified covariates to disentangle the unique topics. The covariates cover for topical 
prevalence, topical content, or both. The former affects how much a topic is discussed 
(+,), whereas the latter affects which words are used to discuss a particular topic 
parameter (.) (Roberts et al., 2014). In order to allow the algorithm to find topics beyond 
the already known identifiers (see Figure 3.1 and discussion in the Introduction for 
healthcare vs. residential), we include property types as metadata covariates. Contrary to 
the LDA, where the topic proportion +, is drawn from a Dirichlet distribution, the STM 
employs a logistic-normal generalized linear model which is based on document covariates 
(L,). Thus, the frequency with which a topic is discussed that is common across all 
documents in the LDA is now affected by the observed metadata, as indicated by the 
following equation: 
+⃗,⃓L,O, P~R		&"(S = L,O, P) , (3.3) 
 
where L, is a 1-by-3 vector, O is a 3-by-(T − 1) matrix of coefficients and P is (T − 1)-
by-(T − 1) covariance matrix. 
Whereas LDA assumes that word proportions within each topic (/) are represented by the 
model parameter ., which is identical for all documents (-), STM allows that the words 
describing a topic vary. Specifically, given a document-level content covariate V,, the STM 
forms document-specific distributions of words representing each topic (/) based on the 
baseline word distribution ("), the topic-specific deviation T., the covariate group 
deviation TWX, and the interaction between the two TWX,.. The following equation 
provided by Kuhn (2018), and based on Roberts et al. (2019), summarizes this relationship 
as follows:  
,,. ∝ Z3 (" + T. + TWX + TWX,.) (3.4) 
 
Figure 3.6 presents the STM in the common plate notation for topic modeling. Hereby, 
one “plate” exists for each document ([) and its associated topic distribution (+,) in the 
textual corpus. The inner plate, comprising topics (\,,]) and words ( ,̂,]), is replicated for 
each of the  words in the document. Analogously, the plate including the model 
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parameter ,,. is replicated for each of the T topics in a textual corpus (Blei, 2012; Kuhn, 
2018)  
Figure 3.6: Structural Topic Modeling 
 
This figure shows the STM in plate notation following Roberts et al. (2019). 
 
After pre-processing, we estimate the STM, based on a variational Expectation-
Maximization algorithm. The maximum number of iterations is set to 100, so that 
convergence is always reached before this threshold.  
 
3.11 Appendix B 
Table 3.5: STM Top Word Lists 
Item 1A 
Topic 1: Transaction 
unenforceable, hence, distinct, origination, repurchases, mentioned, artificially, concentrations, spread, sale-
leaseback, post, enforceability, action, objective, appreciate, terminating, leads, staff, servicing, imposing 
Topic 2: Regulation 
insufficiency, accumulation, reconfiguration, lessors, precautions, refrain, accommodation, unqualified, batteries, 
comprise, re-leased, co-members, anything, grants, removing, extinguished, fix, globally, speed, witness 
Topic 3: Business Process  
appointment, probability, contemplate, economical, terrorist-related, started, voluntarily, confirmed, par, 
unfeasible, caption, execution, discuss, computation, cancelled, dramatically, zero, encumbering, free, please 
Topic 4: Unsecured Claims and Debts 
shares-trust, owing, assign, went, quantities, attached, park, ends, trustees, neglect, commerce, insulate, 
incumbent, appraised, degrees, adapt, impairs, jersey, correspond, beverage 
Topic 5: Rating 
printing, moodys, migration, recycling, injunction, poors, southeast, complicated, declaring, terminates, obligors, 
expirations, enforced, interfere, sent, indentures, vulnerabilities, prone, terminology, pendency 
Topic 6: Tax and Capital Contribution 
draft, motivated, earliest, re-characterization, iraq, administering, faults, functions, choosing, affiliation, widening, 
futures, sensitivity, built, awareness, exercisable, advised, profession, irrevocable, drafts 
Topic 7: Financial Risk 
attestation, recapitalization, dealings, amends, unsatisfactory, fairly, parcel, effectiveness, encumbering, drought, 
departments, time-consuming, effectuated, reliable, firm, james, taxpayer, endowments, exemptions, document 
Topic 8: Capital Products and Market 
exhibits, non-renewal, shows, nyses, institution, expirations, website, perhaps, correctly, servicer, electronically, 
nyse, requisite, cdo, outage, earth, advanced, america, pledged, swaps 
Topic 9: Acquisition 
understanding, describe, vendor, discovered, tactics, coordinated, lessen, rated, lps, inherently, works, expects, 
obama, stores, distributing, emanating, abatement, two-year, clean, co-tenancy  
Topic 10: Contingencies 
correlate, tcja, condominiums, hackers, phasing, functioning, pronouncements, discounted, sent, destruction, 
launched, libor, encouraging, terrorists, non-business, fires, modifying, confidential, inside, deadlines 
see next page 
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Table 3.5: continued 
Topic 11: Capital Markets and Realization of Profit 
excludes, changes, unregistered, prospectus, inclined, optimize, unenforceable, loss-generating, participates, 
eventually, interfere, comprising, list, internalize, registrants, stages, par, twenty, ipo, rata 
Topic 12: IT 
contingencies, normalized, cyberattacks, restraints, oppose, agents, automated, administered, staffing, 
inflationary, faces, cybersecurity, concerned, shall, adoption, sheet, indications, ineffective, interpret, 
recordkeeping 
Topic 13: Legal & Litigation Risk 
plaintiffs, sue, zones, tax-exempt, prejudice, supreme, examine, defendants, federally, defendant, render, oversee, 
complaint, day, straight-line, exposures, tangible, feature, flood, conform 
Topic 14: REIT Status 
nonqualified, revocation, timeframe, mitigated, exploration, referenced, appointment, overpay, follow, 
jeopardizing, broadly, procedural, committee, reviews, transferees, pronounced, violated, re-electing, 
capitalizations, owner-operators 
Topic 15: Single Tenant Risk 
plant, assign, burdensome, involvement, surveyed, non-affiliates, stabilize, greatly, hiring, capacities, owing, 
cessation, cooperation, side, deficit, reputations, forging, seriously, re-leasing, accomplish 
Topic 16: Property 
live, internationally, viable, vandalism, trained, corporate-level, cycles, movement, inventories, capitalizing, 
unionized, served, owner-operators, entry, incorrectly, intervening, union, contractors, equity-related, cercla 
Topic 17: Politics 
users, interstate, expects, perils, possess, avenue, investigative, reclassified, distributes, richard, bidding, lend, 
west, nuclear, holds, manages, advertising, systemic, places, philosophy 
Topic 18: Tax 
drip, itemized, consequence, debt-total, kind, supplemental, passive, tax-free, lease, percent, eligibility, satisfies, 
minimis, protective, snow, files, buy-sell, bind, commitment, commodity 
Topic 19: Cash-flow 
establishes, belief, property, trustees, productive, visual, declaration, withdraw, updates, simultaneously, 
corporate-level, redeemable, capitalized, billed, reviewed, landlords, overruns, noi, secondarily, impairments 
Topic 20: Property 
page, catastrophe, metro, establishes, notification, reauthorization, nearby, unwillingness, ventilation, distributes, 
notify, stem, charters, destructive, repositioning, david, insurers, constant, plaza, tcja 
 
This table shows the top 20 words for each of the topics. 
 
Table 3.6: Metadata Covariates 
Property Type 
# of  
10-Ks 
Covariate Words 
Unknown 0 n.a. 
Unclassified 264 
generation, equipment, products, pressures, distributing, diversification, 
appeal, option, letter, planning, finding, uncertain, paying, lesser, oil, larger, 
capacity, negotiate, satisfying, advantage 
Diversified 233 
incident, five-year, weaknesses, raised, rating, diluted, accept, vacancies, 
renewal, valuation, expiring, dealer, tenant, existence, designed, assumptions, 
terminated, accounting, grade, insolvent 
Health Care 215 
referral, licensure, patients, false, physician, payors, abuse, healthcare, 
whistleblower, medicare, medicaid, denial, hospitals, patient, payor, physicians, 
hipaa, referrals, care, anti-kickback 
Industrial/ Office 424 
feet, office, square, francisco, evaluation, undisclosed, downgraded, space, 
units, evict, budgeted, utilities, perceived, enforcing, building, lack, honor, 
disclosure, geopolitical, settle 
Lodging/ Resorts 269 
brands, hotels, centralized, leisure, travelers, room, revpar, hotel, rooms, 
building, franchisors, guests, true, adr, reservation, travel, franchise, alerts, 
respected, lodging 
Residential 277 
mae, fannie, residents, homes, mac, freddie, apartment, housing, multifamily, 
fhaa, household, communities, explore, apartments, home, lawsuits, offers, 
conservatorship, already, regulating 
see next page 
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Table 3.6: continued 
Retail 455 
retailers, shopping, retailing, shoppers, goods, retail, e-commerce, consumer, 
locations, malls, creditworthiness, traffic, vacated, anchor, tanks, stores, 
premises, convenience, spaces, approvals 
Self Storage 78 
self-storage, extensively, cyber-attack, penetrate, armed, telephone, 
destructive, avail, commerce, storage, collecting, shutdowns, changed, 
disruptive, releases, audits, view, worms, protections, integrating 
This table shows the metadata Covariate Words based on 8 of the Ziman Property Types and the number of 
occurrence within our sample (# of 10-Ks). The STM identifies these covariate words that the algorithm uses to 
determine the covariate group deviation TWX and the covariate-topic interactions TWX,. (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 3.7: Description of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Vola 
The standard deviation of daily log returns extrapolated to the T-trading-day period after 
the 10-K filing; T ∈ [5, 40, 60]. 
ΔVola The change in the standard deviation of a firms’ daily stock returns from the symmetric 
period of T trading days before to after the 10-K filing. 
Control Variables 
FFO/Share FFO scaled by shares outstanding; (NI+SPPE+(DPACREt–DPACREt-1))/CSHO 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets; log(AT) 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; LT/AT 
ΔREV Change in sales; SALEt–SALEt-1 
Sales_Growth Ratio of change in sales to lagged assets; (SALEt–SALEt-1)/ATt-1 
Beta 
This CAPM-based measure of the systematic risk compared to the market is directly obtained 
from CRSP and calculated using the methods developed by Scholes and Williams (1977). 
BTM Book-to-market ratio of common stock; (TEQ/(AT-LT))+TXDITC-PSTK)/ (CSHPRI*PRCC) 
IO 
Shares hold by institutional investors from Thomson Reuters divided by the total shares 
outstanding. 
Lag_Vola The stock return volatility of the last  trading days before the 10-K filing. 
VolaS&P  The stock return volatility of the S&P 500 for T trading days before the 10-K filing. 
ΔVolume The change of a firms’ average daily trading volume from the symmetric period of T trading 
days before to after the 10-K filing. 
Text_Length 
Total number of words in Item 1A or Item 7A of an annual report (excluding stop words). 
We use the natural logarithm of the number in our regressions. 
FOG 
Gunning Fog score for the text in Item 1A or Item 7A of an annual report (excluding stop 
words); calculated as: (words per sentence + percent of complex words)*0.4  
This table describes the variables used and the corresponding Compustat data items. 
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Table 3.9: Short Risk Description 
Example 1 (Bluerock Residential Growth REIT, Inc., 2010) 
Item 1A. Risk Factors We have omitted a discussion of risk factors because, as a smaller reporting company, we 
are not required to provide such information. For a discussion of the significant factors that make an investment 
in our shares risky, see the prospectus that relates to our ongoing Initial Public Offering. (48 words) 
Example 2 (Medalist Diversified REIT, Inc., 2019) 
ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS We have omitted a discussion of risk factors because, as a smaller reporting company, 
we are not required to provide such information. (22 words) 
Example 3 (Paragon Real Estate Equity & Investment Trust, 2009) 
Item 1A. Risk Factors. This annual report contains historical information, as well as forward-looking statements 
that involve known and unknown risks and relate to future events, our future financial performance, or our 
expected future operations and actions. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by 
terminology such as \"may,\" \"will,\" \"should,\" \"expect,\" \"plan,\" \"anticipate,\" \"believe,\" \"estimate,\" 
\"future,\" \"intend,\" \"could,\" \"hope,\" \"predict,\" \"target,\" \"potential,\" or \"continue\" or the negative of 
these terms or other similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are only our predictions based upon 
current information and involve numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties. Our actual results or actions may 
differ materially from these forward-looking statements for many reasons. While it is impossible to identify all of 
theses factors, the following could cause actual results to differ materially from those estimated by us:  \u0095  
worsening of national economic conditions, including continuation of lack of liquidity in the capital markets and 
more stringent lending requirements by financial institutions;  \u0095  depressed values for commercial real estate 
properties and companies;  \u0095  changes in local market conditions due to changes in general or local 
economic conditions and neighborhood characteristics;  \u0095  changes in interest rates and in the availability, 
cost and terms of mortgage funds;  \u0095  impact of present or future environmental legislation and compliance 
with environmental laws;  \u0095  ongoing need for capital improvements, particularly in older properties;  \u0095  
more attractive lease incentives offered by competitors in similar markets;  \u0095  increased market demand for 
newer properties;  \u0095  changes in real estate tax rates and other operating expenses;  \u0095  decreases in 
market prices of the shares of publicly traded real estate companies;  \u0095  adverse changes in governmental 
rules and fiscal policies;  \u0095  adverse changes in zoning laws; and  \u0095  other factors which are beyond 
our control. 3 Table of Contents In addition, an investment in the Company involves numerous risks that potential 
investors should consider carefully, including, without limitation:  \u0095  we have no operating assets;  \u0095  
our cash resources are limited;  \u0095  we have a history of losses;  \u0095  we have not raised funds through a 
public equity offering;  \u0095  our trustees control a significant percentage of our voting shares;  \u0095  
shareholders could experience possible future dilution through the issuance of additional shares;  \u0095  we are 
dependent on a small number of key senior professionals who are part-time employees; and  \u0095  we currently 
do not plan to distribute dividends to the holders of our shares. (374 words) 
 
This table shows 3 instances of Item 1A for a low number of words since there is no legal requirement for small 
firms to do that (Example 1 and Example 2) or the risk factors are very short described (Example 3). Stop words 
are not excluded from these examples. 
 
Table 3.10: Probability of Appearance – Risk Perception measured by the 
Change in Volatility 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (0, 5 days) (0, 40 days) (0, 60 days) 
Freq_Topic 1 -0.008*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
Transaction (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 2 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 
Regulation (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Freq_Topic 3 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.005 
Business Process (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 4 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 
Unsecured Claims and Debts (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
Freq_Topic 5 0.008*** 0.007 0.006 
Rating (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 6 -0.001 -0.009* -0.008* 
Tax and Capital Contribution (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
see next page 
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Table 3.10: continued 
Freq_Topic 8 -0.012*** -0.008** -0.011*** 
Capital Products and Market (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 9 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 
Acquisition (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 10 -0.002** 0.003 0.003 
Contingencies (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Freq_Topic 12 0.00000 -0.006 -0.004 
IT (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Freq_Topic 13 -0.020*** -0.009* -0.012** 
Legal & Litigation Risk (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 15 -0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
Single Tenant Risk (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 16 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.006 
Property (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 17 -0.005*** -0.007 -0.006 
Politics (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Freq_Topic 19 -0.013*** -0.008 -0.007 
Cash-flow (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Freq_Topic 20 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Property (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
FFO/Share 0.0004 0.001 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.002 0.015* 0.014** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.016 -0.006 -0.018 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.029) 
ΔREV 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Sales_Growth 0.006 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Beta -0.001 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
BTM -0.018*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
IO -0.009 -0.033** -0.025* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) 
VolaS&P  -0.208 -0.696*** -0.464** 
 (0.138) (0.230) (0.208) 
ΔVolume 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Text_Length -0.009* 0.010 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
FOG -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 1,228 1,224 1,223 
R2 0.230 0.177 0.223 
see next page 
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Table 3.10: continued 
This table presents the results of fixed-effect models controlling for unobserved firm and time effects for Item 1A. 
The table reports panel regression results of fixed effects models, which include coefficients and standard errors 
(in parentheses) of determinants affecting investor’s risk perception. The dependent variable (ΔVola) takes a 
different number of trading days after the 10-K filing date into account – 5 trading days (Model 1), 40 trading 
days (Model 2), and 60 trading days (Model 3). The descriptive statistics of ΔVola are given in in Table 3.11 in 
Appendix B. The definition of all variables is presented in Table 3.7. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics – Change in Volatility 
 N Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Dependent Variables 
ΔVola (0, 5 
days) 
1,543 0.001 0.044 -0.324 -0.012 0.001 0.014 1.114 
ΔVola (0, 40 
days) 
1,529 0.0003 0.102 -2.238 -0.021 -0.003 0.013 2.023 
ΔVola (0, 60 
days) 
1,519 -0.007 0.106 -2.229 -0.029 -0.004 0.015 1.993 
This table shows the change in the standard deviation of a firms’ daily stock returns from the symmetric period of 
T trading-days before to after the 10-K is filed (ΔVola). N is the number of observations, StdDev stands for standard 
deviation, Q1 is the first and Q3 the third quartile of the distribution, and Min is the minimum and Max the 
maximum of each variable. N is set to the maximal available number of observations for each variable. 
 
Table 3.12: Comparison of STM, CTM, and LDA – Risk Perception 
 Model 1 
(0, 5 days) 
Model 3 
(0, 60 days) 
 
  
 STM CTM LDA STM CTM LDA  
Abs_Allocation 1 -0.007*** 0.001 0.0001 -0.015*** -0.001 0.0005  
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 2 0.032*** 0.007 0.001 0.030*** -0.009 0.001  
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 3 -0.011*** -0.009 -0.0001 -0.006 0.002 0.0001  
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 4 0.038*** -0.013* -0.001 0.031*** -0.007 -0.002  
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.016) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 5 0.009*** 0.009** 0.0001 0.008* 0.006 0.0003  
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 6 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.009** -0.001 -0.00004  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 7  -0.011 -0.001  -0.016 -0.001  
  (0.008) (0.001)  (0.017) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 8 -0.010*** -0.004 0.001** -0.008** 0.004 0.0001  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 9 0.002 -0.006 0.00003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 10 -0.002*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003  
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 11  0.002 0.001  0.004 0.001  
  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.003)  
Abs_Allocation 12 0.00001 -0.006 0.0003 -0.004 -0.011 0.001  
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.001)  
see next page  
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Table 3.12: continued  
Abs_Allocation 13 -0.017*** 0.016*** -0.0004 -0.010** 0.015 -0.001  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 14  -0.004 0.0001  0.014 0.003*  
  (0.011) (0.001)  (0.022) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 15 -0.012*** 0.010*** -0.002*** 0.010** 0.008 -0.005***  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 16 -0.007*** 0.005 -0.0004 -0.005 -0.008 0.0005  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003)  
Abs_Allocation 17 -0.005*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 -0.002  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.002)  
Abs_Allocation 18  0.0001 -0.00004  -0.003 -0.0001  
  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 19 -0.012*** -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.001)  
Abs_Allocation 20 0.003 0.020 -0.001* 0.004 0.080 -0.001  
 (0.002) (0.026) (0.001) (0.004) (0.054) (0.001)  
FFO/Share 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Size 0.001 0.0004 -0.0002 0.013* 0.004 0.004  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
Leverage 0.029** 0.012 0.018 0.007 -0.025 -0.004  
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)  
ΔREV 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002  
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)  
Sales_Growth 0.005 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Beta 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.015** 0.023*** 0.020***  
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  
BTM -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.065***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
IO -0.018*** -0.016** -0.019*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.038***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
Lag_Vola 0.354*** 0.310*** 0.328*** 0.521*** 0.501*** 0.516***  
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)  
VolaS&P  0.866*** 0.885*** 0.893*** 1.290*** 1.328*** 1.278***  
 (0.133) (0.145) (0.145) (0.305) (0.310) (0.310)  
ΔVolume 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.020***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Text_Length -0.005 -0.011 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.034 0.008  
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.010) (0.039) (0.010)  
FOG -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.00004 0.001 0.002  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
N 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,223 1,223 1,223  
R2 0.345 0.234 0.229 0.283 0.268 0.274  
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Table 3.12: continued  
This table presents the results of fixed-effect models controlling for unobserved firm and time effects for Item 
1A. The table reports panel regression results of fixed effects models, which include coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) of determinants affecting investor’s risk perception. The dependent variable (Vola) takes 
a different number of trading days after the 10-K filing date into account – 5 trading days (Model 1) and 60 
trading days (Model 3). The variable Abs_Allocation is derived using three different machine assisted 
approaches (i.e., STM, CTM, and LDA). Each approach applies a 20 topic full model to identify and quantify 
the risks disclosed in Item 1A. The risk topics identified by STM, CTM, and LDA are not identical. The definition 
of all variables is presented in Table 3.7 in Appendix B.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
        
 
3.12 Appendix C 
LDA Topics and Metadata Covariates 
We apply the standard LDA and identify the top words for 20 topics analogously to the 
STM method for Item 1A. Table 3.13 in Appendix C presents the results of this clustering. 
As assumed given by the optimization criterion of the LDA, the topics are close to 
investment foci, such as Topic #1 corresponds to “Health Care”, Topic #4 to “Residential”, 
and Topic #9 to “Retail” to name a few. LDA identifies the foci as the most substantial 
distinction within the textual corpus and allocates them as latent topics.  
We further regress the investment foci (i.e., Ziman property types) on each of the 20 topics, 
in order to analyze whether the frequency of appearance for the individual risk factors is 
associated with property types (see Table 3.14 in Appendix C). We find, for example, that 
5 out of 7 Ziman property types are statistically significantly associated with Topic #8 
“Infrastructure”. A positive coefficient sign suggests that a REIT assigned to the respective 
property type (e.g., “Unclassified”) is likely to allocate a larger proportion of its risk 
disclosure to Topic #8. On the contrary, the negative relationship indicates that Topic #8 
is less likely to occur in filings of REITs which are classified as “Residential”, “Health Care“, 
or “Self Storage”. The relationship between property type and the probability of 
appearance for a risk-factor topic shows that we need to consider document-specific 
metadata (i.e., property types) when using a machine to identify the risk factors discussed 
by a REIT.  
Table 3.13: LDA Top Word List 
Item 1A 
Topic 1: Health Care 
healthcare, medicaid, correctional, detention, hospitals, hospital, brookdale, seniors, nursing, physicians, patients, 
payors, medicare, sunrise, inmates, tenants, care, medical, physician, science  
Topic 2: Taxable REIT Subsidiary 
spin, manager, bennett, comments, master, trss, trs, separation, stockholders, reits, treated, tenant, charter, arc, 
emerging, restaurant, tcja, gain, agreement, withholding  
see next page 
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Table 3.13: continued 
Topic 3: Reporting Duties/Auditing 
reporting, caption, report, discussion, see, analysis, information, management’s, expressions, filer, composed, 
incorporated, rule, relates, underway, sponsoring, jpmorgan, auditors, oxley, sarbanes  
Topic 4: Residential 
staff, single-family, hoa, hoas, homes, homeownership, cdo, loans, mortgage, foreclosure, non-performing, 
servicers, homeowners, residents, rental, securitizations, borrower, borrowers, stockholders, home  
Topic 5: Market and Politics 
smaller, rules, effecting, collected, disclosure, vendor, weakness, oversight, defined, interim, restate, see, electing, 
regulation, misstatement, trump, relates, attestation, detected, commission  
Topic 6: Investment Universe 
advisor, cole, stockholders, wells, ira, erisa, co-ownership, tenant-common, sponsored, estate-related, mezzanine, 
bridge, manager, sponsor, nav, sale-leaseback, internalization, builders, advisory, tenants  
Topic 7: Property and Hurricane 
companies, omitted, professionals, managed, information, rita, controls, investing, commodity, ranks, katrina, 
adequacy, continuance, client, capitalizations, segment, pursue, pose, calculation, disagree  
Topic 8: Infrastructure  
wireless, towers, disclose, tower, antenna, sprint, billboards, t-mobile, nols, radio, advertising, verizon, att, fcc, 
communications, nextel, roaming, lighting, broadcast, theatres  
Topic 9: Retail 
host, incs, penn, mall, centers, shopping, separation, entirety, anchor, stores, sears, gaming, outlet, cam, anchors, 
retailers, malls, retail, lps, shareholders  
Topic 10: Cyber Criminality 
systems, security, information, technology, confidential, cyber, computer, networks, identifiable, breaches, data, 
arisk, unauthorized, cyber-attacks, reputation, electronic, store, hackers, shutdowns, software  
Topic 11: Stock Market/Partnerships 
stockholders, directors, stockholder, risky, partnership, military, privatization, million, preferred, units, warrants, 
agreement, andrew, messrs, llc, quoted, approximately, vice, executive, combination  
Topic 12: Lodging/Resorts 
rmr, included, tas, aic, portnoy, sonesta, stars, trustees, star, adam, gov, irc, travel, hotels, barry, hotel, 
shareholders, marriott, snh, living  
Topic 13: Infrastructure 
adviser, depositary, arc, gas, grand, terminal, corridor, infrastructure, decommissioning, sale-leaseback, percent, 
convertible, commodities, production, investees, privately-held, stockholders, notes, commodity, preferred  
Topic 14: Lodging/Resorts 
hotels, hotel, permitted, lodging, travel, room, rooms, franchisors, shareholders, marriott, trustees, franchisor, 
franchise, revpar, reservations, hilton, leisure, intermediaries, guests, lessees  
Topic 15: Company/Real Estate 
requested, partnership, stockholders, tenants, space, mgcl, honolulu, directors, units, charter, rental, tenant, 
stockholder, self-storage, market, partner, asking, leases, airborne, co-venturers  
Topic 16: Timber 
timber, timberlands, timberland, forest, centers, wood, harvest, species, logs, harvesting, student, connectivity, 
fiber, logging, data, universities, endangered, hbu, campus, colocation  
Topic 17: Residential 
communities, apartment, digital, companys, multifamily, realty, housing, freddie, incs, fannie, mac, homes, mae, 
residents, sale, lps, manufactured, multi-family, excel, partnership  
Topic 18: REIT Specifics 
vornado, trustees, shareholders, alexanders, shareholder, gladstone, roth, transitional, declaration, toys, trust, 
tenants, mandelbaum, wight, maryland, interstate, space, partnership, zell, realty  
Topic 19: Retail 
anchor, shopping, tenants, space, retail, shareholders, centers, self-storage, retailers, tenant, stores, leases, 
redevelopment, predictions, bankruptcy, rental, retailing, re-lease, development, venture  
Topic 20: Property Risk and Terrorism 
page, securityholders, science, tenants, space, industrial, ofac, manhattan, asbestos, avenue, ifrs, co-investment, 
tria, indoor, unconsolidated, earthquake, ventures, nbcr, unsecured, partnership 
 
This table shows the top 20 words for each of the topics. 
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3.13 Appendix D 
Risk Perception for Item 7A 
The second risk section included in the 10-K is represented by Item 7A. This section should 
list “quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk” which are relevant for a 
company (e.g., interest rate risk or foreign currency exchange risk). We conduct our 
analyses additionally for this section describing more long-term risk.  
In the first step, we apply the STM to Item 7A and label the topics. Since Item 7A is shorter, 
we set the number of topics to be identified by the STM to 5. Following the SECs’ 
requirement (Item 305 of Regulation S-K (§ 229.305)) to inform the public on market risk, 
the risk topics describe more long-term risks like “Politics & Regions” or “(Re-)financing 
(see Table 3.15 in Appendix D). The descriptive statistics of Abs_Allocation are given in 
Table 3.16. 
In the second step, we apply the fixed-effect panel regression model as stated in Section 
3.5 to Item 7A, to address Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results are given in Table 3.17 in 
Appendix D. Our results suggest that the extracted risk factors are less informative for this 
item than those identified in Item 1A – none of the 5 factors is significant for the short-
term (5 day) window. If we change to longer windows, three risk topics become 
significant. We conclude that this goes in line with the more long-term nature of the risk 
factors described in Item 7A. The goodness of fit is for all windows smaller than for Item 
1A – ranging from 14% to 21% instead of 21% to 35%. This can be explained by the 
composition of Item 7A, since this section not only names but additionally quantifies the 
impact of the individual risk factors on future firm performance. Thus, managers usually 
use numbers to describe how risk factors affect firms’ filings in this section. However, our 
method focuses on textual data i.e., the words used to qualitatively describe relevant risks 
and topic models cannot take numbers into account. In addition, with an average length 
of only 6,680 words, Item 7A is just a tenth of the average length of Item 1A. As explained 
by Papilloud and Hinneburg (2018), shorter documents decrease the robustness of the 
topic model, because it “learns” less from the data. Third, many documents have (almost) 
the same content, which further distorts the topic model (Papilloud and Hinneburg, 2018). 
Table 3.15: STM Top Word Lists for Item 7A 
Item 7A 
Topic 1: Contractual Risks 
discounted, excluding, one-month, fix, agreements, policy, notional, maturities, effectively, contractual, 
techniques, weighted-average, corresponding, giving, reflects, rating, transactions, fixes, discount, fees  
see next page 
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Table 3.15: continued 
Topic 2: Accounting 
liability, direct, eliminated, actively, stock, accrued, amounted, plan, relating, carried, years, recognized, sale, 
liquidation, statements, statement, investing, accounts, permanent, carrying  
Topic 3: Capital 
segments, redeemable, capitalized, section, venture, immediately, regarding, act, joint, redemption, acquired, 
discussions, consolidation, disclosure, projects, iii, general, reference, receivable, common  
Topic 4: Politics and Regions 
refers, political, monetary, domestic, international, structure, considering, beyond, governmental, considerations, 
factors, many, economic, prices, event, financings, take, unable, high, dependent 
Topic 5: (Re-)financing 
flexibility, refinance, opportunity, issue, change, present, matures, unsecured, although, refinancing, assuming, 
principal, respect, near, term, revolving, exceeds, premiums, mitigate, time 
 
This table shows the top 20 words for each of the topics. 
 
Table 3.16: Descriptive Statistics – Absolute Allocation of Words for Item 7A 
 N Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Item 1A 
Abs_Allocation 1 2,514 1,237.987 2,987.863 0.965 12.295 51.106 1,302.653 42,934.940 
Abs_Allocation 2 2,514 2,075.822 23,277.310 0.573 3.710 10.673 63.392 436,479.300 
Abs_Allocation 3 2,514 1,101.688 12,891.150 0.958 5.486 13.465 175.900 373,974.400 
Abs_Allocation 4 2,514 1,048.147 2,079.992 3.164 14.860 79.551 1,166.431 37,108.090 
Abs_Allocation 5 2,514 1,198.234 3,656.759 0.418 6.859 31.509 1,058.209 94,708.970 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the frequencies (in %) for the risk factor topics multiplied by the total length of the 
corresponding disclosure (Abs_Allocation). N is the number of observations, StdDev stands for standard deviation, Q1 is the first 
and Q3 the third quartile of the distribution, and Min is the minimum and Max the maximum of each variable. N is set to the 
maximal available number of observations for each variable. 
 
Table 3.17: Absolute Allocation of Words – Risk Perception for Item 7A 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (0, 5 days) (0, 40 days) (0, 60 days) 
Abs_Allocation 1 -0.001 -0.011*** -0.009** 
Contractual Risks (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 2 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 
Accounting (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abs_Allocation 3 -0.00001 -0.002 -0.003 
Capital (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abs_Allocation 4 0.001 0.013*** 0.012*** 
Politics and Regions (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Abs_Allocation 5 -0.002 -0.008** -0.009** 
(Re-)financing (0.002) (0.004) 0.0001 
FFO/Share 0.00005 0.001 (0.002) 
 (0.001) (0.002) 0.010 
Size -0.001 0.011 (0.008) 
 (0.003) (0.008) -0.025 
Leverage 0.021 -0.013 (0.030) 
 (0.013) (0.031) -0.00001 
ΔREV 0.00000 -0.00001 (0.00002) 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) 0.003 
see next page 
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Table 3.17: continued 
Sales_Growth 0.005 0.005 (0.010) 
 (0.004) (0.010) 0.027*** 
Beta 0.008** 0.033*** (0.008) 
 (0.004) (0.008) 0.0001 
BTM -0.015*** 0.005 0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
IO -0.019*** -0.051*** -0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) 
Lag_Vola 0.315*** 0.355*** 0.503*** 
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.049) 
VolaS&P 0.954*** 1.540*** 1.228*** 
 (0.148) (0.342) (0.354) 
ΔVolume 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Text_Length 0.002 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
FOG -0.0001 -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1,209 1,205 1,204 
R2 0.195 0.144 0.211 
This table presents the results of fixed-effect models controlling for unobserved firm and time effects 
for Item 7A. The table reports panel regression results of fixed effects models, which include 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of determinants affecting investor’s risk perception. 
The dependent variable (Vola) takes a different number of trading days after the 10-K filing date 
into account – 5 trading days (Model 1), 40 trading days (Model 2), and 60 trading days (Model 3). 
The definition of all variables is presented in Table 3.7 in Appendix B.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 

Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
85 
4 Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing 
Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Purpose: Although many theories aim to explain IPO underpricing, initial-day returns of 
US REIT IPOs remain a “puzzle”. This study proposes textual analysis to exploit the 
qualitative information revealed through one of the most important documents during the 
IPO process – Form S-11.  
Design/methodology/approach: This study determines the level of uncertain language 
in the prospectus, as well as its similarity to recently filed registration statements, to assess 
whether textual features can solve the underpricing puzzle. It assumes that uncertain 
language makes it more difficult for potential investors to price the issue and thus increases 
underpricing. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that a higher similarity to previous filings 
indicates that the prospectus provides little useful information and thus does not resolve 
existing information asymmetries, leading to increased underpricing. 
Findings: Contrary to expectations, this research does not find a statistically significant 
association between uncertain language in Form S-11 and initial-day returns. This result is 
interpreted as suggesting that uncertain language in the prospectus does not reflect the 
issuer's expectations about the company's future prospects, but rather is necessary 
because of forecasting difficulties and litigation risk. Analyzing disclosure similarity instead, 
this study finds a statistically and economically significant impact of qualitative information 
on initial-day returns. Thus, REIT managers may reduce underpricing by voluntarily 
providing more information to potential investors in Form S-11.  
Practical implications: The results demonstrate that textual analysis can in fact help to 
explain underpricing of US REIT IPOs. 
Originality/value: This is the first study which applies textual analysis to corporate 
disclosures of US REITs in order to explain IPO underpricing. 
 
Keywords: Initial public offering, Underpricing, Information asymmetry, Textual analysis, 
IPO Prospectus, Form S-11 
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4.2 Introduction 
Underpricing, the phenomenon that an Initial Public Offerings’ (IPOs’) closing price at the 
end of the first trading-day is higher than its offer price, has attracted considerable 
attention in the financial literature. Researchers have proposed numerous theories to 
explain why IPOs have positive initial returns. Whereas the vast majority of theories revolve 
around asymmetric information between the parties involved in the IPO, others entail for 
example, litigation and behavioral theories. However, despite the substantial efforts to 
explain why issuers accept the large amount of “money left on the table”, unresolved 
questions remain as to how IPO shares are priced.  
Only with the increasing online availability of texts and rising computational power in 
recent decades, have researchers resumed their investigations, relying increasingly on 
qualitative data to solve the underpricing puzzle. For example, Ferris et al. (2013) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2013) depart from the numerical data that is typically considered 
to analyze the narratives that contextualize the numbers in IPO prospectuses. Linking the 
use of language in the disclosure to underpricing, the authors emphasize the importance 
of qualitative information. However, the focus on quantitative data has predominated so 
far, presumably because processing textual data is complex and demanding. Nonetheless, 
it would be negligent to ignore the increasing amount of qualitative information, especially 
since most information disseminated to potential investors during the IPO process comes 
in textual form, either spoken or written. For instance, media attention increases when 
companies announce plans to go public, managers talk to potential investors during the 
roadshow to market the IPO, and the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires 
companies to provide information to investors, also in narrative form, to ensure they have 
the information needed to make well-founded investment decisions. Thus, with the ever-
advancing possibilities of natural language processing, the analysis of qualitative data is 
indispensable and the question inevitably arises as to whether the qualitative information 
provided contributes to our understanding of IPO underpricing. 
This paper contributes to answering this question by analyzing whether and how 
qualitative information impacts initial-day returns of US Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs). Prior studies investigating the impact of qualitative information on IPO 
underpricing exclude the REIT sector due to its financial characteristics, legal requirements, 
and differing performance.16 Nonetheless, as evidenced by its recent market capitalization 
                                                 
16 While the underpricing discount for non-REIT IPOs is consensual, REIT IPOs can historically be either 
overpriced (e.g., Wang et al., 1992) or underpriced (e.g., Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). However, after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, allowing REITs to be internally managed, studies generally find significant underpricing 
for REIT IPOs, albeit lower than for industrial firm IPOs (e.g., Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Gokkaya et al., 2015). 
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of $1,249,186.3 million as of December 31, 2020 for 223 listed REITs, the US REIT sector 
is significant to the overall economy and certainly worthy of consideration. In addition, the 
high dividend payout requirement of at least 90% of their taxable earnings renders REITs 
dependent on external equity capital in order to take advantage of growth opportunities. 
As a result, US REIT managers have an unusually strong incentive to reduce underpricing. 
Likewise, they have a high motivation to maintain investor trust (e.g., Price et al., 2017), 
which ensures high disclosure quality. 
To assess whether qualitative information helps to explain initial-day returns of US REIT 
IPOs, we analyze the IPO prospectus, or more accurately, the registration statement which 
must be filed with the SEC before stock offerings, to provide investors with crucial 
information. For REITs or companies whose primary business is acquiring and holding real 
estate for investment purposes, the registration statement is presented in Form S-11. Given 
that the filing must pass the SEC’s critical review in order to proceed with the IPO, it is 
reasonable to assume that Form S-11 discloses valuable information about the issue. We 
expect this information to be of major importance in solving the underpricing puzzle, as 
theories attributing the phenomenon to asymmetric information are widely accepted. The 
variety of theories revolving around asymmetric information thereby explain the 
underpricing phenomenon by differences in the level of information between issuers and 
investors or between different groups of investors (i.e., informed vs. uninformed). Clearly, 
a filing required by the SEC with the intention to provide investors with substantial 
information about the IPO, should reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, we expect 
companies filing registration statements that reveal useful and explicit information to have 
lower underpricing. 
Analyzing the level of uncertain language in a prospectus, as well as its similarity to 
registration forms filed in the past six months, we indeed find that qualitative information 
in Form S-11 contributes to the understanding of US REIT IPOs. However, against our initial 
expectation that cautious wording makes it more difficult for investors to value the issue 
and thus increases initial-day returns, we do not find a statistically significant impact of the 
level of uncertain language on underpricing. We conclude that cautious wording is induced 
by forecasting difficulties and litigation risks, rather than reflecting issuer confidence in the 
future prospects of the firm. By contrast, document similarity is statistically and 
economically significant related to underpricing of US REIT IPOs. We assume that higher 
similarity to prior filings indicates that the filing contains a relatively high proportion of 
standard content or boilerplates, but little useful information. Thus, information 
asymmetries persist, leading to increased underpricing. In sum, our results show that 
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qualitative information, just like quantitative information, conveys valuable insights, 
impacts investors’ capability to price the issue and thus affects underpricing. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which applies textual analysis to 
corporate disclosures of US REITs in order to explain IPO underpricing. We demonstrate 
that textual analysis can indeed help to explain initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs, as 
qualitative information in Forms S-11 decreases information asymmetries between US REIT 
managers and investors, thus reducing underpricing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 presents common theories 
explaining the underpricing phenomenon, discusses related literature analyzing how 
textual features affect initial-day returns of industrial firms, summarizes studies examining 
REIT underpricing, and finally, develops hypotheses. The textual analysis procedure and 
data used for this study are described in Sections 4.4 and 4.6, while the empirical methods 
for the analysis are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.7 discusses the empirical results, 
and Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.3 Previous Literature and Hypotheses Development  
4.3.1 Common Theories to explain IPO Underpricing 
Since Ibbotson (1975) provided evidence of underpricing, researchers have proposed 
numerous theories to explain why IPOs have positive initial returns, mostly citing litigation 
risk, information asymmetries, or behavioral aspects as potential causes. 
Ibbotson (1975) originally suggested that underpricing serves as insurance against 
lawsuits, opening up a whole strand of litigation-based literature. Since the Securities Act 
of 1933, each party signing the registration statement in the US is liable for its contents, 
which is the SEC's way of ensuring adequate pre-market due diligence and investor 
protection (Tinic, 1988). According to Lowry and Shu (2002), issuers try to minimize the 
risk of being sued and to avoid associated costs, by underpricing their IPOs. Underpricing 
is intended to prevent financial damages from unforeseen risks that serve as the basis for 
a lawsuit, and thus reduce investor propensity to sue. While litigation theories help us 
understand the underpricing puzzle for countries with strong investor protection, such as 
the US, they have minor importance in other markets. 
By contrast, information-asymmetry-based theories, as initially proposed by Ritter (1984) 
and Rock (1986), find a wider application. According to the authors, underpricing arises 
due to asymmetric information between investors, whereby informed investors are 
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assumed to be the best-informed stakeholders, as they collectively even know more than 
the issuer. Once shares are evenly distributed among all participants and informed 
investors only place orders for underpriced IPOs, uninformed investors suffer from their 
order being allocated partially to underpriced IPOs, but fully to overpriced IPOs. Hence, 
IPOs must on average be underpriced, so that uninformed investors generate a positive 
return and keep participating in the IPO market, despite the predominant allocation of less 
attractive IPOs. Beatty and Ritter (1986) further find that underpricing increases with rising 
ex-ante uncertainty about an IPO. Firms with higher ex-ante uncertainty promise higher 
returns, which leads to more investors becoming informed. Consequently, uninformed 
investors are allocated even fewer shares, the more attractive or uncertain an IPO, 
requiring higher underpricing to participate in the offering. The book-building theory of 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) modifies these theories by assuming that shares are 
distributed with priority to regular investors. Since investors in their entirety are the best-
informed stakeholder group, the issuer relies on their premarket indications of interest 
when pricing an IPO. However, the issuer faces investors who are unwilling to reveal any 
information, as this would increase the proportion of informed investors and decrease their 
returns. Using investors’ premarket indications of interest in share allocation, issuers force 
investors to disclose their interest, otherwise investors would jeopardize their own interests 
by indicating for something other than actual interest. Underpricing hereby acts as an 
incentive for investors to reveal their information. Sherman and Titman (2002) further 
emphasize the value of information by arguing that information-generation is costly and 
can either be conducted by investors or the issuer. According to the authors, it depends 
on the relative costs and benefits of issuers and investors, regarding who acquires the 
information. If investors are to participate in the information gathering process, their effort 
must be compensated for through higher initial returns. 
While litigation and information asymmetry theories support the existence of underpricing, 
they fail to explain oscillations in hot market periods, such as the dot-com bubble. For 
those periods, behavioral theories, assuming irrational stakeholder behavior, come into 
play. Miller (1977) proposed that a small group of excessively optimistic investors, who are 
characteristic of hot markets, can drive up first-day closing prices if they can clear the 
market. Welch (1992) adds that the sequential sale of the shares creates a cascade effect, 
where later investors solely rely on prior sales as a buying motive instead of their own 
private information. Therefore, issuers try to attract early investors through underpricing 
their IPOs. In contrast, Loughran and Ritter (2002) state that issuers are the ones behaving 
irrationally, as they do not care about the level of wealth, but about the change in wealth. 
Issuers most of the time, and especially during hot market phases, experience a positive 
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change in wealth, as the increase in share prices during the IPO usually outweighs the 
losses due to undervaluation. 
Despite major efforts to explain why issuers accept the large amount of "money left on 
the table", none of the above theories can fully explain the phenomenon. The theories are 
thus not mutually exclusive and seem to have varying importance during selected time 
periods and market phases. While behavioral theories help to understand oscillations in 
hot market periods, litigation based and information asymmetry theories justify the general 
existence of underpricing. However, the vast majority of theories center on asymmetric 
information, as this seems to best explain underpricing over time and space. 
4.3.2 Textual Analysis and Underpricing of IPOs 
Fueled by the increasing availability of textual information and advances in the processing 
of this complex data, an emerging body of accounting and finance literature has attempted 
to explain initial-day returns of industrial firms through the use of textual analysis. Thereby, 
researchers have most frequently relied on news articles or corporate disclosures to 
examine the impact of qualitative information on IPO pricing. 
The literature investigating news articles has mainly focused on news coverage (e.g., 
Schrand and Verrecchia, 2005; Cook et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2020) or sentiment (e.g., 
Bajo and Raimondo, 2017; Zou et al., 2020) to assess whether and how textual analysis 
contributes to solving the underpricing puzzle. News coverage, that is the number of 
articles mentioning the issuing company before the IPO day, has thereby provided 
ambivalent evidence on how it affects underpricing. Schrand and Verrecchia (2005) and 
Chen et al. (2020) show, for a US and global sample respectively, that greater pre-IPO 
disclosure frequency reduces information asymmetry and hence underpricing. By contrast, 
Cook et al. (2006) present supporting evidence of a positive correlation between pre-IPO 
media coverage and underpricing of US IPOs. Using news coverage as a proxy for 
investment banker promotional activity to attract sentiment investors, this study postulates 
that higher pre-offer publicity leads to more sentiment investors and higher underpricing. 
Sentiment, in the sense of the tone conveyed by the media, has been examined, for 
example, by Bajo and Raimondo (2017) and Zou et al. (2020). While the former claim that 
a positive media tone increases investor interest and demand for shares, and find that 
positive sentiment increases first-day returns, the latter state that both positive and 
negative words contain useful information, thus reducing the degree of information 
asymmetry between investors and issuer, and thus decreasing underpricing.  
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Studies focusing on corporate disclosures have investigated, for example, the industrial 
counterpart to Form S-11, the initial document for registering a non-REIT stock offering 
with the SEC (Form S-1), or the final IPO prospectus filed at the time of or a few days after 
the IPO (Form 424). Again, sentiment is a common technique to process qualitative 
information. For example, Ferris et al. (2013) and Loughran and McDonald (2013) analyze 
the tone conveyed in certain sections of Form 424 and the entire Form S-1, respectively, 
and find that conservatism and uncertainty revealed by the issuing firm increase 
underpricing. According to the authors, conservative or uncertain language reflects issuer 
confidence in the company's future prospects and makes it more difficult for investors to 
price the issue, so that companies must set a lower price to attract investors. Conducting 
similar analyses for the Chinese market, Yan et al. (2019) confirm that uncertain or negative 
tone is positively associated with first-day returns. In contrast to previously mentioned 
studies, which focus on financial words, Brau et al. (2016) analyze strategic words and find 
a more positive strategic tone to be associated with higher underpricing. Brau et al. (2016) 
interpret their results as suggesting that investors misprice soft information, i.e., the tone 
in the registration statement. To utilize the qualitative information in Form S-1, Hanley and 
Hoberg (2010) determine the informativeness of disclosures. Specifically, they split 
prospectuses into their standard and informative components, where standard content is 
the part of the prospectus that was already included in recent and past industry IPOs, while 
informative content is the residual that is not explained by these two sources. In line with 
Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) book-building theory, Hanley and Hoberg (2010) find that 
more informative disclosures signaling greater effort by issuers during premarket are 
associated with lower underpricing. Instead of analyzing corporate disclosures in their 
entirety, some studies assume that a specific section of the prospectus is particularly 
important for pricing, and limit themselves to parts of the disclosure such as the use-of-
proceeds or the risk-factor section. Beatty and Ritter (1986), who were among the first to 
analyze IPO prospectuses, restrict their analysis to the use-of-proceeds section as an 
example, and find a positive relationship between the number of uses, which serves as a 
proxy for ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing. Similarly, Leone et al. (2007) show that 
firms that are more specific in the use-of-proceeds section reduce ex-ante uncertainty and 
therefore have lower underpricing. Examining the risk factor section instead, Beatty and 
Welch (1996) and Arnold et al. (2010) link greater disclosure to higher first-day returns. 
Beatty and Welch (1996) employ the number of risk factors declared in the prospectus to 
proxy for ex-ante uncertainty, while Arnold et al. (2010) use the section to measure 
ambiguity, claiming that risk information is per se soft and ambiguous, and that investors 
demand compensation for ambiguous prospectuses. 
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4.3.3 Underpricing of US REIT IPOs 
Whereas the non-REIT literature has analyzed several disclosure-media and textual features 
to solve the underpricing puzzle, the literature on REIT initial-day returns has so far only 
relied on quantitative factors to explain the phenomenon.   
One of the first studies to analyze REIT IPOs was Wang et al. (1992), who find, in contrast 
to general evidence from industrial firm IPOs, a return of -2.82% on the first trading day 
for 87 REITs going public between 1971 and 1988. REIT overpricing was invariant to 
several influencing factors such as offer price, issue size, distribution method, offer period, 
and underwriter reputation. Ling and Ryngaert (1997), by contrast, report significant 
average underpricing of 3.6% for a sample of equity REIT IPOs issued during the period 
1991-1994. The authors attribute this turnaround from over- to underpricing to the regime 
change that occurred with US equity REITs in the late 1980s, and the subsequent increased 
interest of institutional investors. The evolvement of the REIT industry from being externally 
managed to internally managed has increased uncertainty regarding the issuing firms’ 
value. Additionally, a larger share of institutional, presumably better-informed investors, 
has made REIT IPOs more susceptible to the winner's curse (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). 
Indeed, analyzing both direct and indirect costs of REIT IPOs, Chen and Lu (2006) find 
higher gross spreads, overpricing, and high frequency of integer offer prices in the 1980s, 
which confirms that REIT IPOs were at that time mainly marketed to less informed 
individual investors. In line with previous literature, initial-day returns shifted from -1.30% 
in the 1980s to 4.30% in the 1990s for their sample of 197 US REITs. The researchers 
further identify determinants of the indirect costs of going public (i.e., underpricing). 
Whereas gross spreads are negatively associated with initial-day returns, underpricing is 
higher for self-managed REITs, internally advised REITs, UPREITs, and REITs with higher 
institutional holdings. Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) add to the findings of Chen and Lu 
(2006), by revealing a negative relation between underpricing and underwriter reputation, 
industry differentiated auditors, and REITs’ post-offer ownership structure. Their study also 
documents an average underpricing of 3.18% and a value-weighted underpricing of 
4.76% for a sample of 123 US REIT IPOs issued between 1996 and 2010, suggesting that 
offer size affects initial-day returns of US REITs. Buttimer et al. (2005) and Hartzell et al. 
(2005) analyze the presence of cycles or waves for the REIT industry. The former define a 
wave (i.e., hot market) as any year with 10 or more REIT IPOs, while the latter use a supply- 
and demand-side definition represented by the IPO volume and initial day returns, 
respectively. Both studies find positive initial returns of US REIT IPOs (2.47% and 0.27%), 
although the stock price performance is the same in both hot and cold markets. 
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Further adding to the understanding of initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs, Dolvin and Pyles 
(2009) and Gokkaya et al. (2015) compare underpricing of REIT and non-REIT IPOs. 
Although both studies find significant underpricing for REIT issuances, initial-day returns 
are lower than that observed for a matching industrial sample. The lower underpricing of 
REITs has thereby been attributed to their unique nature and specific regulatory 
requirements, making them more transparent than general stocks, and thus easier to value 
for potential investors (Buttimer et al., 2005; Hartzell et al., 2005; and Dolvin and Pyles, 
2009). However, despite being considered more transparent than their industrial 
counterparts, REITs suffer from information asymmetry. Measuring the net asset value of 
REITs is difficult for investors, as the underlying assets are heterogenous and illiquid. In 
addition, REITs are actively managed, further complicating valuation due to the growth 
options developed by managers (Ghosh et al., 2000). Therefore, incorporating the 
qualitative information from corporate disclosures using textual analysis may also be 
valuable in solving the underpricing puzzle of US REIT IPOs. REITs thereby offer a unique 
and useful setting for conducting textual analysis, as they are strongly incentivized to 
minimize “money left on the table” when going public, and thus guarantee high disclosure 
quality. Given the high distribution requirement of at least 90% of their taxable earnings, 
REITs have a very limited cash reserve by regulation, and are highly dependent on external 
equity capital in order to take advantage of growth opportunities. Thus, consistent with 
Beatty and Ritter's (1986) asymmetric information hypothesis, REIT managers might 
voluntarily reveal valuable insights into the upcoming IPO through corporate disclosures, 
in order to reduce information asymmetry and underpricing.  
4.3.4 Hypothesis Development 
Recognizing that asymmetric information between the parties involved in the IPO can be 
reduced by quantitative and qualitative information alike, this study complements earlier 
studies by investigating whether and how qualitative data in Form S-11 affects initial-day 
returns of US REIT IPOs. Informing investors about the firms’ business model, financial 
situation, potential problems or risks, and other important information, Form S-11 presents 
one of the most important documents during the IPO process. Before it is filed, IPO firms 
are typically without public record. As such, we not only expect Form S-11 to contain 
valuable insights, but also that sophisticated investors process the filing to use the 
information in order to value the offer. Under these circumstances, Form S-11 could help 
to reduce information asymmetry between the parties involved in the IPO. However, the 
language used in Form S-11 can impact on investors capability to price the issue (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2013; Ferris et al., 2013). Whereas explicit language would facilitate the 
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inclusion of value-related information, executives tend to use uncertain language, 
frequently using words like "may," "could," "depends," and "approximately". Although 
necessary to reduce litigation risk, as the future prospects of the issuing firm are uncertain, 
cautious wording makes it difficult for investors to evaluate the IPO. Furthermore, word 
choice may reflect issuer confidence in projecting financial outcomes, so that extreme 
linguistic caution could even imply that executives themselves are not confident about the 
company's prospects. Hence, the level of uncertain language in Form S-11 might serve as 
a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty.  
In line with Beatty and Ritter (1986), who demonstrate a positive link between ex-ante 
uncertainty about an IPO’s value and its initial return, we expect that firms providing filings 
with uncertain language need to underprice more, to attract investors, and we thus 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of uncertain language in Form S-11 make it more difficult for 
investors to price the issue and thus increase initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs.  
Although Form S-11 is the major document providing information to investors during the 
IPO process, it is also a standard document required by the SEC. Therefore, Form S-11 
contains a relatively high proportion of standardized content. In particular, registration 
statements filed at the same time, subject to the same regulatory requirements, and 
exposed to the same market environment, may be similar. Clearly, registration statements 
which are by large boilerplate do not help investors to determine the true value of the firm. 
By contrast, unique and specific disclosures that are different from registration statements 
filed by firms that recently brought an IPO to the market, are likely to provide valuable 
insights. Thus, we develop a similarity measure indicating the informativeness of a 
disclosure by comparing it to registration statements filed up to six months prior to the 
document in question. Assuming that disclosures which are similar to past prospectuses 
provide little useful information and thus not resolve information asymmetry, we formulate 
our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: A higher level of similarity of Form S-11 to previously filed registration 
statements indicates low information content, persistent information asymmetry, and 
thus higher underpricing of US REIT IPOs. 
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4.4 Textual Analysis Procedure 
To test our hypotheses, we extract textual features from Form S-11. Specifically, we 
determine the level of uncertain language in the prospectus, as well as its similarity to 
recently filed registration statements. 
4.4.1 Disclosure Tone    
To determine the level of uncertain language, we rely on sentiment dictionaries which 
classify the words in the prospectus into pre-defined categories (e.g., positive, negative). 
Tetlock (2007) provides what is probably the pioneering study applying the dictionary-
based approach to extract sentiment in the financial domain. Examining news articles from 
The Wall Street Journal, Tetlock emphasizes that high values of media pessimism induce 
downward pressure on market prices, and that unusually high or low pessimism predicts 
temporarily high market-trading volumes. Subsequently, several papers followed his 
example and relied on dictionary-based approaches to extract qualitative information from 
text (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Garcia, 2013). 
Accordingly, researchers have employed a variety of dictionaries, including general English 
language dictionaries such as the Diction or the Harvard GI wordlists (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; 
Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012), as well as dictionaries created specifically for financial text 
(e.g., Henry, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Since domain-specific wordlists have 
proven superior (Henry and Leone, 2016; Doran et al., 2012), a financial dictionary created 
by Loughran and McDonald (2011), by examining word usage in 10-Ks, has become 
popular. In line with previous literature, we measure Uncertainty using the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) sentiment wordlists.17 We thereby follow Loughran and McDonald's 
(2013) recommendation and use an aggregate uncertainty measure, which comprises 
words from the uncertain, weak modal, and negative wordlists to determine the level of 
uncertain language in Form S-11 (Uncertainty).  
Assigning all words in the prospectus to the respective categories of the LM dictionary, we 
obtain the raw count of uncertainty words included in the prospectus. Since this number 
is, however, strongly tied to document length, we use the ratio of uncertain words to the 
total number of words in the prospectus as a measure of disclosure uncertainty:  
                                                 
17 The wordlists are available at https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/. 
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`&	V = `&	V ^- #"a b ^- (4.1) 
Before applying the financial dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011), we clean the 
data to reduce linguistic complexity and facilitate the textual analysis procedure. 
Specifically, we remove appendices and html formatting, transfer all text to lower case and 
eliminate white spaces, numbers, and punctuation.  
4.4.2 Disclosure Similarity 
Given that we expect prospectuses filed at the same time to be particularly similar, we 
determine a similarity score (Cosine) for each disclosure, by comparing it to registration 
statements filed up to six months prior to the document in question. If there are not at 
least two filings available for that time period, we go back further in time to obtain two 
documents for comparison. Similarity is thus determined using one of the most popular 
measures for identifying the similarity of two documents – the Cosine Similarity. This 
technique was used, for example, by Brown and Tucker (2011), who measure year-over-
year modifications in MD&A disclosures; Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) who examine 
annual report similarity; Peterson et al. (2015) who compare accounting policy footnotes 
in 10-K filings; Hoberg and Phillips (2010; 2016) who focus on product descriptions in 10-
K filings; and Hanley and Hoberg (2010) who decompose IPO prospectuses into their 
standard and informative components. 
The basic idea of applying cosine similarity to text classification problems is to map 
documents onto a vector space model (VSM), which enables measuring the similarity 
between two vectors or textual documents by computing the dot product. We thus create 
a VSM by representing each IPO prospectus i as an N-dimensional vector Vi summarizing 
its word usage. Thereby, each element n of the vector Vi corresponds to a specific word 
that is present in the textual corpus and denotes the frequency of appearance of the 
respective word in prospectus i. For example, the vectors v1 and v2 for two documents in 
the corpus are as follows:  

! =  (c!, c%, … , ce=!,  ce) and 
% =  (f!, f%, … , fe=!,  fe), (4.2) 
where wn and ψn specify the frequency of each word n ϵ [1, N]. N comprises only essential 
words, i.e., no numbers, punctuation, and stopwords. Additionally, vectors are based on 
word roots identified using the Porter (1980) stemming algorithm, rather than explicit 
word inflections.  
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Having stored all prospectuses i in the sample into vectors Vi, we determine the similarity 




%) =  gA ∙ gB‖gA‖ ‖gB‖  , (4.3) 
where 
! ∙ 
% represents the dot product of the two vectors, ‖ 
!‖ is the length of vector 
 
!, and ‖ 
%‖ is the length of vector  
%. Thus, the cosine similarity is geometrically the 
cosine of the angle between the two vectors, normalized to their vector length. Although 
the dot product itself provides a measure of similarity, normalization avoids over-scoring 
larger documents. To determine the similarity of three documents (i.e., the prospectus in 
question and two prospectuses filed up to six months earlier), we determine the mean 
vector of the comparative documents, and calculate Cosine using the mean vector along 
with the vector of the document of interest. For non-negative vectors, the measure is 
bounded between 0 and 1, where two prospectuses using exactly the same words have 
the same orientation, and thus, a cosine similarity of 1, whereas prospectuses with no 
words in common are orthogonal and have a similarity of 0.  
Figure 4.1 provides a simplified example illustrating the textual analysis procedure for 
determining disclosure similarity. Each of the three introductory statements from Form 
S-11, A, B, and C, is represented as a vector, with each value indicating the number of 
occurrences of the corresponding word in the sentence. The resulting VSM enables 
calculating the level of similarity of the respective statements. 
Figure 4.1: Stylized Illustration of Cosine Similarity 
Panel A 
A is a REIT that focuses on the ownership of community shopping centers. 
B is a REIT that focuses on the ownership of regional shopping centers. 
C is a REIT that focuses on the acquisition of suburban office properties. 
Panel B 
 REIT focuses ownership community 
shopping 
centers 
regional acquisition suburban 
office 
properties 
A 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
B 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
C 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Panel C 
 A and B A and C B and C 
Vector  
j = (1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0)  
j = (1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0)  
k = (1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0) 
  
k = (1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0)  
l  = (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1)  




j‖ =  √5, ‖ 
k‖ =
 √5   
‖ 
j‖ =  √5, ‖ 
l‖ =
 √5   
‖ 
k‖ =  √5, ‖ 
l‖ =
 √5   
Dot Product 4 2 2 
Similarity  0.8 0.4 0.4 
This figure illustrates the textual analysis procedure for determining cosine similarity. Panel A 
presents three introductory statements from Form S-11 of US REITs, stopwords are highlighted in 
grey. Panel B shows tokens in a document frequency matrix. Panel C presents the determination of 
the similarity score.   
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With a similarity score (Cosine) of 0.8 for sentences A and B and 0.4 for sentences A and 
C and B and C, respectively, Figure 4.1 shows that sentences A and B are similar, while 
sentences A and C and B and C are rather different. 
 
4.5 Model Specification 
To assess whether qualitative information in Form S-11 helps to explain the underpricing 
of US REIT IPOs, we regress the tone revealed in Form S-11 (Uncertainty) and the similarity 
score (Cosine) on the initial-day returns of the IPO (IR), respectively. Specifically, the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model is as follows: 
m*$ =  +  !Z# #$ +  %($ + n$ , (4.4) 
where n$ denotes the error term and we assume n$  ~ (0, o%). In addition to the vector 
of textual features comprising tone (Uncertainty) and similarity (Cosine), the regression 




For the purpose of our analysis, we combine multiple datasets: (1) the text corpus given 
by Form S-11 obtained from EDGAR, (2) the IPO first-day return calculated by using the 
first closing price from CRSP and the initial offer price, as well as (3) IPO specific control 
variables comprising firm characteristics, offering characteristics, third-party certification, 
and market conditions. Control variables are derived from CRSP, Compustat, Thompson 
Reuters, and Jay R Ritter’s website. 
4.6.1 Textual Corpus 
Our initial sample includes US Equity REITs that have completed an IPO between January 
1996 and December 2019, as reported by the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT). Mortgage REITs are excluded from the analysis, because they 
differ in characteristics (e.g., underlying asset, risk structure), and are recognized as less 
transparent to value for external investors (Buttimer et al., 2005). For each IPO in the 
sample, we employ a web-crawling algorithm to download Form S-11 from the SEC’s 
Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. If there are multiple filings 
available, we select the closest to the IPO date, to ensure that we include all information 
available prior to the day of going public. However, we do not intend to download 
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amended filings, as amendments are typically shorter, include more numbers and legal 
notes. Likewise, the final IPO prospectus (Form 424) is not the subject of this study, as it is 
filed on or shortly after the day of going public, so that the qualitative information in this 
disclosure is unlikely to affect IPO underpricing. Although part of the initial sample, 
prospectuses filed in 1996 are only used to calculate the similarity (Cosine) of subsequent 
IPOs. Since no filings are available to determine Cosine for REITs that went public in 1996, 
these observations are dropped. Furthermore, IPOs that do not have a Form S-11 filing 
available online, lack the necessary control variables or initial-day returns are eliminated, 
resulting in an overall sample of 114 US REIT IPOs. 
4.6.2 Underpricing 
In order to calculate underpricing, we match each REIT that issued an IPO during the 
sample period with data from CRSP. In accordance with prior studies (e.g., Brobert, 2016; 
Chen et al., 2020), the initial-day return represents the return enjoyed by IPO investors on 
the first day of trading of a new issue, and is defined as follows:  
m*$, = pq,<=pq,<rApq,<rA  , (4.5) 
where $, is the closing price on the first day of trading from CRSP, and $,=! is the initial 
offer price as recorded by NAREIT.    
Figure 4.2 displays the number of IPOs, as well as average underpricing on a yearly basis. 
The sample of IPOs is not distributed equally across time; instead Figure 4.2 suggests the 
prevalence of hot and cold market periods. For example, 2000/2001 and 2008 are cold 
market periods that correspond with stock market declines, commonly referred to as the 
end of the dot-com era and the global financial crisis. Similarly, average underpricing varies 
over time. During the hottest market period (1997-1999), underpricing is high, suggesting 
that irrationally optimistic sentiment investors were active in the REIT IPO market at that 
time. Likewise, high initial-day returns are observed in the years before the global financial 
crisis, while the post-crisis period is characterized by low underpricing. 
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Figure 4.2: Number of IPOs and average underpricing over Years 
 
This figure shows the number of IPOs, as well as average underpricing on a yearly basis between 1997 and 2019. 
 
4.6.3 Control Variables 
To control for information beyond textual clues revealed in Form S-11 that might affect 
initial-day returns of REITs, a set of control variables is included. We describe all control 
variables below, and provide more specific definitions in Table 4.5 in the Appendix. We 
cluster the controls into four subsets: firm characteristics, offering characteristics, third-
party certification, and market conditions. 
For the first of the four, we include the natural logarithm of the age of the firm (Age), and 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s valuation (Size) as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty. 
More mature firms provide a longer track record and operating history, while larger 
offerings are typically issued by well-established firms that have more publicly available 
information. Thus, the information-gathering process of potential investors is easier for 
both older and larger firms, which results in a lower level of underpricing. Because we 
expect more profitable companies to require less underpricing to attract investors, we 
include a dummy variable equal to one if the firms’ earnings per share is positive in the IPO 
year (EPS), as a measure of profitability. Furthermore, we incorporate a common proxy for 
firm risk, Leverage, which we expect to be positively related to underpricing. Recognizing 
that this study is based on a REIT sample, we additionally include a dummy variable 
(Property_Type) which indicates whether the firm invests in one or more property types 
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investors to value a firm that is invested in multiple property types, so that the issuer must 
compensate for the complexity by higher initial-day returns.  
Controls belonging to the subset of offering characteristics are Offer_Price, Up_Revision, 
and Share_Overhang. We take into consideration whether the Offer_Price is an integer or 
not, since integer values might signal valuation uncertainty (Bradley et al., 2004). 
Underwriter and issuing firm dispense with a holistic valuation in order to precisely 
calculate the price and agree on an overall price, so as to save time and costs (Harris, 
1991). Thus, integer values are associated with higher initial-day returns (Bradley et al., 
2004). Another control variable related to the offer price is Up_Revision, the percentage 
upward revision from the mid-point of the initial filing range. The offer price is usually 
raised by the underwriter when the issue is in high demand. However, investors require 
for compensation to truthfully disclose their demand during book-building. Thus, the offer 
price is only partially adjusted, with the remainder of the adjustment taking on the form 
of underpricing to compensate investors (Bradley and Jordan, 2002). This causes a positive 
relation between Up_Revision and underpricing. It is important to note, however, that 
firms often sell only a fraction of their outstanding shares in the IPO. The unsold shares, or 
more precisely the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares in the IPO, 
is usually referred to as Share_Overhang. Since the cost of underpricing for the issuer 
decreases as Share_Overhang increases, a larger Share_Overhang is associated with 
greater underpricing (Bradley and Jordan, 2002).  
Third-party certification is represented by a dummy variable (Underwriter) equal to one if 
the IPO's lead underwriter was ranked as top tier (value of nine) according to the Carter 
and Manaster (1990) ranking, as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). The underwriter 
serves a certification role, with underwriters of high reputation guaranteeing a more 
accurate premarket valuation of the issuing company. Additionally, prestigious 
underwriters tend to underwrite less risky IPOs in order to protect their reputation. 
Therefore, top-tier underwriters signal high quality, in addition to increasing the 
transparency and credibility of the information. Consequently, underwriter prestige is 
expected to have a negative effect on underpricing.  
The final subset of controls addresses market conditions at the time of the IPO and 
comprises a dummy variable for a Hot_Market, and the standard deviation of stock returns 
for the first 20 days after the IPO (Volatility). Following Buttimer et al. (2005), Hot_Market 
equals one in years experiencing ten or more IPOs. Many new IPO issuances indicate 
positive sentiment in the capital market, making investors more receptive to further 
offerings and expecting lower compensation (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). Volatility, as 
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a common measure of risk, shows whether market participants agreed with the pricing 
before and after the IPO. If this is the case, volatility and underpricing are low (Ascherl et 
al, 2018). 
4.6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the 114 REIT IPOs, and 
textual features of their registration statements. The average underpricing for our sample 
is a statistically and economically significant 2.49%. This is relatively low compared to non-
REITs, but consistent with previous research on US REITs (e.g., Buttimer et al., 2005; Chan 
et al., 2013). On average, the offer prices are revised upwards by 4.83% from the mid-
point of the initial filing range. Hereby, 78.1% of the final offer prices are integers. The 
average size of a REIT at the time of the IPO is $665.9 million, with a maximum of $7,215.6 
million and a minimum of only $12.0 million. However, only 29.94% of the outstanding 
shares are sold to the market. As evidenced by an average score of 7.7 on the Carter and 
Manaster (1990) scale and 44.7% selecting an underwriter ranked 9, REITs appear to 
prefer underwriters with excellent reputation. The average standard deviation of daily 
stock returns for the first 20 days after the IPO is 1.25%. The age of the issuing company 
is on average 6 years. In the IPO year, 47.4% of the issuing firms have positive earnings 
per share and are on average 43.3% debt financed. While 76.3% of the firms were 
invested in a single property type, the remaining 23.7% held multiple types of real estate 
assets.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean StDev Min 5th Median 95th Max 
Form S-11 
Uncertainty  0.0256 0.0031 0.0179 0.0202 0.0263 0.0303 0.0325 
UncertaintyLM 0.0272 0.0032 0.0197 0.0219 0.0277 0.0319 0.0341 
Cosine 0.8805 0.0547 0.6650 0.7814 0.8888 0.9456 0.9700 
CosineLM 0.8665 0.0562 0.6445 0.7791 0.8754 0.9348 0.9643 
Control Variables 
Age 6.3684 12.0568 1 1 2 26 80 
Size (mm) 665.8947 1,091.5417 12.0000 58.6946 32.8077 2,558.1013 7,215.5800 
EPS 0.4737 0.5015 0 0 0 1 1 
Leverage 0.4333 0.1970 0.0030 0.04087 0.4554 0.7457 0.8352 
Property_Type 0.2368 0.4270 0 0 0 1 1 
Offer_Price 0.7807 0.4156 0 0 1 1 1 
Up_Revision -0.0483 0.0806 -0.2727 -0.1938 -0.0426 0.0531 0.1500 
Share_Overhang 0.2994 0.2848 0.0000 0.0000 0.2084 0.8209 0.9032 
Underwriter 0.4474 0.4994 0 0 0 1 1 
Hot_Market 0.3772 0.4868 0 0 0 1 1 
Volatility 0.0125 0.0078 0.0044 0.0056 0.0114 0.0219 0.0658 
see next page 
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Table 4.1: continued 
Dependent Variable 
IR  0.0249 0.0676 -0.1338 -0.0540 0.0017 0.1300 0.3750 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the textual features extracted from Form S-11 (Uncertainty and 
Cosine), further control variables, and the dependent variables (IR). The definition of all variables is presented in 
Table 4.5 in the Appendix. The sample consists of 114 US REIT IPOs from 1996 to 2019. 
 
The textual features extracted for the analysis suggest that REIT IPO prospectuses display 
a low level of Uncertainty and are relatively similar to each other. The mean of Uncertainty 
is 0.0256, indicating that on average, 2.56% of the total words in disclosures are 
uncertainty words. The observed standard deviation of 0.0031 is quite small, so that the 
uncertainty levels of the individual prospectuses are close to the overall mean. The 
similarity score, which ranges between 0 and 1 by construction, averages 0.88, and varies 
from a 5th percentile of 0.78 to a 95th percentile of 0.95. The high similarity of documents 
can be attributed to the comparison within a single industry, but is certainly also induced 
by the strict regulatory requirements for SEC registration statements and the specific 
requirements for US REITs. 
 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Disclosure Tone is not informative 
To analyze Hypothesis 1, which predicts that a higher level of uncertain language in Form 
S-11 is related to increased underpricing, we regress the disclosure tone on the level of 
underpricing. We run two model specifications, the first of which only includes quantitative 
factors influencing initial-day returns (Model 1), whereas the second contains traditional 
factors along with the level of uncertain language (Model 2). 
Table 4.2 column one presents regression results with the traditional IPO control variables. 
Seven of the eleven independent variables are statistically significantly associated with 
initial-day returns. The insignificance of the variables Offer_Price, Underwriter, Leverage, 
and Property_Type could be due to the strong influence of the other variables. The 
goodness of fit of this regression is 39.5%. Contradicting our hypothesis, we do not find 
a statistically significant relation between Uncertainty and IPO underpricing (IR), when 
incorporating our measure of uncertain language into Model 2.  
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Table 4.2: Initial-Day Return – Disclosure Tone 












Intercept -0.344***  -0.270**  
 (-2.776)  (-2.021)  
Age 0.011** 1.22% 0.010** 1.11% 
 (2.117)  (2.005)  
Size 0.019*** 2.22% 0.019*** 2.22% 
 (2.955)  (2.981)  
EPS 0.028** 1.40% 0.024** 1.20% 
 (2.601)  (2.138)  
Leverage -0.015 -0.30% -0.015 -0.30% 
 (-0.553)  (-0.530)  
Property_Type -0.003 -0.13% -0.001 -0.04% 
 (-0.255)  (-0.102)  
Offer_Price -0.002 -0.08% -0.004 -0.17% 
 (-0.128)  (-0.336)  
Up_Revision 0.283*** 2.28% 0.297*** 2.39% 
 (4.047)  (4.227)  
Share_Overhang -0.040* -1.14% -0.036 -1.03% 
 (-1.662)  (-1.480)  
Underwriter -0.019 -0.95% -0.019 -0.95% 
 (-1.540)  (-1.582)  
Hot Market 0.029** 1.41% 0.026** 1.27% 
 (2.619)  (2.327)  
Volatility 0.641 0.50% 0.390 0.30% 
 (0.829)  (0.494)  
Uncertainty   -2.635 -0.82% 
   (-1.442)  
N 114  114  
R2 0.395  0.407  
Adj. R2 0.329  0.336  
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model using first-day IPO 
returns as the dependent variable. The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of 
determinants affecting initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs. Economic significance is defined as the coefficient 
multiplied by the standard deviation. The definition of all variables is presented in Table 4.5 in the Appendix. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
This result contrasts with Loughran and McDonald (2013), who find that uncertain 
language produces higher initial-day returns. However, the authors put their results into 
perspective, providing a possible explanation for the diverging results. While Loughran and 
McDonald (2013) analyze a sample of firms characterized by low sales and negative 
earnings, they clarify that it is unclear whether prospectus wording is as important for 
large, established firms with highly profitable businesses. With a positive earnings ratio of 
48% compared to 37% of firms in the Loughran and McDonald (2013) sample which 
shows positive earnings in the IPO year, we conclude that our US REIT sample presents 
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precisely this exception. In addition, soft information like language has proven to exert a 
greater impact on prices when hard information is noisier (Dye and Sridhar, 2004). For 
example, tech IPOs are more susceptible to soft information (i.e., sentiment) because they 
are more likely to be driven by hype or buzz caused by fads, news coverage, rumors, or 
speculation, than by factual information (e.g., historical and current key figures). 
Accordingly, Ferris et al. (2013) find that textual tone in terms of its conservatism (as 
measured by negative words) affects initial-day returns of tech IPOs, but not those of non-
tech IPOs. Compared to a sample of industrial firms that includes tech firms, the US REIT 
sector can certainly be considered less noisy. While tech companies, especially during the 
dot-com bubble, did not have a long history and benefited from speculative investments 
and overly optimistic markets, the real estate sector in general and the US REIT sector in 
particular have proven to be stable and lucrative investments that guarantee a high level 
of hard information through specific regulatory requirements. Thus, the insignificant 
coefficient on Uncertainty is plausible, although we initially expected a positive correlation 
between Uncertainty and underpricing.  
We conclude that the tone of Form S-11 in terms of its Uncertainty does not present a 
suitable proxy for ex-ante uncertainty about an US REIT IPO’s valuation. This is supported 
by the low standard deviation of our measure of uncertain language. While it was 
hypothesized that Uncertainty might reflect issuer confidence in the future prospects of 
the firm, the low variation suggests that managers use cautious wording only because the 
future prospects of the issuing firm are uncertain. If uncertain language provided 
information about the issuer's expectations, one would expect stronger variations in 
Uncertainty between prospectuses of companies with good future prospects and those 
about which the issuer itself is less confident. 
4.7.2 Disclosure Similarity is informative 
Although Form S-11 is the major document providing information to investors during the 
IPO process, it is also a standard document required by the SEC. As such, we expect the 
disclosure to include standardized content; particularly prospectuses of companies 
bringing an IPO to market at the same time could be similar. We hypothesize that 
disclosures with a higher similarity to previously filed registration statements reveal little 
useful information to potential investors, thereby preserving information asymmetry and 
leading to greater underpricing. To test Hypothesis 2, we regress the similarity measure 
for each registration form on the corresponding first-day return of the IPO. After 
controlling for firm and offering characteristics, third-party certification, and market 
conditions, all of which have shown to be associated with initial-day returns in prior 
Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
106 
literature, we find that the qualitative information revealed in the Form S-11 indeed helps 
to explain the underpricing of US REIT IPOs (see Table 4.3). Specifically, a one-standard 
deviation increase in the similarity score (Cosine) leads to a 1,61% increase in first-day 
returns (0.294 coefficient value multiplied by standard deviation of 0.0547). The economic 
significance of Cosine thus lies within the range of widely accepted determinants of IPO 
underpricing, namely Size and EPS. Only Up_Revision, a variable that can only be measured 
after the S-11 filing date, specifically on the day the shares are sold, has a higher economic 
significance of 2,15% (0.267 coefficient value multiplied by standard deviation of 0.0806). 
The key point to note here is that among the variables with the greatest economic 
significance, Cosine is the only factor that the firm can influence directly before going 
public. While Up_Revision and the firms’ earnings per share in the IPO year (EPS) can only 
be determined after the IPO, Size cannot be changed by the company at short notice. 
Further emphasizing the importance of qualitative information, the goodness of fit of the 
regression improves with R2 increasing from 39.5% to 44.5% when Cosine is added as an 
independent variable. 
Table 4.3: Initial-Day Return – Disclosure Similarity  












Intercept -0.344***  -0.559***  
 (-2.776)  (-4.029)  
Age 0.011** 1.22% 0.012** 1.33% 
 (2.117)  (2.414)  
Size 0.019*** 2.22% 0.016*** 1.87% 
 (2.955)  (2.670)  
EPS 0.028** 1.40% 0.036*** 1.81% 
 (2.601)  (3.337)  
Leverage -0.015 -0.30% -0.011 -0.22% 
 (-0.553)  (-0.394)  
Property_Type -0.003 -0.13% -0.004 -0.17% 
 (-0.255)  (-0.307)  
Offer_Price -0.002 -0.08% -0.004 -0.17% 
 (-0.128)  (-0.287)  
Up_Revision 0.283*** 2.28% 0.267*** 2.15% 
 (4.047)  (3.949)  
Share_Overhang -0.040* -1.14% -0.043* -1.22% 
 (-1.662)  (-1.830)  
Underwriter -0.019 -0.95% -0.020* -1.00% 
 (-1.540)  (-1.718)  
Hot Market 0.029** 1.41% 0.027** 1.31% 
 (2.619)  (2.533)  
see next page 
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Table 4.3: continued 
Volatility 0.641 0.50% 0.484 0.38% 
 (0.829)  (0.649)  
Cosine   0.294*** 1.61% 
   (3.027)  
N 114  114  
R2 0.395  0.445  
Adj. R2 0.329  0.379  
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model using first-day IPO 
returns as the dependent variable. The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of 
determinants affecting initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs. Economic significance is defined as the coefficient 
multiplied by the standard deviation. The definition of all variables is presented in Table 4.5 in the Appendix. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Demonstrating that the informativeness of corporate disclosures as measured by 
document similarity is statistically and economically significant related to underpricing of 
US REIT IPOs, our results confirm, that qualitative information is as important as 
quantitative information in solving the underpricing puzzle. Instead of merely restating 
qualitative data, the narratives in corporate disclosures add context to numerical 
disclosures, which provides additional insights to investors and thus impacts their capability 
to price the issue. Accordingly, REIT managers can reduce underpricing by voluntarily 
providing more information in Form S-11. We acknowledge, however, that there is a trade-
off between acquiring costly information in the premarket, so as to provide informative 
disclosures that simplify the evaluation of the offering, and gathering information from 
investors during book-building (Sherman and Titman, 2002). In order to provide valuable 
insights in the prospectus and determine an accurate offer price that potential investors 
agree with, companies have to bear high costs for information procurement in the 
premarket. If the company deems this too expensive, it can rely on investors themselves 
to gather information and value the IPO during book-building. However, investors must 
be compensated for their efforts through higher initial-day returns.  
4.7.3 Robustness 
To examine the robustness of our findings, we additionally run the analysis when limiting 
the total number of words in the prospectus to the number of words that also appear in 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) master dictionary. This adjustment ensures that all 
words included in the textual analysis procedure contain meaningful information, thus 
reducing the impact of noise caused by irrelevant words. 
Uncertainty is thus defined as the ratio of words assigned to the uncertain wordlist, to the 
number of words in the prospectus also appearing in the Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
master dictionary. For Cosine, the maximum number of elements N of each vector Vi 
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representing a document is limited to the total number of words that compose the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) master dictionary. Furthermore, we now use specific word 
inflections instead of word roots. Our results are robust to these alternate main 
independent variables, since all coefficient signs are the same and their magnitudes have 
a comparable size (see Table 4.4). Again, there is no association between the level of 
uncertain language (Uncertainty) and a REIT's initial-day return, while a higher similarity 
score (Cosine) is associated with increased underpricing. These results survive several other 
robustness checks which are not tabulated separately. For example, we omit control 
variables and winsorize all variables to common levels.  
Table 4.4: Initial-Day Return – Robustness 



















Intercept -0.344***  -0.265*  -0.537***  
 (-2.776)  (-1.963)  (-3.889)  
Age 0.011** 1.22% 0.010** 1.11% 0.012** 1.33% 
 (2.117)  (1.988)  (2.461)  
Size 0.019*** 2.22% 0.019*** 2.22% 0.017*** 1.98% 
 (2.955)  (2.967)  (2.716)  
EPS 0.028** 1.40% 0.024** 1.20% 0.034*** 1.71% 
 (2.601)  (2.144)  (3.161)  
Leverage -0.015 -0.30% -0.014 -0.28% -0.012 -0.24% 
 (-0.553)  (-0.518)  (-0.438)  
Property_Type -0.003 -0.13% -0.001 -0.04% -0.004 -0.17% 
 (-0.255)  (-0.087)  (-0.355)  
Offer_Price -0.002 -0.08% -0.004 -0.17% -0.003 -0.12% 
 (-0.128)  (-0.335)  (-0.234)  
Up_Revision 0.283*** 2.28% 0.298*** 2.40% 0.266*** 2.14% 
 (4.047)  (4.239)  (3.917)  
Share_Overhang -0.040* -1.14% -0.035 -1.00% -0.044* -1.25% 
 (-1.662)  (-1.461)  (-1.865)  
Underwriter -0.019 -0.95% -0.019 -0.95% -0.020* -1.00% 
 (-1.540)  (-1.586)  (-1.718)  
Hot Market 0.029** 1.41% 0.026** 1.27% 0.028** 1.36% 
 (2.619)  (2.315)  (2.561)  
Volatility 0.641 0.50% 0.375 0.29% 0.513 0.40% 
 (0.829)  (0.473)  (0.684)  
UncertaintyLM   -2.592 -0.83%   
   (-1.435)    
CosineLM     0.266*** 1.49% 
     (2.817)  
N 114  114  114  
R2 0.395  0.407  0.439  
see next page  
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Table 4.4: continued 
Adj. R2 0.329  0.336  0.372  
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression model using first-day IPO 
returns as the dependent variable. The table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of 
determinants affecting initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs. Economic significance is defined as the coefficient 
multiplied by the standard deviation. The definition of all variables is presented in Table 4.5 in the Appendix. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As our empirical findings persist when using a different approach to quantify textual data 
and altering the set of controls, we conclude that qualitative information in Form S-11 in 
fact helps to explain initial-day returns of REIT IPOs. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
REIT IPO candidates provide investors with information about the business model, financial 
situation, potential problems or risks, and other important information in Form S-11, the 
initial filing for registering stock offerings with the SEC. However, while quantitative factors 
have been well studied, the impact of qualitative information on the underpricing of US 
REIT IPOs has been neglected so far. Recognizing that the vast majority of theories attribute 
underpricing to asymmetric information between the parties involved in the IPO, which 
can be reduced by both quantitative and qualitative information, this study examines 
whether textual features extracted from Form S-11 contribute to the understanding of US 
REIT IPOs.  
To assess whether and how textual features help to explain initial-day returns of US REITs, 
we determine the level of uncertain language in the prospectus, as well as its similarity to 
recently filed registration statements. We assume that cautious language makes it more 
difficult for investors to value the firm, and we thus expect a positive relation between 
uncertain language and underpricing. Higher similarity to past disclosures suggests that 
the prospectus provides little useful information, does not resolve information asymmetry, 
and is therefore associated with increased underpricing. 
Contrary to our initial expectation that a higher level of uncertain language is associated 
with higher initial-day returns, we find an insignificant coefficient for Uncertainty. 
However, this can be explained by the characteristics of the US REIT sample. Being subject 
to strict regulatory requirements, US REITs are mandated to provide a variety of 
information on a regular basis. Moreover, they often represent established firms with 
highly profitable businesses. Thus, the information environment is dominated by facts and 
figures, known as hard information. According to Dye and Sridhar (2004) US REITS are 
therefore less prone to soft information such as language. Furthermore, the low standard 
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deviation observed for the measure of uncertain language suggests that cautious wording 
is induced by forecasting difficulties and litigation risks, rather than reflecting a lack of 
confidence in the firm's prospects. Therefore, the level of uncertain language in Form S-
11 is not suitable as a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty. Analyzing the similarity of disclosures 
brought to the market at the same time, we find a statistically and economically significant 
impact of qualitative data on initial-day returns of US REIT IPOs. As hypothesized, US REITs 
providing disclosures that are more similar to previously filed prospectuses do not resolve 
information asymmetry and thus suffer from increased underpricing. Our findings 
demonstrate that qualitative information, just like quantitative information, conveys 
valuable insights and impacts on investor ability to price the issue. Thus, it is up to the REIT 
managers to reduce underpricing by providing more information to potential investors in 
Form S-1. We conclude that analyzing qualitative information in corporate disclosures of 
US REITs offers a new perspective on IPO pricing. Furthermore, our results show that 
textual analysis can in fact contribute to solving the underpricing puzzle of US REIT IPOs.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to analyze the impact of corporate 
disclosures on underpricing of US REIT IPOs. Clearly, understanding the market reaction to 
corporate disclosures is essential for REIT managers, investors and regulators alike. Given 
their high dependency on external capital, REITs are incentivized to provide as much 
information as possible to reduce underpricing. Investors interested in buying new shares 
benefit from the opportunity to use textual analysis to identify offerings that promise the 
highest returns on the first day of trading. Ultimately, regulators can use disclosure 
similarity to measure the informativeness of required filings and decide on the need for 
further guidance on that basis.  
Despite these many applications, our analysis is subject to certain limitations. The relatively 
small number of US REITs that went public during the sample period limits ways to process 
textual data to bag-of-words measures. More sophisticated textual analysis procedures 
such as machine learning are not applicable. Nonetheless, all contemporary approaches 
can capture only a small portion of the narratives, which are complex by nature. Further 
research should therefore aim to expand the information that can be gained from Form S-
11 by investigating multiple textual features, for example, by incorporating readability or 
key word counts. Additionally, it is worth examining whether qualitative information in 
Form S-11 provides signals regarding other quantitative measures, such as the firms’ post-
IPO operating performance and volatility. 
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4.10 Appendix 
Table 4.5: Description of Control Variables 
Variable Description 
Age 
The natural logarithm of a firm’s age in years. Age is thereby defined as the period of 
time between a firm’s founding date and its IPO in years. Founding dates are obtained 
from Datastream and the Field-Ritter dataset, as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) and 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
Size 
The natural logarithm of of the firm’s valuation, measured as the product of the offer 
price and the number of shares outstanding. 
EPS Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s earnings per share is positive in the IPO year. 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; LT/AT 
Property_Type Dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm invests in multiple property types. 
Offer_Price Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO offer price is an integer. 
Up_Revision The percentage upward revision from the mid-point of the filing range. 
Share_Overhang The number of shares retained, divided by the number of shares in the IPO. 
Underwriter 
Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO's lead underwriter was ranked as top tier (value 
of nine) according to the Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking, updated by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004). 
Hot Market Dummy variable equal to one for observations in years experiencing ten or more IPOs. 
Volatility The standard deviation of stock returns for the first 20 days after the IPO. 





This dissertation examines whether qualitative data revealed in corporate disclosures of US 
REITs conveys useful information to market participants, helping them to make well-
informed investment decisions. The three papers comprising this thesis hereby differ in the 
disclosure media, methodologies, textual features, and outcomes investigated. The 
following section summarizes the motivation, research design, and key findings for each 
article and concludes with final remarks, along with suggestions for further research. 
 
5.1 Executive Summary 
Paper 1 | Is the MD&A of US REITs informative? A Textual Sentiment Study 
Although the “MD&A is intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the 
company through the eyes of management” (SEC, 1987) the informativeness of the MD&A 
has frequently been criticized (e.g., Pava and Epstein, 1993). With the aim of assessing the 
informativeness of US REIT disclosures, this study examines the language disclosed in 
approximately 6,500 MD&As filed by the SEC between 2003 and 2018. Specifically, this 
study investigates whether textual sentiment conveyed through the MD&A of US REITs 
provides signals regarding future firm performance, and thus generates a market response. 
To determine the overall sentiment inherent in each filing, that is, the level of pessimistic 
or optimistic language, the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary and a 
custom wordlist for the real estate industry created by Ruscheinsky et al. (2018) are 
employed. Thereafter, a panel fixed effects regression enables investigating the 
relationship between sentiment and future firm performance, as well as the market 
reaction. 
Confirming the informativeness of the MD&A, this study finds that higher levels of 
pessimistic (optimistic) language in the MD&A are indeed associated with lower (higher) 
future firm performance. This holds even after controlling for the information released in 
other concurrent disclosures that may predict future performance. In accordance with prior 
literature from Rogers et al. (2011), Doran et al. (2012), and Henry and Leone (2016), the 
use of a domain-specific real estate dictionary, namely that developed by Ruscheinsky et 
al. (2018), leads to superior results. Furthermore, this study finds a significant market 
response to pessimistic language in the MD&A at the time of the SEC filing. However, 
corresponding to the notion that the human psyche is affected more strongly by negative 
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than positive news (Rozin and Royzman, 2001), the impact of optimistic language is 
insignificant. 
This is the first study to provide evidence that the use of language in the MD&A reveals US 
REIT manager expectations regarding future firm performance and that the market 
responds to this information. Given that investigating the language in the MD&A decreases 
information asymmetries between US REIT managers and investors, this study 
demonstrates that the market can indeed benefit from textual analysis. 
 
Paper 2 | Can Risks be Good News? Revealing Risk Perception of Real Estate 
Investors using Machine Learning 
The SEC mandates firms to discuss the most relevant factors that may entail speculative or 
risky aspects for the firm in their 10-Ks, so that investors are able to monitor the current 
and future risk factors a firm is facing and integrate them into their decision-making 
analysis. However lengthy and complex disclosures – mostly for dozens of firms in an 
investor’s portfolio – can barely be processed by a human being. To cope with the flood 
of information, this study proposes using unsupervised machine-learning approaches 
(STM, CTM, and LDA) to identify and quantify the risk factors discussed in REITs’ 10-Ks.  
Assuming that documents are characterized as a collection of topics, and topics as a 
collection of words, STM, CTM, and LDA automatically cluster words around topics and 
thus enable uncovering latent topics in a relatively short time period. However, since LDA 
is limited when identifying common risk factors across industries (i.e., property types of 
REITs), this study focusses on the advanced topic modeling approaches (STM and CTM). 
Hereby, STM has demonstrated superiority over CTM. 
To assess whether the STM presents a valid approach to quantifying risk in narrative form, 
this study examines whether the machine-extracted risk factors help to explain the 
perceived risk on the stock market. Analyzing a US REIT sample between 2005 and 2019, 
this study finds that the majority of the STM-extracted risk topics is significantly associated 
with volatility, confirming the effectiveness of the model. Furthermore, this study 
disentangles how the identified risk topics explain investor risk perception, in addition to 
traditional firm characteristics. Although initial intuition suggests that risks are per se 
negative, a risk-reducing effect of risk disclosures is expected, since most risk factors are 
revealed in a timely manner through press releases or Form 8-K. Thus, instead of disclosing 
new risk factors, Item 1A primarily provides essential information on risk factors that have 
already been communicated to investors using more frequent channels, thereby reducing 
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uncertainty and risk perception. Accordingly, most of the STM-identified factors follow the 
convergence argument, indicating a risk-reducing effect.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study employing STM in the accounting and 
finance domain. By analyzing the topics’ generated vocabulary, the nature and scope of 
the disclosed risk factors can be identified. This allows assessing the stock market reaction 
to each risk factor. Therefore, investors would benefit from using machine-learning 
techniques which enable them to process a huge amount of company information 
simultaneously, just as the risk items in the 10-Ks.  
 
Paper 3 | Can Textual Analysis solve the Underpricing Puzzle? A US REIT Study 
REIT IPOs provide investors with information about the business model, financial situation, 
potential problems or risks, and other important information in Form S-11, the initial filing 
for registering stock offerings with the SEC. However, while quantitative factors have been 
well studied, the impact of qualitative information on underpricing of US REIT IPOs has 
been neglected so far. Recognizing that the vast majority of theories attribute underpricing 
to asymmetric information between the parties involved in the IPO, which can be reduced 
by both quantitative and qualitative factors, this study examines whether textual features 
extracted from Form S-11 contribute to solving the underpricing puzzle of US REIT IPOs. 
In particular, this study determines the level of uncertain language in the prospectus, using 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlists, as well as its similarity to recently filed 
registration statements employing one of the most popular measures to identify the 
similarity of two documents – the Cosine Similarity. To assess whether and how textual 
features help to explain initial-day returns of US REITs, this study regresses the level of 
uncertain language and document similarity on the initial-day returns of a sample of 114 
US Equity REITs that completed an IPO between January 1996 and December 2019. 
Contrary to the initial expectation that a higher level of uncertain language makes it more 
difficult for investors to price the issue and thus increases underpricing, this study does not 
find a statistically significant association between uncertain language and initial-day 
returns. The study concludes that cautious wording is induced by forecasting difficulties 
and litigation risks, rather than reflecting issuer confidence in the future prospects of the 
firm. Analyzing the similarity of disclosures brought to the market at the same time, this 
study finds a statistically and economically significant impact of qualitative data on initial-
day returns of US REIT IPOs. Specifically, a higher similarity to previous filings suggests that 
the prospectus provides little useful information and thus does not resolve existing 
information asymmetries, leading to increased underpricing. Overall, the results confirm 
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that qualitative information, just like quantitative information, conveys valuable insights 
and impacts on investor capability to price the issue. Thus, textual analysis can in fact 
contribute to solving the underpricing puzzle of US REIT IPOs. 
This is the first study to analyze the impact of corporate disclosures on initial-day returns 
of US REIT IPOs. Yet, understanding the market reaction to corporate disclosures is 
essential for REIT managers, investors and regulators alike. 
 
5.2 Final Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research  
While academics and practitioners have traditionally relied on quantitative data as the basis 
for economic decision-making, the qualitative data contextualizing numbers in corporate 
disclosures has lately become increasingly valuable to the financial sector. However, the 
US REIT market and its narratives have been largely neglected, despite its emergence as an 
attractive asset class that offers investors an efficient way to diversify their investments, 
reduce risk and enhance long-term returns. The present dissertation addresses this 
important omission in the literature by investigating whether qualitative data revealed in 
corporate disclosures of US REITs indeed conveys valuable insights to market participants.  
Specifically, the first paper examines whether language disclosed in the MD&A of US REITs 
provides signals regarding future firm performance and generates a market response. The 
empirical results suggest that sentiment, that is, the level of pessimistic or optimistic 
language in the MD&A, is indeed associated with future firm performance. Moreover, this 
study finds a significant market response to pessimistic language in the MD&A at the time 
of the SEC filing. Corresponding to the notion that the human psyche is affected more 
strongly by negative than positive news (Rozin and Royzman, 2001), the market does not 
respond to optimistic language in the MD&A. The second paper complements the analysis 
on annual reports and exploits an unsupervised machine learning algorithm to identify the 
specific risk-factor topics discussed in 10-Ks. To evaluate the validity of this approach, the 
study investigates whether the probability of appearance of the extracted risk factors helps 
to explain the perceived stock market risk. The results indicate that the majority of risk 
factors is indeed significantly associated with volatility confirming the effectiveness of the 
machine-assisted modeling. The third paper determines the level of uncertain language in 
IPO prospectuses, as well as their similarity to prospectuses filed up to six months prior to 
the document in question, to assess whether textual features can solve the underpricing 
puzzle. Contrary to expectations, this study does not find a statistically significant 
association between uncertain language in Form S-11 and initial-day returns. This finding 
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disproves the initial assumption that uncertain language makes it more difficult for 
potential investors to price the issue and thus increases underpricing. On the other hand, 
document similarity is statistically and economically significantly related to the underpricing 
of US REIT IPOs. Thus, the hypothesis that a prospectus showing high similarity to previous 
filings provides little useful information and does not resolve existing information 
asymmetries is confirmed. 
In their entirety, the three papers forming this dissertation show that the market responds 
to various textual features (i.e., sentiment, risk factor topics, disclosure similarity) revealed 
through corporate disclosures of US REITs, thus, providing evidence that market 
participants incorporate more than just quantitative data into their decision making. 
Rather, qualitative information appears to constitute an essential component of the 
information set that financial market participants use for economic decision making. 
Furthermore, the results of all three studies demonstrate that US REITs reveal material 
information in their narratives, indicating that qualitative information in corporate 
disclosures is truly informative. In this respect, the SEC appears to be successfully pursuing 
its mission of maintaining efficient markets.  More importantly however, this dissertation 
demonstrates the tremendous necessity of analyzing qualitative information. Thereby, the 
use of computer-based techniques to process textual data can deliver significant 
competitive advantage. The consequent ability of processing textual data more quickly and 
accurately equips users of textual analysis for faster and better-informed decisions. For 
example, textual analysis allows traders to identify market-moving events at an early stage, 
providing them with enough time to initiate respective steps to capitalize on changes, or 
at least avoid losses. Thus, investors can utilize textual analysis to enhance returns, reduce 
risk or increase efficiency.  
Although demonstrating the importance of qualitative information and the potential of 
conducting textual analysis on corporate disclosures, this dissertation is subject to certain 
limitations. While representing the most comprehensive analysis, it is still restricted to a 
subset of the enormous volume of disclosures available. To further evaluate the importance 
of qualitative data, subsequent research should investigate other disclosure outlets such 
as press releases, internet postings, and news media. Similarly, future research could be 
devoted to other aspects of the unstructured world of big data such as imagery, 
recordings, audio, video. Moreover, textual analysis is often criticized for being imprecise 
due to its inability to identify the full information content of a document. However, the 
findings in this dissertation show that such lack of precision is not something that precludes 
using this technique. More so, the given limitations of the technology should motivate 
researchers to approach this shortcoming and develop new methodologies that enable to 
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extract more information from texts. In this regard, this study aims to serve as a starting 
point to a generation of researchers who analyze qualitative information to gain insights 
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